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**Political struggle and co-operative visions for change: An
analysis of the political and theological thought of major black
leaders in South Africa**

Mosoma, David Luka, Ph.D.

Princeton Theological Seminary, 1991

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POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND CO-OPERATIVE VISIONS FOR CHANGE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT
OF MAJOR BLACK LEADERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

BY

DAVID LUKA MOSOMA

DECEMBER 1990

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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ABSTRACT OF
POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND CO-OPERATIVE VISIONS FOR CHANGE:
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DAVID LUKA MOSOMA

The challenge of "apartheid" (harsh and tight social control of black lives) has provoked or elicited a spade of responses in the black community. These responses have been marked by recurring factional and partisan actions, rather than a united front against apartheid. The political and religious leaders have exhibited partisan responses shaped by differing societal visions of social change. Mandela and Tutu share a non-racial vision; Sobukwe, Biko and Manas Buthelezi espouse a Africanist/Black Consciousness vision; Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena embrace a collaborationist vision. This study analyses these visions and how they formed the positions the leaders took against apartheid.

Rather than fostering individual organizational approach against apartheid, the study advocates coalitional approach for authentic emancipatory praxis. Further, the co-operative liberational action that the study envisions is predicated

upon the thesis that good black leadership implies a united resistance to apartheid and a common vision for a racially just society requiring a coalition of divergent strategies. For this reason, the African traditional concept **Tsimu** serves as the foundation for building an effective political coalition that is both theologically and morally sound. In addition, we argue that **Tsimu** can also serve as a bridge between Black Liberation Theology and African Christian theology because of its breadth and depth. Further, we believe that it can be the basis for a new political system in South Africa--a political community that allows participation of all the people irrespective of race; that enables working unity while affirming a diversity of persons, political philosophies and affiliations. Further, we argue that **Tsimu** can be a vehicle for the propagation of the Christian Gospel.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	v
Introduction	1
Chapter	
1. SOCIETAL VISIONS: PROPOSAL FOR CO-OPERATIVE POLITICAL ACTION	7
A. Non-racial Societal Visions	
1. Nelson Mandela	
Biographical Sketch	9
Mandela's No-racial societal vision	16
2. Desmond Tutu	
Biographical Sketch	24
Tutu's Non-racial Societal Vision	27
B. Africanist/Black Consciousness Societal Visions	
1. Sobukwe's Biographical Sketch	36
Sobukwe's Africanist Societal Vision	39
2. Steve Biko	
Biographical Sketch	48
Biko's Black Consciousness Societal Vision	51
3. Manas Buthelezi	
Biographical Sketch	62
Buthelezi's Africanist/Black Consciousness	63
C. Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi	
Biographical Sketch	72
Buthelezi's Collaborationist Societal Vision	74
Isaac Mokoena	
Biographical Sketch	80
Mokoena's Collaborationist Societal Vision	82
11. MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES OF POLITICAL DISPUTES AMONG THE LEADERS	88
A. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela	
Civil Disobedience	89
Armed Struggle	92
Negotiation	100
Constitution	102
Land	109
Sanctions	111
Homeland	114
B. Desmond Tutu	
Civil Disobedience	118

Armed Struggle	123
Negotiation	126
Constitution	129
Land	131
Sanctions	134
Homeland	138
C. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe	
Civil Disobedience	143
Armed Struggle	148
Negotiation	151
Constitution	155
Land	159
Sanctions	162
Homeland	165
D. Steve Biko	
Civil Disobedience	167
Armed Struggle	172
Negotiation	176
Constitution	179
Land	184
Sanction	186
Homelands	189
E. Manas Buthelezi	
Civil Disobedience	193
Armed Struggle	196
Negotiation	201
Constitution	205
Land	208
Sanctions	212
Homeland	214
F. Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi	
Civil Disobedience	217
Armed Struggle	226
Negotiation	233
Constitution	237
Land	244
Sanctions	247
Homeland	252
G. Isaac Mokoena	258
Civil Disobedience	258
Armed Struggle	260
Constitution	268
Sanctions	272
Homeland	276
H. Schematic Synopsis of Positions	
on Selected issue	279
111. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL	
RATIONALE: DIFFERENCE AND SIMILARITIES	281
The Issue of Non-Racialism	282
The New Constitution	295
Civil Disobedience	301
Armed Struggle	303

Negotiation	310
Land	312
Sanctions	318
IV. TSIMU EVENT: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL FOR POLITICAL COALITION	328
A. Introduction	328
B. Social Context and Procedure	331
C. Plural Political Context	333
D. Cultural, Political and Religious Practice of Tsimu	336
1. Economic Tsimu	350
2. Political Tsimu	352
3. Church Tsimu	356
E. Wholeness of Life: A Reflection on Symbols	360
1. Feast of Ancestors	369
2. Agape Feast	374
F. Christ and Tsimu Cultural form	381
Conclusion	388
Bibliography	391

PREFACE

This dissertation is a personal search for a humane political system that is theologically grounded and morally justified in a country whose people have known only domination and oppression in all spheres of their lives. Our oppressors turned us into educational containers rather than thinkers through inferior Bantu education. We construed our world through their lenses. Now, this project marks the realization and discovery of a new personhood, full of purpose and meaning.

Through the African traditional concept of *tsimu*, we have located a solid foundation upon which an authentic participatory political system can be based. This system would retain and affirm a diversity of persons, political philosophies and affiliations.

This project is for the people and the church in South Africa, particularly those mothers and children in the rural areas and fathers in the single-sex-hostels of urban South Africa whose struggle for purpose and meaning of life has affected me tremendously. In my farewell sermon at the rural Church in N'wamitwa fifteen years ago, I vowed that I would remember them. That memory of human degradation and waste, and the peoples' vigorous struggle for justice and dignity remains

a constant reminder in the search for a humane political system in the new political community.

In this personal search, I have been encouraged and assisted by my teachers who have awakened in me some latent vestige of critical creativity and independent thinking. They allowed me to say things in my own words and helped to clarify, sharpen and to keep the words accurate to the object I seek to describe and make known. Without them this work would have been a jumble of incomprehensible words. I am deeply grateful for the indelible mark each made on my intellectual growth.

The personal desire to address the political struggle and co-operative visions for change took form under the guidance of Dr. Peter Paris, Elmer G. Homrighausen Professor of Christian Ethics and chairperson of my dissertation Committee. I owe much to him for his analytical skills and his untiring guidance, valuable suggestions and support from the very beginning of this project; to Dr. Charles C. West, Stephen Colwell Professor of Christian Ethics, for his insistence that Christ be the norm in any cultural discourse; and Dr. Mark Kline Taylor, Associate Professor of Theology and Culture, for his understanding of the relationship of theory and practice and his emphasis for dialogue between Christian theology and indigenous cultures not in a condescending spirit but as equal partners in the search for truth.

I also express my hearty thanks to my colleagues and

friends, Donald Reid Schweitzer, Nyambura J. Njoroge and Kimberly P. Chastain, for their contributions as discussion partners; to Charles Haward for the valuable time he took out his busy schedule to edit some parts of this manuscript.

At a personal level, the immeasurable support for my work comes from my beloved wife, Salome and our children, Maskanyisi, Itumeleng and Morongwa. They are indeed a source of inspiration without whom this project would not have materialized.

INTRODUCTION

The era of oppression and servitude has denied black South Africans one of the most precious opportunities to deliberate together on the nature of their conditions. As a matter of fact, all black political parties were banned in South Africa for thirty years. Yet whenever Blacks held meetings, whether inside or outside South Africa, they talked about the enemy "out there" rather than, the enemy in their midst: division and incessant rivalry. The agreement about who the external enemy was gave them a false sense of unity. This attitude precluded them from dealing with their fundamental differences through public debate in search of strategies for adjudicating conflicts. This state of affairs limited their experience of creating alliances for co-operative action. The release of Mandela in February 1990 unleashed unprecedented political conflicts among black political groups. The cocoon of false unity was irreparably shattered. Our forebears remind us that "when two elephants fight, the grass suffers," meaning that the unresolved conflicts result in unnecessary loss of human life. That is, innocent lives are sometimes sacrificed at the altar of the leaders' stubborn ideological whims and fixations. When those who are privileged to lead the oppressed are preoccupied with squabble and political snobbery, the

oppressed pay the price with their precious lives. This scenario is the context within which our study unfolds.

Since its inception in 1912 the ANC embraced non-racialism as its societal vision. This vision was later challenged by Robert Sobukwe and his group within the ANC who favored an Africanist Societal vision emphasizing African political self-determination. Sobukwe advocated the exclusion of non-Africans in the African struggle. This dispute over exclusion of Whites and related political differences eventually led to a breakaway of the PAC from the ANC in 1959. The wave of antagonism and enmity created by this split was devastatingly decisive and distorted any meaningful formal relationship between these major political groups.

Inadvertently, the breakaway of PAC from the ANC did not motivate black leaders to see the urgency for coalitional political activity. The reason for this costly omission was the attitude black leaders held that any political differences imply non-co-operative action. This understanding has been responsible for successive years of rivalry and intolerance between the ANC and PAC. This rivalry has no cultural justification. That is, African culture has resources for dealing constructively with plurality. Thus, one cannot attribute lack of co-operative action exhibited by the black leaders to the African culture. We contend that it is a product of cultural alienation and uprootedness.

The emergence of the homelands politics created by the

government for its alternative solution to the black problem gave prominence to a third political force: Inkatha and others. This anti-liberation force further truncated the struggle and rendered the possibility for association of black political groups espousing divergent views impossible. The Homeland system is characterized by its collaborative activity with the government. In the same period, end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the Black Consciousness Movement was formed with Steve Biko as its leader. Biko's organization articulated the PAC societal vision and broadened it to include Coloreds and Indians.

The religious leaders we have studied are confined to their respective political alliances. Desmond Tutu embraces and articulates the non-racial vision and gives it moral and theological justification. Manas Buthelezi, despite his physical association with the South African Council of Churches, a supporter of non-racial societal vision, embraces the Africanist/Black Consciousness societal vision. Isaac Mokoena identifies himself with the views of the homeland groups.

Many assert that much divisiveness of these leaders centered around strategies for opposing apartheid. Evidently, they agree that apartheid be opposed relentlessly but they disagree about the form such methods of opposition should take. This is the practical problem which form the basis of our inquiry. I argue that no single method can be effective in

destroying apartheid. Hence, I encourage the need for a strategic unity. That is, identifying areas where possible co-operative activity informed by a comprehensive understanding of apartheid, can be achieved. This means that we must admit that each groups' understanding of apartheid is limited but it can be complemented by other forms of action and discernment.

Further, I argue that the divergent societal visions which both the political and religious leaders hold are responsible for the positions they have taken on crucial political issues like civil disobedience, armed struggle, negotiation, constitution, sanctions, land and Homelands. More importantly, I argue that such political differences should not necessarily drive a wedge among them. That, coalitional politics offers a new way of envisioning and shaping plural political activity in a political community.

As a constructive move, I appropriate **tsimu**, a cultural resource familiar to all of them, as the basis for authentic co-operative action. "Tsimu" is a cultural event in which people from diverse backgrounds, political and religious affiliations, come together for a common task. They bring their tools and skills for a joint communal co-operative responsibility. The distinction of tribe, sex and ideology does not matter. I argue that the appropriation of **tsimu** by these leaders provides breadth and depth for dealing with the current political conflictual life marked by intolerance of the views of others. In my judgment, **tsimu** lays a solid ground

for loosely constructed coalition of those who hold divergent understandings of apartheid and who opt for various forms of action. This cultural resource allays the fears of those who feel threatened by possible loss of identities and ideological affiliation in the process, since *tsimu* advocates co-operative action that preserves one's identity and political affiliations. In this inquiry a claim is made that South African political solution lies in its appropriation of its rich African cultural resources. Instead of searching for fresh water in the foreign fountains, we better cast our buckets into our own cultural fountains to draw water which may quench our political and religious thirsts regardless of our diversity.

I conclude that coalitional co-operation is essential for effective opposition against apartheid and that diversity should not always be viewed as politically undesirable. It has to be appreciated and celebrated; it resembles the rich colors of the rainbow.

The argument is developed in four chapters. Chapter one contains the following: (a) the biographical sketch of the leaders which provides the background of birth, school attended, Church affiliation, and other related information regarding their influences and formation; (b) the analysis of the three societal visions which provides a theoretical framework by carefully discussing political, theological, and ethical arguments that the leaders advanced in support of

their respective societal visions. Chapter two presents an internal analysis of political disputes and how their visions informed their respective positions. This analysis casts light on the interdependence of theory and practice relative to the black leaders, thus providing a better understanding of their societal visions and the political issues in question. Chapter three offers a critical discussion of the differences and similarities of the seven black leaders. The discussion establishes areas of differences and commonalities and concludes that the possibility for co-operative action can be forged if there is will and commitment. In chapter four, the discussion centers on the constructive coalitional co-operative action on the basis of *tsimu*; a concept deeply rooted in traditional South African culture. I argue that it can be the basis for a new political system in South Africa. In addition, it can serve as a bridge between Black liberation Theology that accentuates political liberation and African Christian Theology that emphasizes cultural retrieval. I argue that both are deeply rooted in *tsimu*. Further, I conclude that "tsimu" can be a vehicle for expressing the prophetic message of Christ.

Chapter 1

SOCIETAL VISIONS: PROPOSAL FOR CO-OPERATIVE POLITICAL ACTION.

This inquiry seeks to set forth an analysis of the writings and speeches of the major South African black leaders, in order to discover the basis upon which their theological and moral principles for fighting apartheid are founded. The leaders selected for this project hold different visions of how a good society should be organized. While they agree on some issues, their different societal visions seem to dominate their common struggle, thereby inhibiting and undermining the prospects for co-operative political action. Their writings and speeches will enable us to discern their respective underpinnings of the "good society" and their concomitant disagreements, and whether any possible co-operative activity can be entertained. These leaders have fought vociferously against apartheid in different ways. The aim of this investigation, *inter alia*, is to find some coherence in their activities which can be the basis for collaborative action.

Throughout this study, we are concerned about some actual concrete problems emanating from human political actions. To

be sure, the inquiry concerns itself with the good that humans can do together to achieve their end, namely justice. In examining the writings and speeches of the black leaders an attempt will be made to offer some resolutions to the problems arising from their divergent visions and to liberate the agents for a more creative enterprise in achieving their desired goal.

The apartheid system has created necessary but not sufficient conditions for co-operative resistance. Despite the harsh conditions of oppression and the common experience of being fourth-class citizens, the black leaders have not, as yet, intensified their quest for co-operative unity. Our focus in this study is an attempt to determine whether there are forms of understanding among our leaders that hinder co-operative activity and whether there exists in their respective understandings some basis for co-operative action.

This study analyzes the writings and speeches of four black political leaders and three corresponding religious leaders: (1) Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu; (2) Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe/Steve Bantu Biko and Bishop Manas Buthelezi; (3) Gatsha Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Bishop Isaac Mokoena. One thing these leaders have in common is that they are to some degree products of missionary education. That is to say, they have been influenced, in part, by the culture of Christian missionaries. As we will see, the religious and cultural formation of each plays an important

role in their respective visions of the good society.

Non-Racial Societal Visions.

Nelson Mandela

Biographical Sketch

A member of the Tembu (Madiba clan) royal family, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela¹ was born in 1918 at Qunu near Umtata, the capital town of the Transkei homeland². His father, Henry Gadla Mandela, was chief councilor to his relative, the Paramount chief (David Jongintaba Dalindyebo) of the Tembu. Nelson's mother, Nongaphi, was a woman of strong character. Neither parent had received formal Western education. But the naming of their son, Nelson, reflected a certain degree of Western influence. His traditional name, Rolihlahla, means "stirring up trouble."

Mandela grew up in the rural areas and had the opportunity of listening to the stories of the tribal elders as they were reminiscing about the African community "before the arrival of the white man". He recalled some of the moments which shaped his political life thus:

¹Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, hereafter referred to as Mandela.

²Homelands are areas designated by the South African government as reservation-homes for various African ethnic groups. The Land Act of 1913 was a significant precursor for Verwoerd's homeland policy in 1959. The homelands are products of divide-and-rule strategy and they have become labor reserves. The ten homelands are: Bophutatswana, the Ceskei, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Ndebele, Qwaqwa, the Transkei, and Venda. Of the ten homelands, Bophutatswana, Ceskei, the Transkei and Venda have accepted independence from the South African government.

"My political interest was first aroused when I listened to the elders of our tribe in my village as a youth. They spoke of the good old days before the arrival of the white man. Our people lived peacefully under the democratic rule of their kings and counsellors and moved freely all over their country. Then the country was ours. We occupied the land, the forests and the rivers. We set up and operated our own government; we controlled our own armies, and organized our own trade and commerce.

The elders would tell us about the liberation and how it was fought by our ancestors in defence of our country, as well as the acts of valour performed by generals and soldiers during those epic days. I hoped and vowed then, that amongst the pleasures that life might offer me, would be the opportunity to serve my people and make my humble contribution to their struggle for freedom."³

In contrast to the education for African consciousness which the elders of his village imparted to him, Mandela was introduced to another world at the mission school he attended. At school they taught only about white heroes, and Blacks were described as barbarians and cattle thieves. In spite of this difference, and seemingly contradictory reality of the mission education, which ostensibly undermined the African traditional reality, Mandela was keen to learn. From the elders of his village, he learned the true history of his people. Tatu Joyi, the Tembu sage, was one of the elders at whose feet Mandela learned a great deal. Joyi recounted how the white man dispossessed the African tribes of their land. He said:

"They (African people) were defeated by the white people's papers, [by] which they took by law, their law, what they could not take by war. That was

³Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1986), p. 235. See also James Kantor, A Healthy Grave, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967), pp. 144-6. This contains Mandela's autobiographical notes written in 1964.

their witchcraft and magic. He told them about a white man who came to Ngangelizwe one day and asked for the land. He gave him land that, Tatu Joyi said, was the greatest mistake King Ngangelizwe ever made: The **abantu** shared the land as they shared water and air, but **abelungu** took the land as a man takes a wife. That white man brought the piece of paper and made Ngangelizwe to put his mark on it. He then said that the paper gave him possession of the land and when Ngangelizwe disputed that, the white man took him to the white man's court and the court looked at the paper and said Ngangelizwe had given the white man 4,000 morgan of land. The court also said the white people needed the land of the Tembus to protect themselves from the Tembus!"⁴

Joyi's view of the encounter between Africans and Whites could not be obtained in history books, for South African history reflected for the most part the perspective of the conquerers, not that of the indigenous people. Henry Mandela also taught him how the history of the clan fitted into a broader history of the African struggle. However, he did not live to see his son mature into manhood. At his death bed, Henry presented his son to the Paramount chief, saying, "I am giving you this servant, Rolihlahla. This is my only son. I can say from the way he speaks to his sisters and friends that his inclination is to help the nation. I want you to make him what you would like him to be; give him education, he will follow your example."⁵ Having given the assurance to care for

⁴Fatima Meer, Higher Than Hope: The Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988), p. 15. "Abantu" is a Xhosa word for African people and "abelungu" means white people.

⁵Quoted by Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, (new York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986. Mabel, Mandela's sister, was said to have been present when her father uttered these

Mandela, the Paramount chief sent him to Clarkebury School. At sixteen years of age, Mandela entered the traditional school for circumcision. He later recalled the experience with pride when he said, "at sixteen, as our custom was, I went to a circumcision school on the banks of the Bashee River, the place where many of my ancestors were circumcised. By the standard of my tribe, I was now a man ready to take part in the 'parliament' of the tribe Imbizo."⁶

He took special interest in matters affecting the tribe. During the school holidays, Mandela listened and observed how the Paramount chief conducted the affairs of his people. Mary Benson writes, "for Nelson it was a gripping experience: the prosecution followed by defence, cross-examination of witness and finally, the judgment given by the chief in consultation with the councilors."⁷ In addition to taking an interest in community matters, he enjoyed studying the history of the conflict between Black and White. He graduated from Healdtown, a Methodist high school in 1938. In 1939 he enrolled at Fort Hare University to study law. Fort Hare

words in 1930 on his death bed.

⁶Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 235. He said these words in 1964 while on trial for sabotage. In the Circumcision school candidates spent "several weeks in the mountains with young men of their age group, their faces white-painted, their bodies grass-skirted, as tribal elders led them through the ritual initiation and schooling to prepare them for manhood and participation in tribal councils" See Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, p. 17.

⁷Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, p. 18.

lifted him out of his tribal reality into the concept of an African nation due to his exposure to other African students from (other countries in Southern Africa) different tribal, ethnic and urban backgrounds. In 1940 he was expelled from the University due to his participation in the strikes. His guardian, Paramount chief David Dalindyabo, pressed him to return to the University but he refused. Mandela and his cousin set out for Johannesburg to seek employment without informing his guardian. In Johannesburg, he was employed as a mine policeman--a position he was forced to relinquish upon the insistence of his guardian that he return to the Transkei. Thereafter, he was introduced to Walter Sisulu. Walter, in turn introduced him to the firm of attorneys, Messrs Witkin, Sidelsky and Eidelman, where he became articled. In 1942 Mandela obtained his BA degree by correspondence from the University of South Africa.

It was in Johannesburg that his political evolution took place. Although Johannesburg was different in many respects from the Transkei rural areas, Mandela soon learned the politics of the cosmopolitan city. In 1944 he joined the African National Congress (ANC): a multi-racial political organization formed in 1912 in response to political exclusion of Blacks; he later moved into a leadership position within the organization. In the same year, Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu were among those who were elected to the

executive committee of the Youth League.⁸ In the Youth League, he was exposed to the Africanist ideas which emphasized the promotion of African nationalism as the basis for the struggle. Undoubtedly, African nationalism was not foreign to him since his own rural roots comprised a communitarian social structure.

In contrast to his Africanist tribal roots, Mandela discovered another world of multi-racialism at Witwatersrand University campus. It was at Witwatersrand where he began to take an interest in liberalism and Marxism and he later testified to this fact when he said, "I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East." In seeking a political formula for South Africa, he said, "I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than socialism. I must leave myself to borrow the best from the West and from the East."⁹ Similarly, through his close association with his fellow law students, Ismail Meer and J. N. Singh, he was introduced to Indian passive resistance. Later, he met Ruth First, and Joe Slovo (members of the Communist Party), Bram and Molly Fischer and others. These were men and women with

⁸The Youth League was formed in 1943; it was considered a radical or a militant wing within the ANC. Its aim was to transform the ANC into a militant African Organization. The ANC Youth League manifesto of 1944 remains the basis for the Pan-Africanist Congress. For example, it espouses the idea that "Africans must struggle for development, progress and national liberation so as to occupy their rightful and honorable place among the nations of the world." See Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is My Life, p. 11.

⁹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1965), p. 183.

whom he was in solidarity in the struggle against white domination. The multi-racial context both in the Witwatersrand University and within the ANC had some influence on his political thought. In fact, it broadened his political perspective to include non-Africans. In the ANC, he was national volunteer-in-chief of the Defiance Campaign in 1952, and one of the 156 accused in the Treason Trial of 1956-1960. He was elected organizer of the stay-at-home protest in 1961. He went underground for six months (January 11--August 5, 1962) evading intensive police search. In 1962 he left the country without the necessary travel documents to visit heads of states in Africa and Britain. He later reported his experience to his colleagues and said:

"For the first time in my life I was a free man; free from white oppression, from idiocy of apartheid and racial arrogance, from police molestation, from humiliation and indignity... In the African States, I saw Black and White mingling peacefully and happily in hotels, cinemas, trading in the same areas, using the same public transport and living in the same residential areas."¹⁰

These impressions bore testimony to his vision of a new South African society, where people, Black and White, can lead a free life and live together in harmony. Upon his return from the African tours, he was captured and imprisoned. In the

¹⁰Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 160. Among the heads of states he met were Julius Nyerere, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure and Tubman, Presidents of Guinea and Liberia respectively. He also met Ben Bella, the President of Algeria, and Colonel Boumedienne, the Commander-in-Chief of the Algerian Army of National Liberation. In London he met Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour Party and Jo Grimond, the leader of the Liberal Party.

famous Rivonia Treason trial, Mandela and his colleagues were sentenced to life imprisonment, in June 1964. He remained in prison until he was released on Sunday, February 11, 1990 after spending 27 years in prison. While Mandela was in imprisonment, President Botha offered him conditional release contingent upon his denouncement of violence as a means for political change. Mandela rejected the offer.

Given this sweep of Mandela's political formation, let us examine his political vision of the good society.

Mandela's Non-Racial Societal Vision

Mandela's political development and his vision of the good society are grounded in both rural (African royal tradition of the Tembu tribe) Christian religion,¹¹ and urban experience. That is to say, there is a correlation between Mandela's social, religious and political formation and his vision of the good society. In rejecting the government's accusation that the black struggle was externally influenced, he unequivocally asserted: "I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background."¹² He further explains his political formation:

"The structure and organization of the early

¹¹Nelson Mandela is a confirmed Anglican. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Trapped In Apartheid, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988), p. 89.

¹²Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 163.

African societies fascinated me very much and greatly influenced the evolution of my political outlook. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the whole tribe, and there was no individual ownership whatsoever. There were no classes, no rich or poor and no exploitation of man by man. All men were free and equal and this was the foundation of government. Recognition of this principle found expression in the constitution of the council, variously called "Imbizo" or "Pitso" or "Kgotla," which governs the affairs of the tribe. The council was so completely democratic that all members of the tribe could participate in its deliberations. Chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, all took part and endeavoured to influence its decisions. It was such a weighty and influential a body that no step of any importance could be taken without it.

There was much in such a society that was primitive and insecure and it certainly could never measure up to the demands of the present epoch. But in such a society are contained the seeds of revolutionary democracy in which none will be held in slavery or servitude and in which poverty, want, and insecurity shall be no more. This is the inspiration which, even today, inspires me and my colleagues in our political struggle."¹³

In this citation, we discover some rudiments of the African political system such as "the land belonged to the whole tribe," "no exploitation of man by man," and that "all men were free and equal." These principles were embodied in the constitution of the council also known as "Imbizo." Similarly, Mandela was destined to advocate that the principles of justice, equality and freedom of the non-racial society should to be enshrined in a non-racial democratic constitution for South Africa in order to enable citizens of all races to live

¹³Ibid., p. 147-148. Emphasis is mine. Mandela said these words at his trial in Pretoria at the Old Synagogue (converted into a courtroom) in October 22, 1962. The trial offered him the occasion to give a scathing indictment of White supremacy.

together in a united society. In fact, he attested to this when he said, "we of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were."¹⁴ Thus, the ethic of equality and participation in a non-racial community actualizes his vision of the good society. Clearly, Mandela's non-racial vision is predicated upon the reality of a common citizenship for both Blacks and Whites. To that end, he asserted:

"We of the Youth League take account of the concrete situation in South Africa and realize that **different racial groups have come to stay**, but we insist that a condition for interracial peace and progress is the abandonment of White domination and such a change in the structure of South African society that these relations which breed exploitation and human misery will disappear. Therefore our goal is the winning of national freedom for African people and inauguration of a people's free society where racial oppression and persecution will be outlawed."¹⁵

Mandela's vision of the good society is characterized by "interracial peace" and "abandonment of White domination." That is to say, the prerequisite for a good society is the cessation of the use of skin-color as a norm for citizenship, the recognition that "different racial groups have come to stay" and the dawning of "a people's free society." He envisions a society where racial discrimination will be no more, and for this reason, he expressed his abhorrence of

¹⁴ Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 168.

¹⁵ Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 25. Emphasis is mine.

racism:

"I hate the practice of racial discrimination, and in my hatred I am sustained by the fact that the overwhelming majority of mankind hate it equally....Nothing that this court can do to me will change in any way that hatred in me, which can only be removed by the removal of the injustice and the inhumanity which I sought to remove from the political, social and economic life of this country."¹⁶

For Mandela, the struggle against the practice of discrimination is a universal struggle. Hence he concludes that the "the struggle against color discrimination and for the pursuit of freedom is the highest aspiration of all men."¹⁷ This assertion serves as the basis of Mandela's vision for a non-racial society. The words "all men"(humankind) transcend color, creed and class. The concept of non-racialism may reflect, in part, Mandela's religious and liberal training in a western context, for in the African community, the language of non-racialism is virtually foreign and unknown. What determines whether one belongs or not is not his race or lack of it, but his "ubuntu"¹⁸ or humanness.

¹⁶Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 159. These words were part of his final oration to the court at his trial in Pretoria in 1962. Mandela was accused on two counts, that of inciting persons to strike illegally (during the 1961 Stay-at-home Campaign) and that of leaving the country without proper travel documents. He conducted his own defence.

¹⁷Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 130-131.

¹⁸The concept of "ububtu" implies a state of moral character: humanness or personhood. In his dissertation, Harvey Sindima defines it as "quality and fulness of human life." See Harvey Sindima, Malawian Churches and the Struggle for Life and Personhood, (Princeton: Speer Library, 1987), p. 387. Among Africans, someone who lacks "ubuntu" removes himself/herself from

Mandela has tried hard to reconcilile his ambivalent attitudes to Whites and other non-Africans through his active struggle together with them. He firmly believes that "it is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division based on color is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one group by another."¹⁹ In the same vein he was equally opposed to Black or White domination; he had come to cherish the ideal of "a democratic and free society." In reinforcing his vision he says:

"During my lifetime, I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."²⁰

At the heart of his concept of non-racialism lies a deep commitment to fight racism of any form (whoever professes it), and to uphold the principles of "free society" in which skin-color remains irrelevant. A society where, in the words of

the category of the humans and becomes a thing or an object. Often, murderous, racists, etc. are considered as such.

¹⁹Nelson, Mandela, The Struggle is My Life, p. 181.

²⁰Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 191. See also Nelson Mandela, "I am Prepared to Die," in David Mermelstein, ed., The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle Against White Racist Rule in South Africa, (New York: Grove Press, 1987), p. 228. Mandela said these words on June 11, 1964 at the conclusion of his trial before the Pretoria Supreme Court, in which he and seven others were sentenced to life imprisonment.

Martin Luther King Jr., "people will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their own character."²¹ Against a charge of being anti-White, Mandela reiterated, "we are not anti-White, we are against White supremacy and in struggling against White supremacy, we have the support of some sections of the European population and we have made it clear from time to time."²² He continued, "I hate race discrimination most intensely and in all its manifestations."²³

The vision of an inclusive community (Black and White together) reflects not only Mandela's love for communal co-existence, but also his deep conviction that "all men are born free and equal."²⁴ For him true equality means:

"The right to participate in making the laws by which one is governed, a constitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the population, the right to approach the court for protection or relief in the case of violation of rights guaranteed in the constitution, and the right to take part in administration of justice as judges, magistrates, attorney-general, law

²¹James M. Washington, ed., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 219.

²²Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, pp. 83-84. The African National Congress seeks to forge an alliance with any person irrespective of skin-color, as long as the individual is committed to the total abolition of apartheid. Put differently, for the Congress, commitment was a criterion for admission in the struggle for the new society rather than skin-color.

²³Ibid., p. 129.

²⁴Ibid.

advisers, and similar positions."²⁵

In a sense, "constitutional guarantees of democratic rights," "the right to participate in making laws," and recourse to "the courts for protection...in the case of violation of rights" became the bedrock upon which his vision of the good society was based. He expressed his admiration and veneration of the Magna Carta, the Petition for Rights and the Bill of Rights. This admiration implies his willingness to draw from these documents to sustain and enrich his non-racial vision of the good society. Therefore, one can rightly conclude that equality and participation suggest sharing of all that the society has to offer, including the land. To be sure, Mandela's notion of inclusive participation demonstrates his brand of nationalism, which accepts the reality that Whites have permanent residence in South Africa. He declared: "Whites in South Africa belong here, this is their home. We want them to live with us and to share power with us."²⁶ In line with his non-racial thinking, the Freedom Charter states, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White, and not to one group, be it Black or White."²⁷ In addition, he

²⁵Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 127.

²⁶Mary Benson, Nelson Mandela: The Man and the Movement, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986), p.231. In this volume Mary Benson traces Mandela's life, his participation in the struggle and the power that his imprisonment unleashes.

²⁷Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 39. The Freedom Charter was drawn up by the Congress of the People (a multi-racial and cross-sectional body), held on June 23, 1955. This document embodies a conception of freedom in a new society for those who

substantiates his concept of belonging when he said:

"The African Congress further believes that all people, irrespective of the national groups to which they may belong, and irrespective of the color of their skins, **all people whose home is South Africa** and who believe in the **principles of democracy** and of **equality of men**, should be treated as Africans; that all South Africans are entitled to live a free life on the basis of **fullest equality** of the rights and of the opportunities in every field, of **fullest democratic rights**, with direct say in the affairs of the government."²⁸

A non-racial vision underlies Mandela's view of the good society: A society founded on full democratic principles of equality of rights and of opportunities for all. Mandela posits that acceptance of the "principles of democracy and of equality of men," qualifies one to "be treated as an African and entitles one "to live a free life...." At least, a recognition that South Africa is a common home creates a climate conducive for common citizenship of all, Black and White. In other words, the society is deemed good if Black and White live harmoniously together. What is even more critical is the premise that whites should be included in any vision of the good society.

At this point, we shall continue our discussion of Mandela's non-racial vision of society by focusing on Desmond Tutu's theological understanding of the same.

formed the Congress of the People. See also Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is My Life, p. 163.

²⁸Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 150. Emphasis mine.

Desmond Tutu
Biographical Sketch.

Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu was born on October 7, 1931 in Klerkdorp in the Western Transvaal. Zacharia, his father, was a fingo (Xhosa) by ethnic affiliation, and a school teacher by profession. Aletha Matlhare, his mother, was a Motswana woman. Both his parents were devout Methodists. One can say that in Desmond Tutu two tribes meet and claim his sonship, the Xhosa and the Tswana tribes; and because of this dual tribal belonging of his parents, he learned Xhosa and Tswana very well. Evidently, his roots are firmly African.

His African name "Mpilo" means "life" and it explains something about his physical disposition, as he was not a strong baby. He obtained his high school education at Johannesburg Bantu High School and also known as Madibane in Western Native Township (1945-50). Upon completion of his high school education, he entered the Bantu Normal College, where he obtained a teacher's diploma in 1953. In 1954 he earned his Bachelor of Arts degree through the University of South Africa, teaching at his alma mater soon thereafter. In 1955 and 1958 he taught at the Munsieville High School in Krugersdorp. He had barely started teaching when the Nationalist Government introduced the Bantu Education Act²⁹

²⁹The Bantu Education Act resulted from the work of the Eiselen Commission two years earlier. Through this Act, the Department of Native Affairs obtained control over all African schools. This also involved financial pressure on missions to hand over their schools to the government. The Act enforced vernacular instructions in the

on March 31, 1955. The implementation of this Act led to Tutu's resignation from the teaching profession. In a word, Tutu refused to serve within the institution of apartheid.

Disgruntled and disenchanted with the Bantu Education Act, he decided to enter the ministry in the Anglican Church-- a church he and his parents joined because Tutu's older sister was a member there. He later recounts how they joined the Anglican church: "we followed her for no really strong reasons; perhaps we just subconsciously thought that it would be a good thing for the family to stick together."³⁰ In entering the ministry, he received his training at St. Peter's Theological College in Rosettenville, Johannesburg. In December 1960 he was ordained deacon and subsequently became Father Tutu.

His mentors include Mrs. Blaxall, who also taught a young, black, deaf and blind mute how to understand English. In order to do this incredible act of love, she had had to walk through the walls not only of blindness, but also of

junior schools; and made both English and Afrikaans compulsory subjects in the high primary schools, and laid down differential syllabuses for Bantu schools. As Tutu's Biographer, Shirley Du Boulay later recorded, "it was the most deliberately vicious of all the legislation of the 1950s, seeking, as it did, to ensure that black people remained forever in a position of servitude. The declared aim of the Act was to produce Africans who would aspire to nothing higher than certain forms of labour" see Shirley Du Boulay, Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988), p. 41.

³⁰Desmond Tutu, "Desmond Tutu: Tracing the Roots," in The Other Side, (January/February 1985), p. 13. This was an interview with Leslie Campbell and Kathleen Hayes.

culture and prejudice. The missionary Trevor Huddleson had an immense effect on Tutu's life. He recollects how he fell under his spell:

"Years later I had the great fortune of going to school run by the Community of the Resurrection. Trevor Huddleson was a member of the community and was the parish priest in the town....He was deeply involved in political action on behalf of black South Africans but always consciously drew on spiritual resources to sustain his work. Here one saw in the flesh the integration of the spiritual and a passionate concern for justice."³¹

Tutu and his family lived in London, England from 1962 to 1966. While there, he pursued his academic studies, obtaining his BA honours in 1965 and his Masters in Theology in 1966. Tutu also served as part-time curate at St. Albans and at St. Mary's, respectively. Upon his return to South Africa at the end of 1966, he joined the faculty of Theology at the Federal Theological Seminary, Alice, in the Cape. Thereafter he taught for two years at the then University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, at Roma in Lesotho. He was appointed Associate director of the Theological Education Fund of the World Council of Churches based in Bromley, Kent where he served from 1972 to 1975. He returned to South Africa and was elected the Dean of Johannesburg from 1975-1976 and a year later consecrated Bishop of Lesotho. In 1978 he returned to Johannesburg and he was elected General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches. At this time, his political leadership was noticed. In 1985 he was awarded Nobel Peace

³¹Ibid., p. 13-14.

Prize in recognition of his involvement in the liberation struggle on behalf of the voiceless.

Given this terse biographical information of Tutu, we now proceed to probe his theological vision of the good society. No doubt his broad interrelation with people of various backgrounds, and his religious and political persuasions, disposed him toward an inclusive understanding of the good society.

Tutu's Non-Racial Societal Vision.

Desmond Tutu stands in the tradition of Mandela and Albert Luthuli³² and he shares the vision of non-racial and democratic society as the end of the political struggle in South Africa. He states, "my vision is of South Africa that is totally non-racial."³³ Tutu's non-racial vision of society is rooted in part in African thought, particularly in the concept of "ubuntu"³⁴ (being human). He observes that "a person is a

³²Albert Luthuli was a Zulu chief, a School teacher and a Methodist lay preacher, who in 1951 served as the Natal provincial president of the ANC. In 1952 he was elected the President General of the ANC and subsequently led the Congress through the Defiance Campaign until it was banned. He became the first black South African to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1961.

³³Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. M. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985), p. 45.

³⁴Tutu understands "ubuntu" as the rare gift of sharing. He adds, "this concept is exemplified at African feasts even this day, when people eat together from a common dish, rather than individual dishes. That means a meal is indeed to have communion with one's fellows" see Desmond Tutu, Crying In The Wilderness: The Struggle For Justice In South Africa, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. M. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982), p. 100. In line with this

person through other persons."³⁵ That is to say, a community is a community when it recognizes the personhood of all its citizens. Put differently, one's humanity defines the other's humanity, in the sense of recognizing and acknowledging the infinite value of the other.³⁶ This ontological relation and interdependence based on our common humanity is at the center of the concept of "ubuntu" and this understanding is reinforced by his christology, particularly the view of "Jesus Christ as the man for others."³⁷

To be a "man for others" is not simply a theoretical proposition: it has to be concretely expressed in human relationships, in the coexistence between Blacks and Whites. Further, Tutu contends that "man for others" should be predicated upon being "man for God" in the first place. The point could be made thus: "man of prayer" (piety) equals "man

concept of "ubuntu," is the idea of non-racial South Africa in which whites are included in the common meal of a new and just community. Setiloane corroborates Tutu's words when he speaks of "Motho ke Modimo," that is, the human person is sacred and cannot be kicked around with impunity. See Gabriel Setiloane, "Salvation and the Secular," in Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala, eds., Hammering Swords into Ploughshares: Essays in Honor of Archbishop Mpho Desmond Tutu, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. M. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), p. 80.

³⁵Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 70. See also Allan Boesak, Black and Reformed: Apartheid, Liberation and the Calvinist Tradition, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984), p. 19.

³⁶Through this kind of theological reasoning, Tutu refuses to give up on P. W. Botha. When praying for friends in prison, he prays for P. W. Botha, the jailors and the police "because they are God's children too."

³⁷Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 30.

of God," equals "man for others." Here the piety he imbibed from the Community of Resurrection is explicit: "the authentic Christian spirituality is one where your love for God flows outward, expressing itself in your relationship with your neighbor."³⁸ He concludes, "loving God and loving one's neighbor, are the two sides of the same coin."³⁹ Stated differently, the knowledge of God, in Tutu's understanding, is gained only by knowing Christ in faith, which implies a commitment to the neighbor and to human struggle. So to be integrally spiritual is to be openly political; nothing less is adequate for social resistance. Indeed, the witness of the Gospel is a witness in behalf of authentic humanity.

This theological underpinning provides a foundation for Tutu's vision for the non-racial society and the moral justification to fight against injustice. Apartheid for him is "evil, totally immoral and totally un-Christian" because it claims that "God created us human beings for separation, for apartness and for division." The truth of the matter is that "God created us for fellowship, for community and for friendship with God and with one another..."⁴⁰ He locates his non-racial vision of society deeply and firmly in the divine purpose for all humanity. And that human freedom is a gift to all people. In South Africa, he is convinced that

³⁸The Other Side, (January/February 1985), p. 14.

³⁹Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 33.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 54.

freedom is coming:

"Freedom is coming, because that is God's will. Freedom is coming, because God did not make us doormats on which people can wipe their dirty boots. Freedom is coming, because God has created us for freedom...And we can all walk hand-in-hand, Black and White...Freedom is coming for you, Mr. P. W. Botha. We want you to be free. We want you to be here with us."⁴¹

Tutu depicts freedom as rooted in the divine purpose for all people. Yet, apartheid negates the creation story of our common humanity rooted in the depth of faith; undermines the humanity of Blacks and thereby renders any form of relationship between blacks and whites impossible. Hence "ubuntu" serves not only as corrective for the conflicts that apartheid has created, but also as a basis for creating a new community of persons where, "people matter because they are made in the image of God."⁴² What counts is one's humanity rather than one's skin-color or race. The idea of *Imago Dei* from which all people are created provides for Tutu, a paradigm for his theological vision of a non-racial community. First and foremost, we are who we are because God made us in his own image. He asserts, "Black and Whites are made in the image of God. All of us--Black and White together--are made

⁴¹Desmond Tutu, "Clarifying the Word," in Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, eds., Crucible of Fire: The Church Confronts Apartheid, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989), p. 38-39.

⁴²Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 39.

for freedom."⁴³ In a word, freedom is not a figment of our mental invention, but it flows from the gracious act of God. He concludes, "they (Whites) cannot decide to give or to hold it (freedom). Our freedom is an inalienable right bestowed on us by God."⁴⁴

This understanding falsifies apartheid's claim that our humanity resides in the biological trait of skin-color. In addition, Tutu's view of incarnation (God in Jesus Christ becoming a human being) indicates that Jesus cares for all of life and he endows Blacks with infinite worth. Since Jesus cares, all who profess his name ought to do so also. More importantly, by the act of incarnation, God declares all human beings to be the subject of his redeeming love. In South Africa, incarnation puts Black and White on equal footing, thus ensuring the possibility of a non-racial political society.

Tutu's involvement in political matters is not motivated by political self-interest or gain. He declares that he is not a politician:

"It is not politics that determines our attitudes and actions. It is quite firmly our Christian faith which determines our socio-political involvement. We ask: is such and such an action, policy or attitude consonant with our understanding of the

⁴³Desmond Tutu, "Education of Free Men," in Mark A. Uhlig, eds., Apartheid In Crisis: Perspective on the Coming Battle for South Africa, (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), p. 30.

⁴⁴Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 89.

teaching of Jesus Christ?"⁴⁵

However, his active role in social affairs as an act of obedience to God the liberator , aims at the "liberation of Black people which involves the liberation of Whites as well."⁴⁶ He makes the latter dependent upon the former. He poignantly posits, "as long as Blacks are not free, no one will be free in South Africa. Freedom is indivisible."⁴⁷ The interdependence of freedom and liberation for Blacks and Whites are the basis for his vision of the good society.

In all of Tutu's speeches and writings no other theme is more pervasive than that of God the liberator. I argue that all other important notions pervading his writings and speeches--for example, non-violence, justice, "ubuntu" (humanness), reconciliation or freedom--are either explicitly or implicitly related to his understanding of God in Jesus Christ. An example is the way in which the Exodus event serves as an inspiring guide for Tutu's liberation motif. He draws upon the Exodus paradigm to demonstrate God's action in history and the inevitable destruction of evil, since "He is

⁴⁵Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 33. See Desmond Tutu, "How can you say you love God whom you have not seen when you hate your brother whom you have seen," in Engage/Social Action, Vol. 13, (1985), p. 19. "We get our marching orders, as it were not from Peking or Moscow. We get our marching orders, as it were, from Galilee."

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁷Missionalia, vol. 5, (1977), p. 115.

the Lord of the entire universe and the Lord of all life."⁴⁸ "God is God" implies that God is in control of history, guiding it to its true end. Consequently, he asserts, "injustice and evil oppression will not last forever. They have been overcome by God in the cross of Jesus Christ. As we protest the evil of your threatened removal we must do so knowing that victory is ours already."⁴⁹ Tutu believes that good will always be victorious. The non-racial vision of society is the good that will certainly prevail against the evil of apartheid and separation.

So the Exodus paradigm depicts God's victorious act in the political and religious emancipation of the slaves, and helps to shape their destiny as a community. He underscores the praxis of God's liberating activity in the struggle for justice. It is unclear how, for Tutu, the liberation of the Israelites becomes at the same time the liberation of the Egyptian slave drivers. If God is on the side of the victims of oppression, how does the Exodus event serve as the basis for a non-racial society, particularly where the society mirrors the slave-and-master reality? Ostensibly, Tutu locates the nucleus of the non-racial community in the character of the liberated agents: those who are compassionate to strangers and the bearers of *shalom*. He points out:

"Exodus had to do with their whole lives--

⁴⁸Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 56.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 42.

political, social, economic, personal, corporate-- they were liberated people whose entire lives must reveal this comprehensive liberation that they have experienced. And they had been liberated from bondage for the purpose of being God's people, His agent for the sake of the world."⁵⁰

The liberated agents are so formed that they engage in the liberation activity for the sake of others. One can deduce that, for Tutu, theology and ethics are inseparable, since they both originate from God. An analysis of Tutu's thought reveals that his ethics are derived from his reflection on God, Jesus and the prophets. In his theological discourse, he attempts to show that his non-racial vision of society is firmly rooted in the tradition of the Scriptures as embodied in the life of the authentic church.

Tutu's commitment to work for a non-racial society flows from his concern for the integrity of the church of Jesus Christ. He states, "our integrity as a church depends entirely on our ability to say this is wrong because it is inconsistent with the Christian values. The church of God is the only instrument to speak against all evils..."⁵¹ In addition, the church does not only "condemn the evils of society, but also helps to establish a healthy community in a more just society, that is truly democratic and non-racial."⁵² The South African

⁵⁰Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 56.

⁵¹The African Challenge: All Africa Conference of Churches Magazine, Vol. 2. No. 2., (May 1988), p. 6.

⁵²Desmond Tutu, On Trial, (Leeds, London: John Paul the Preacher's Press, 1982), p. 27.

Council of Churches (SACC) and other churches seem to exemplify and concretize his vision of a non-racial society. That is to say, they (SACC and other churches) become the official expression of non-racial society in word and deed. He observes that "in St. Mary's Cathedral in Johannesburg, Black and White worship together under the Black dean. In the SACC, we have staff of all races, Black and Brown, and all work harmoniously together. It can happen in the whole of South Africa."⁵³ In other words, the church, properly defined, exemplifies a true and authentic non-racial society, since Jews and Gentiles have a common status. To be sure, only the principle of love and reconciliation can hold the diversity of human beings together in a peaceful community. Tutu draws justification for his non-racial vision from the imperative of the Scriptures and the African understanding of personhood.

In addition to the preceding sources from which he drew in support of his non-racial vision, Tutu also appeals to the Bill of Rights--a universally acclaimed document. He advocates for the Bill of Rights and he states, "There will be a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty. There will be no enforced integration, which I abhor as I do enforced separation." He concludes, "I am an unabashed egalitarian and libertarian because God created us free for freedom."⁵⁴ His appeal for the creation of the Bill of Rights is based on his

⁵³Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 39.

⁵⁴Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 45.

understanding of the infinite worth of human beings and their concomitant freedom. This may imply that he has an optimistic view of human beings. That is to say, a belief that since a human being is created in the image of God, he is basically good.

Contrary to this view of the goodness of man, however, Tutu says, "the Rule of Law will prevail again."⁵⁵ His recognition of the need of the "Rule of Law" may reflect his understanding of human nature. Tutu's point here is not so much about whether human beings are good or bad, but that badness does not necessarily make one less the child of God. Botha and his Afrikaner politicians are by all intents and purposes bad fellows in their treatment of Black people, but Tutu recognizes that they too are made in the image of God. He refuses to give up on them. Therefore, we may conclude that Tutu's ethical thought attempts to ensure, in all human relations, the rule of justice and love. And these virtues are, for him, the cornerstone of his non-racial community.

Having discussed the non-racial vision of Mandela and Tutu and its political and theological justification, we now proceed to examine the Africanist/Black-consciousness vision of the good society.

Africanist/Black-consciousness Societal Visions.

Sobukwe's Biographical Sketch

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 45.

Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe⁵⁶, son of a Methodist preacher and a laborer, was born in Graaff Reinet (an arid platteland town) in the Cape in 1924. His family lived in a segregated township of poor match-box houses on the periphery of the White town. There was no social interaction between the Black and White communities in that area. His African name, "Mangaliso" means "Wonderful." Sobukwe's character was shaped by a background of discipline and hard work. Both his parents were devout Christians. Later in life, he followed in his father's footsteps by becoming a Methodist lay preacher.

Sobukwe grew up in grinding poverty. He received his high school education at the Healdtown Mission School. Writing about the young Sobukwe at Healdtown, Godfrey Pitje said:

"It was in Healdtown that Robert learned to see, not Xhosas, Zulus, and Shangaans; not Sotho, Pedi and Chuana people; but Black people, inhabiting the "dark" continent of Africa. For him there was no tribalism, no ethnicity. It was at Healdtown that the thin line separating the English from the Afrikaner; Nationalists from the United Party members paled into insignificance, and young Sobukwe began to see only Whites. True, among them he did see missionaries and liberals. But he was very critical about the role they played in African affairs. He read about Cape liberals and Cape liberalism of Schreiner and others and was quick to see how useless they were when the Cape Blacks were

⁵⁶Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe/Steve Bantu Biko: Hereafter referred to as Sobukwe/Biko. Both Sobukwe and Biko are dead, but their contribution to political thought and the struggle for justice is very important, hence their inclusion in this study. Throughout this project, I will use Africanist and Black Consciousness interchangeably, and also show some differences in direction and emphasis where necessary. The term Africanist was used by Sobukwe while Black Consciousness was Biko's synthesis of African Nationalism that demonstrates uncompromising demand for the repossession of the African land.

disenfranchised. He saw how the doyen of White liberals, J. H. Hofmeyer, remained in the United Party and even acted as Premier during the absence of Jan Smuts. Smuts, the international humanist and elder statesman, had said in 1942: '...segregation has fallen on evil days....' but in South Africa he pursued the policy of segregation vigorously...."⁵⁷

This passage explains to a certain extent why Sobukwe was not in favor of the inclusion of Whites in his political thought. That is to say, Sobukwe's schooling would have ended at the high school had it not been for the modest financial support he received from the principal of the missionary Healdtown Institute, which enabled him to enroll at Fort Hare College. At college, Sobukwe was a militant youth leader. His encounter with Whites has been on the basis of a "boss" and "boy" relationship. He saw this within the Methodist Church where a system of different stipends for Black and White Ministers was practiced. Sobukwe was outspoken and politically active and he combined political activism with intellectual sobriety and commitment. He served as the president of the Students' Union, editor of the students magazine Inkundla Ya Bantu, and the secretary-general of the ANC Youth League. In 1949 he went as a delegate to the ANC conference. Upon completion of his degree at Fort Hare, he taught at Standerton--a rural town in the Transvaal. Within two years, he was dismissed for his role in the Defiance Campaign. A few months later, he was offered

⁵⁷South African Outlook, Vol. 108-109, (1978-79), p. 116. This was a major speech delivered by Godfrey Pitje at the funeral of Robert Sobukwe in Graaff Reinet on March 11, 1978. Pitje had known Sobukwe as a friend and fellow student at Fort Hare.

a post as language assistant at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

He remained a member of the ANC until 1959 when his militant group broke away to form the Pan-Africanist Congress. He was elected its president, and resigned from a lectureship in African languages at the University of Witwatersrand, so that he could dedicate himself fully to challenge the apartheid system. In 1960 he led the anti-pass-laws protest culminating in the famous Sharpville Massacre on March 21, 1960. Sobukwe was arrested and charged with a campaign against pass laws. In conducting his defence, he refused to enter a plea since the law under which he was charged was made exclusively by and for the white man. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment. On his release he was detained on Robben Island by an Act of Parliament called the "Sobukwe Clause."⁵⁸ In 1969 he was released, only to be banned and confined to the District of Kimberly, where he died in 1978.

Though he is dead, his vision for South Africa continues in the hearts and minds of those who have embraced it. Let us now turn to his Africanist vision.

Sobukwe's Africanist Societal Vision.

⁵⁸The Sobukwe Clause was a "provision making it legal for the government to imprison Sobukwe beyond the end of his three year-year sentence, which was due to expire within days after the passage of the Act." See Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p.253.

Sobukwe was the founder of the Pan-Africanist Congress. His Africanist vision is both regional and universal encompassing as it does the whole African continent and beyond. That is to say, it envisions the possibility of a "democratic United States of Africa"⁵⁹ similarly explicated by the former President of Ghana, Nkwame Nkruma. The Africanist vision puts an emphasis on the idea of "Africa for Africans," a Garveyian concept of African in quest for nationhood based on African solidarity and self-determination. Sobukwe states that "the chief aim of the PAC is the complete destruction of white domination and the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa as well as throughout the whole of Africa."⁶⁰ From this statement, the Africanist vision seems to have as its ultimate goal the establishment of a non-racial democracy. For the Africanist, the land is a *sine qua non* for any authentic African democracy. Consequently, Sobukwe was engaged "in the struggle for land and status of African people, wherever they are."⁶¹ He further asserts the broader objective of the Africanist vision as "the greater struggle throughout the Continent for the restoration to the

⁵⁹Mary Benson, ed., The Sun Will Rise: Statements from the Dock by South African Political Leaders, (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1981), p. 8. The Africanists saw their role as a contribution towards a United States of Africa from the Cape to Cairo, Morocco to Madagascar.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis mine.

⁶¹Robert M. Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe from 1949-1959 and Other Documents of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, (new York: Pan-Africanist Congress, 1989), p. 9.

African people of effective control of their land."⁶²

In seeking to overthrow white domination for the purpose of creating African democracy, Sobukwe's Africanist vision excludes Whites, Indians and Coloreds from active participation in a common struggle against apartheid from the beginning and resolves to include them at the end, when the non-racial African vision is realized. An analysis of Sobukwe's political thought indicates that the exclusion of non-Africans is rooted in the principle of "native origin." That is to say, that Africans are indigenous to South Africa in particular and to Africa in general, while Whites, Coloreds and Indians are to a certain extent newcomers. Evidently, the reasons for this exclusion were not racially motivated; they were motivated in part by the need to create a solid front of the African people, in order to execute effectively the aims of the struggle. The Africanist vision is rooted in part in the doctrine of love for Africa. Sobukwe rejected hate as the basis for his vision when he said: "a doctrine of hate can never take people anywhere."⁶³ When accused of reverse racism, Sobukwe asserted:

"We are anti-nobody. We are pro-Africa. We breathe, we dream, we live Africa, because Africa and humanity are inseparable...On the liberation of the **African depends** the liberation of the **whole world**. The future of the world lies with the oppressed and

⁶²Ibid., p. 27.

⁶³Ibid., p. 9.

Africans are the most oppressed people on earth."⁶⁴

Sobukwe envisions the liberation of Africans as the source of liberation of the whole world. Since Africans are "the most oppressed people on earth," he invests his energy in their liberation first, and then the "whole world." He sees how the liberation of one group (Africans) could become a gift of liberation for all. Surely, if one group is oppressed no one is free. So the exclusion of non-Africans, for Sobukwe, is intended to put the struggle squarely in the hands of the most oppressed people, Africans. In support of his exclusivistic stance, he says:

"We do not wish to use anybody, nor do we intend to be used by anybody. We want to make African people conscious of the fact that they have to win their own liberation, rely on themselves to carry on the relentless and determined struggle instead of relying on court cases and negotiations on their behalf by sympathetic Whites...In short, we intended to go it alone."⁶⁵

The idea of "we go it alone" was born from the frustrations and disappointments of small court-case victories, which gave an illusion that justice was being served, while the aim was to arrest the momentum of the struggle. When he was arrested in 1960 charged with inciting the burning of the passbooks, he refused to enter a plea for he did not accept the law under which he was to be tried. Since the law was exclusively made by the Whites, he doubted the scale of its justice. Hence, he

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 10-11. Emphasis mine.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 22.

concluded "do not rely on court cases" or "negotiations of sympathetic Whites" because liberation will not come through that process, at least not for now. You are your own liberators.

His exclusivistic stance invariably leads to a rejection of any form of collaboration with the apartheid government. In denouncing collaboration with Whites, Sobukwe writes, "we want to build a new Africa and only we can do it...Talks of co-operation are not new to us. Every time our people have shown signs of unity against oppression, their friends have come along and broken that unity."⁶⁶ And that, often Whites who join our struggle do so with the express motive to lead Africans and not to be led by them because the white man is always "boss," the black man is always "boy."⁶⁷ Whether in church or society this attitude operates. The idea of "go it alone" also formed the basis and direction of the Black-consciousness Movement as we shall see. The notion of Blacks

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁷The words "boss" and "boy" are used to express the superiority of Whites and inferiority of Blacks in the South African context. The emphasis of the African struggle was intended as a practical way to fight this issue and dispell the myth that Blacks are not capable of taking their destiny in their hands. In fact, Steve Biko's Black-consciousness Movement served to reawaken racial self-pride and self-confidence. If one is called "kwedini" or "mfana," meaning "boy," in the African sense, it means that one is uncircumcised and therefore does not qualify to sit in the council of men of practical wisdom. The sense communicated to Africans when Whites called them "boy" was that they would never qualify to sit on the same council with them, for Whites regarded them almost always as children subject to their perpetual tutelage. See Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Magaliso Sobukwe, p. 31.

as the custodian of their own liberation was central. As for Sobukwe, the alliance of Africans, Indians and Coloreds was futile and self-defeating in that "among Indians have emerged a class which has become tainted with the virus of national arrogance and cultural supremacy."⁶⁸ He concluded that like "sympathetic" Whites, Indians are "concerned with protecting their own sectional (and class) interests."⁶⁹ However, he was aware of the poor Indians working on the plantations who, given their material conditions, could be interested in the destruction of white domination, and in favor of authentic Africanist socialist democracy. Whether or not this was a correct reading of the poor Indians regarding their attitude toward the Africanist vision remains unverifiable--meaning: no one can verify it.

The mistrust Sobukwe expressed about including Indians and Coloreds in the struggle was apparently justified when opportunistic ones agreed to serve in the tricameral parliament formed by the South African government in 1983 against strong black opposition. It is significant that Tutu expressed the Africanist viewpoint when he said:

"The Blacks will never forget when they are free in a genuinely democratic and non-racial South Africa which is coming, whatever anybody else may try to do or tell you, that when that happens they will remember that Indians and Coloreds **deserted us** and **delayed our liberation**, with all that could have meant in the high cost of human suffering caused by

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 22.

⁶⁹Ibid.

apartheid. Make no mistake about it: if you go over to the other side, then the day of reckoning will come. Let Coloreds and Indians make no mistake about it."⁷⁰

The substance of Sobukwe's argument against the inclusion of Whites was that despite their intellectual conversion to African cause, "they benefit materially from the present set-up, they cannot completely identify themselves to that cause."⁷¹ So he contends that the Africans are the only people who, because of their material position, can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present structure of society. He goes on to show what the history of co-operation between Blacks and Whites in South Africa reveals:

"...as South African history so ably illustrates, that whenever Europeans "co-operate" with African movements, they keep on demanding checks and counter checks, guarantees and the like, with the result that they stultify and retard the movement of the Africans and the reason is, of course, that they are consciously or unconsciously protecting their sectional interests."⁷²

In essence, Sobukwe argued for the exclusion of non-Africans because he believed that they had absolutely very little at stake. For the most part, they are given preferential

⁷⁰Richard John Neuhaus, Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), p. 141. Neuhaus cites this passage from a speech Tutu gave to Indian communities in Durban immediately after the Indians and Coloreds were offered participation in the tricameral parliament in 1982. Emphasis mine. The words "deserted us and delayed our liberation" certainly cannot be inclusive in that context. The pronouns "us" and "our" may only refer to the Africans who have been excluded from the constitution.

⁷¹Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 22.

⁷²Ibid.

treatment both politically and educationally. Practically, very few of them join African organizations. Instead of spending precious time debating their inclusion or non-inclusion, the way forward would be to continue the struggle with the knowledge that Africans are alone. The idea here was to "free the mind of the African--and once the mind is free, the body will soon be free."⁷³ In this way, the Africans will reject their abject status to assume their true humanity that will serve as a material condition for the creation of a state of mind true to the African democratic vision and the destruction of white domination.

His rejection of co-operation with non-Africans *ipso facto* leads to some ambivalence about multi-racialism. In dismissing multi-racialism as a tenable basis for the Africanist vision for the Society, Sobukwe argues:

"The Africanist view of democracy must be startling and upsetting to those who have been bred and fed on the liberal idea of an African elite being gradually trained, brain-washed, fathered and absorbed into so-called South African Multiracial Nationhood, whilst the vast masses of Africans are being exploited and denied democratic rights on the grounds of their unreadiness and backwardness and illiteracy."⁷⁴

A careful observation of this statement demonstrates how sensitive he was to elitist tendencies of multiracial politics and the place of the masses in his African democratic

⁷³Ibid., p. 32.

⁷⁴Robert Sobukwe, "Pan-Africanist Congress on Guard in Defence of P.A.C. Policy and Programme," The Africanist, December 1959, p. 13 (Carter-Karis collection).

thought. He defended the idea of African rule at all cost because Africans comprised the majority population, and that the "future of Africa will be what Africans make it."⁷⁵ By definition the rule of the Africans (majority population) means freedom for all. He declares, "freedom would not mean that Whites and Indians would be driven from the country or excluded from political rights...people of color would be equal citizens and an individual's color would become as irrelevant as the shape of his ears."⁷⁶ In showing the irrelevance of one's skin-color in his African political thought, Sobukwe says, "I see no reason why, in a free democratic Africa, a predominantly black electorate should not return a White to Parliament for color will count for nothing in free Africa."⁷⁷

Mindful of the problem regarding the exclusion of non-Africans, Sobukwe declares, "politically, we stand for the government of the Africans, for the Africans, by the Africans, with everybody who owes loyalty only to Africa and accepts the democratic rule of an African majority, being regarded as an African...We guarantee individual rights."⁷⁸ "Loyalty to Africa" and "individual rights" are the foundation of the

⁷⁵Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 16.

⁷⁶Robert Sobukwe, "The State of the Nation." August 2, 1959, reproduced in Carter and Karis, Vol. 3, pp. 542-48.

⁷⁷Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 23.

⁷⁸Ibid.

Africanist socialist democracy. The principle of "loyalty to Africa" in South Africa seems to be the criterion with which each person would be evaluated and accepted. If this criterion is applied to its logical conclusion, some Africans will be found wanting. Unless participation in the homeland is understood as "loyalty to Africa," the homeland leaders, for instance, could be some Africans who have betrayed the struggle by collaborating with the oppressive system.

Problems: It is unclear how the exclusion of other groups at first will practically enhance and foster African socialist democracy. The critical issue, however, is how the Africanist proposes to deal justly with the minority. To speak about "guaranteeing individual rights" when these groups have been excluded at the beginning of the liberation process does not help to allay their fears about the future. How can one be sure that such an exclusion will not lead to a permanent interracial conflict which the struggle aims to solve or avoid? Sobukwe's view of temporary racial disengagement may be naive, given human nature.

We now continue our analysis of the Africanist vision, particularly its modern expression, Black Consciousness, focusing on the writings and speeches of Steve Biko.

Steve Biko

Biographical Sketch

Stephen Bantu Biko, the son of Mr. and Mrs. Mzimgayi Biko, was

born in King William's Town, in the Cape Province, in December 18, 1946. His African name "Bantu" means "the people"⁷⁹. The young Biko received his primary education at the Charles Morgan Primary School and his secondary education at Forbes Grant Secondary School in Ginsberg black township. He later went to Lovedale College in Alice and graduated at Marianhill in Natal. Both Lovedale and Marianhil were denominational missionary schools.

Afer graduating at Marianhill, he went to Natal University, in Wentworth, to study medicine, in 1966. At the medical school, he was involved in the activities of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), and he became a member of the Student Representative Council (SRC) on the campus. NUSAS was a predominantly white students' organization. Increasingly disenchanted with NUSAS, he founded the all-black South African Students' Organization (SASO) in 1968 and he became its first president. In 1972 he was expelled from the medical school due to his political involvement in SASO activities.

He later explained the reason for his break-away from the all-white organization:

"When we broke away to form an exclusive black movement....we were accused of being anti-white. But with more whites at the university, the non-racial students' union was dominated by white liberals. They made all the decisions for us. We

⁷⁹"Bantu" means one who has the quality of "ubuntu," that is, humanness and togetherness and the celebration of life. Biko was a man of "abantu" meaning that where he was, there was community.

need time to look at our own problems, and not leave them to people without experience of the terrible conditions in the black townships or of the system of Bantu education."⁸⁰

Biko and others visited the black-University campuses and propounded the philosophy of Black-consciousness. They defined Black to mean Africans, Indians and Coloreds. In 1970 he was instrumental in forming the Black People's Convention (BPC), as an umbrella political organization for groups sharing the ideas of Black-consciousness.

He worked with the Black Community Programmes in Durban. In 1973 Biko, together with other office-bearers of SASO and BPC was served with banning orders. Biko was restricted to the district of King Williams Town and he was not allowed to work with any political organization including SASO, BPC and BCP.

Biko's banning increased his commitment to work for the oppressed people. Since he believed in self-help and self-determination, Biko founded the Zimele Trust Fund to help the political prisoners and their families, and the Educational Fund in order to give financial aid to black students. For his involvement in the liberation struggle of his people Biko, was held for 137 days in detention without charge. Despite harsh restrictions, he remained active. Finally, August in 1977, he was again detained. On September 13, 1977 he died in police custody. The life of Biko was characterized by arrests and detentions just for speaking his mind. We can see why Biko was

⁸⁰Quoted in Sunday Times, 18. 9. 1977.

concerned with the liberation of the colonized mind of the oppressed. He saw the mind as the source and center of true liberation.

It is important to discern his vision of the good society. Having suffered so much at the hands of the police, would he be so bitter as to wish every white person dead? No, far from it! His "ubuntu" quality lies in his quest for a new community of persons in South Africa.

Biko's Black-consciousness Societal Vision.

Biko's broader Africanist/Black-consciousness vision takes seriously the conditions of the victims of oppression. He observed that many years of degradation, humiliation and inferior education have conditioned the oppressed to accept their situation of oppression as if it were predestined for them. So Biko's vision seeks to restore the black person from his/her lost personhood. In his investigation into the black psyche, he discovers startling evidence that "all in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow man, completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity."⁸¹

Given the state of affairs for Blacks, he identifies the destructive force of apartheid for black subjecthood, namely, loss of identity. How does the loss of identity (the state of

⁸¹Steve Biko, I Write What I Like: A Selection of His Writings, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), p. 29.

alienation) result in the distortion of black humanity? Biko replies, "Blacks associate everything good with White...so you tend to feel there is something incomplete in your humanity, and that with humanity goes whiteness." Further, he asserts, "Black Consciousness seeks to produce at the end of the process real black people who do not regard themselves as appendages of the white society."⁸² The solution to the appendage syndrome into which Blacks have been thrust can only be found through self-liberation. This act of self-liberation arises, for Biko, by recognizing that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed."⁸³ This realization is the first act in the quest for authentic humanity. The upshot, for Biko, is that "if one is free at heart, no man-made chains can bind one to servitude, but if one's mind is manipulated and controlled by the oppressor so as to make the oppressed believe that he is a liability to the white man, there will be nothing the oppressed can do...."⁸⁴ The aim of Black Consciousness was to eradicate the feelings of black dependency and inferiority, to inculcate black pride. With their sense of black pride awakened, Biko contends that the black people must reject all value systems that seek to make them foreigners in the country of their birth and to reduce their human dignity.

⁸²Ibid., p. 51.

⁸³Ibid., p. 92.

⁸⁴Ibid.

True, Biko's vision of the good society is rooted in part in the black people's discovery of their worth and complete humanhood imbued with a "spirit of self-reliance."⁸⁵ In a word, the liberation of the whole person, psychological and physical, is for Biko, true justification for the good society--A society where full human potential is released to its highest creative actualization. For this reason, Black Consciousness focuses on the transformation of the way in which black people construe their world under the tutelage of apartheid. Thus, Biko's liberational introspection aims at tapping and reorienting the thinking habits of the people. He states, "the power of the movement lies in the fact that it can indeed **change the habits of the people.**" This change, he claims, "is not the result of force but dedication, of moral persuasion."⁸⁶ At the core of his societal vision was the human being as the political agent. Speaking about the centrality of man, Biko says, "one of the most fundamental aspects of our culture is the importance we attach to man. Ours has been a man-centred society."⁸⁷ Hence, his idea of "change of habit" was important for his entire political thought in that it placed the liberational power, the creative subjectivity of the good society, in the hands of the

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 33.

⁸⁶Bernard Zylstra's interview with Steve Biko, published in The Reformed Journal, Vol. 27, Issue 12, (Michigan) December 1977, p. 13. Emphasis mine. This interview took place before August 1977.

⁸⁷Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 41.

oppressed. For this reason, he defines Black Consciousness as "an attitude of the mind and a way of life...."⁸⁸ The new way of life characterizes the new personhood habituated in the tenets of political struggle. The expression "a way of life" seems to imply that the struggle cannot be viewed as a one-time activity.

Remarking about the power of Biko's societal vision, Alan and Turner say, "what is powerful and new about Biko's ideas is that he always centers the possibility of change within the subjectivity of the oppressed...."⁸⁹ That is to say, Biko credits the masses as their own liberators--a fact which the perpetrators of apartheid set out to undermine by arresting the creative power of the oppressed. Apartheid has instilled fear in its victims in the name of law and order, but Biko infused them with fearlessness; hence, the Soweto upheavals of 1976.

Biko predicates the birth of the new society which must "exhibit African values and be truly African in style"⁹⁰ to the African majority. In order for this society to come about Blacks must accept the truth of the statement: "black man you are on your own."⁹¹ For the task of creating a new society,

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 91. Emphasis mine.

⁸⁹John Alan and Lou Turner, Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought, (Chicago: News and Letters, 1986), p. 22.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 24.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 91.

he does not expect much help from the liberals. Liberals have claimed to be the spokespersons for blacks; the attitude which Biko rejects on two grounds: (1) "As long as the white liberals are our spokesmen, there will be no black spokesmen. (2) "It is not possible to have black spokesmen in a white context."⁹² The logic flowing from this assertion is that White liberals are our spokesmen. This is bad for three reasons: (i) Whites, liberal or otherwise, **cannot** really speak for blacks. (ii) It keeps Blacks from becoming spokesmen. (iii) It is not possible to have Black spokesmen in a White context. Biko rejects the white trusteeship mentality in which Whites know what is good for Blacks. The preceding reasons lead to his exclusion of whites in the struggle:

"All true liberals should realize that the place for their fight for justice is within their white society. The liberals must realize that they themselves are oppressed if they are true liberals and therefore they must fight for their own freedom and not that of the nebulous "they" with whom they can hardly claim identification."⁹³

Strategically, Biko sees problems with the inclusion of Whites in the black struggle because he believes they have a "lots at stake in the **status quo**."⁹⁴ He further points out, "while the white liberal identifies with Blacks, the burden of the enormous privileges which he still uses and enjoys becomes lighter. Yet at the back of his mind is a constant reminder

⁹²The Reformed Journal, Vol. 27, December 1977, p.12.

⁹³Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 10.

that he is quite comfortable as things stand and therefore should not bother about change." He also accuses the liberals of having inhibited black unity.

Having dealt with the question of the right placement of whites, Biko skillfully provides a rationale for the exclusion of the so-called non-whites. He makes a distinction between non-whites and true black people or "muntu," or "munhu." Following this distinction, Biko reasons:

"Being black is not a matter of pigmentation; being black is a reflection of mental attitude...we can see that the term black is not necessarily all-inclusive; i.e. the fact that we are all **not white** does not necessarily mean that we are all **black**. Non-whites do exist and will continue to exist for quite a long time. If one's aspiration is whiteness but his skin pigmentation makes the attainment of this impossible, then the person is a non-white. Any man who calls a white man "Baas," any man who serves in the police force or security Branch is **ipso facto** a non-white. Black people are those who can manage to hold their heads high in defiance rather than be willing to surrender their souls to the white man."⁹⁵

This citation helps to explain Biko's understanding of true black humanity based on an unflinching commitment to the struggle--a true humanity infused with a "new-found pride in themselves, their efforts, their value system, their culture,

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 48. Emphasis mine. The word non-white was used by the government as a designation for all black people. Biko rejected this designation as a negation of blackness or something less than white. The term non-white was intended to foster and perpetuate a false view that blackness is defined in terms of whiteness and its value. Here Biko uses the concept to describe a black person alienated from whom he/she truly is--that is, alienated from the commonwealth of black community.

their religion and their outlook on life."⁹⁶ The distinction he makes only shows the difference in the black psyche between those (non-whites) who are trapped by false consciousness (that is to say, those who have not attained the "envisioned self which is a free self,"⁹⁷) and those who have attained true consciousness and who "rally together with their brothers around the cause of their operation- the blackness of their skin--and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude."⁹⁸ What this distinction purports to demonstrate is that Blacks are not a homogeneous community. If they were, there would be no need for the black unity and solidarity which Biko advocates. The non-white category is but one example of the non-homogeneity of the black community. It is precisely for this reason that Black-Consciousness is such a potent force to correct this situation.

Biko's vision of the good society assumes black unity on one hand and white power on the other in order to create a political equilibrium. That is to say, black unity offers the potential basis for credible bargaining power with Whites. For this reason, the thesis of white racism, according to Biko, could only have one tenable antithesis: a solid black unity to counter-balance the scale. He argues:

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 49.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid.

"If South Africa is to be a land where Black and White live in harmony without fear of group exploitation, it is only when these two opposites have interplayed and produced a viable synthesis of ideas and **modus vivendi**. We can never wage any struggle without offering a strong counterpoint of the white racism that permeates our society so effectively."⁹⁹

The end product of Biko's dialectic is that " out of these two situations we can therefore hope to reach some kind of balance--a true humanity where power politics have no place."¹⁰⁰ An analysis of Biko's political thought leads us to an understanding that when black unity meets white racism a new political person is bound to emerge, only then can the vision of the good society be actualized. Biko accuses the proponents of non-racialism of failure to define their synthesis. He asserts, "for white liberals, the **thesis** is apartheid, the **antithesis** is non-racialism, but the **synthesis** is very feebly defined. They want to tell the Blacks that they see integration as the ideal solution."¹⁰¹

For Biko, the liberal approach is implausible because "no group, however benevolent, could hand power to the vanquished on a plate." He continues:

"We must accept that the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress. As long as we go to Whitey begging cap in hand for our own emancipation, we are giving him

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁰⁰Steve Biko, "Black Consciousness and the Quest for a True Humanity," in Basil Moore, ed., **Black Theology: The South African Voice**, (London: C. Hurst & Com., 1973), p. 39. Emphasis mine.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 39.

further sanction to continue with his racist and oppressive system. We must realize that our situation is not a mistake on the part of the Whites but a deliberate act, and that no amount of moral lecturing will persuade the white man to "correct" the situation. The system concedes nothing without demand, for it formulates its very best method of operation on the basis that the ignorant will learn to know, the child will grow into an adult and therefore the demands will begin to be made. It gears itself to resist demands in whatever way it sees fit. When you refuse to make these demands and choose to come to a table to beg for your deliverance, you are asking for the contempt of those who have power over you. This is why we must reject the beggar tactics that are being forced on us by those who wish to appease our cruel masters."¹⁰²

In articulating that apartheid cannot be eradicated by the "endurance" of the oppressed, "moral lecturing" and "beggar tactics," Biko advocates black unity, "totality of involvement." That is to say, "Blacks must respond as a cohesive group...cling to each with a tenacity that will shock the perpetrators of evil"¹⁰³ In the interest of black unity and solidarity in the struggle, Biko rejects integration because it is practically impossible to achieve; that it is "the superior-inferior white-black stratification that makes the White a perpetual teacher and Black the perpetual student (and a poor one at that)."¹⁰⁴ He believes that the whole system has to be overhauled before Black and White can walk hand in hand to oppose a common enemy. Further, he claims that

¹⁰²Steve Biko, I Write What I like, p. 90-91.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 24.

"the political (integration) vocabulary that the Blacks have been using has been inherited from the liberals."¹⁰⁵ In rejecting integration as understood by the liberals as the basis for a new political reality, Biko seems to allege that the language of non-racialism and integration has no contextual reference for Blacks, as such; it was externally imposed.

Biko favors a more radical understanding of integration based on "free participation by all members of a society, catering for full expression of the self in a freely changing society as determined by the will of the people."¹⁰⁶ This form of integration should exhibit the true values of the African majority population. Participation and African values such as sharing, belonging, respect and humanness are the foundation of the good society. Since apartheid has denied full participation to the majority population and undermined "true African values," the way out for black people is this: "white liberals must leave Blacks alone to take care of their own business while they concern themselves with the real evil in our society--white racism."¹⁰⁷ Biko argues that white liberals have to attack the evil of "white racism" rather spending time trying to win credibility among Blacks. The idea of "leaving Blacks alone" is Biko's strategy of temporary

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 23.

disengagement until Blacks have gained self-confidence and self-reliance, so that they can claim equal political place with whites in the political life of the country.

For Biko, the period of engagement as political strategy was not a type of black racism. He also rejected the charge that Black Consciousness and its exclusion of whites constituted hate. He explains:

"The liberal is no enemy, he is a friend--but for the moment he holds us back, offering a formula too gentle, too inadequate for our struggle...Our main concern is the liberation of the Blacks--the majority of South Africa--and while we want to work to establish a country in which **all men are free and welcome citizens**, White as well as Blacks, we have to concentrate on what means most to Blacks."¹⁰⁸

Biko envisions the liberation of the oppressed majority as the **sine qua non** for the good society, where the democratic ideals of freedom and citizenship are upheld and respected. In addition, the good society implies full participation in the decision-making process which is what citizenship is all about. Biko seems to assert that the many are a guarantee for an authentic community, where everybody belongs. Hence the exclusion of whites is not an end in itself but it is a means to the good society.

Let us now proceed to examine its corresponding theological support for the Africanist/Black Consciousness by focussing on Manas Buthelezi.

¹⁰⁸Donald Woods, Steve Biko, (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1987), pp. 63-64. Emphasis mine. This was an interview that Woods had with Biko.

Manas Buthelezi
Biographical Sketch

For lack of sufficient information, we set out to present only a cursory biographical sketch of Bishop Manas Buthelezi.¹⁰⁹

Buthelezi was born in February 10, 1935 in Ceza, Mahlabathini in Zululand. His parents, Solomon and Grace are communicant members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa. Buthelezi's father was a miner. That is to say, he worked in the goldmines in Johannesburg. Regarding the nature of his father's work, Buthelezi says, "...while he was a young man, used to work in the mines in Johannesburg."¹¹⁰ He received his primary education at Ceza. Subsequently, in 1960 he received his BA degree from the University of South Africa by correspondence. He obtained his Master of Sacred Theology degree at Yale Divinity School in 1964 and four years later earned his doctorate in theology from Drew University (1968). Prior to his decision to enter the ministry of the Church in 1961, Buthelezi was a high school teacher having obtained his teaching deploma in 1957. Upon the completion of his doctoral degree at Drew Unviversity, Buthelezi returned to South Africa to teach at Maphumulo Theological Seminary, 1968-69. In 1972 he was a visiting professor at Heidenburg University in Germany. In 1975 he was offered similar opportunity at Wesley

¹⁰⁹Bishop Manas Buthelezi. Hereafter he is refered to as Buthelezi.

¹¹⁰Theo Sundermeier, ed., Church and Nationalism in South Africa, p. 103.

Seminary.

He is regarded as the father of the South African Black Theology and an arch critic of the system of apartheid. In December 1973 a five-year ban was imposed on him by the South African government. The ban was lifted in May 1974 after a series of protests from all over the world.

In 1973 he served as a director of the Natal Region for the Christian Institute of South Africa. He moved to Johannesburg where he was consecrated Bishop of the Lutheran Church. In 1976 at the height of the unrest, he was elected the chairperson of the Soweto Black Parents' Association. The association was created to deal with educational crisis in black schools. He is at present the Bishop of the Central Diocese in the Transvaal, Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa. In addition to being a member of the Commission of Faith and Order of the World Council of Churches, Buthelezi is the president of the South African Council of Churches.

Having briefly considered Buthelezi's biographical information, we now set out to probe his vision of the good society.

Buthelezi's Africanist/Black-consciousness

Vision

Buthelezi's vision of the good society is rooted in the African concept of the wholeness of life and the Christian concept of fellowship. The idea of the wholeness of life, for

Buthelezi, meant that "religion and life (political, social and economic) belonged together. Far from being a department, religion was life." He further explains, "in traditional African religion there was no separate community of religious people, because everyone who participated in the life of the community automatically participated also in its religion."¹¹¹ An analysis of the concept of the wholeness of life demonstrates that life had sacramental character. That is to say, "life, therefore, becomes our place of rendez-vous with God. Life was alive with God."¹¹² Given the situation of apartheid, black life has been made cheap; are denied access to the wholeness of life because they have been oppressed, their humanity denigrated and distorted. Hence the questions: "After all who am I?" "How can I so live as to overcome what militates against the realization of my destiny as a human being?" These questions are in substance a cry for authentic humanity, characterized by the wholeness of life which is the end of the good society. Buthelezi's understanding of the idea of wholeness of life calls for the liberated humanity without which the vision of the good society is impossible. He states that Blacks must be liberated from becoming "objects of manipulation by forces--human or otherwise--that vie to take possession of man's selfhood in order to shape and direct its

¹¹¹Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation and Wholeness," in John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, (London: SPCK Press, 1987), p. 95.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 96.

own ends." Blacks must be liberated too from "the colonization of the human self,"¹¹³ which is characteristic of the alienation which apartheid has caused in black existence. In essence, Buthelezi makes Black liberation the basis for the good society, for indeed no good society can be constituted by people who are an "object of manipulation by others and means to others people's ends."¹¹⁴ That is to say, under the conditions of apartheid it would be impossible to experience concretely the wholeness of life.

Buthelezi considers Black theology an instrument for self-emancipation and offers the possibility of the realization of the wholeness of life by affirming the black person's divine creatureliness. For this reason, he observes, Black Theology is an "attempt on the part of black theologians to define the Gospel in a way that repairs the damage inflicted by apartheid." He contends:

"Gospel" so defined then says to black people: You too, black as you are, and even though poor and feeling powerless, were created in the image of God for a higher destiny than what you experience. Do not despair; take courage in the liberating Gospel of Jesus Christ. Take your own good initiative. Do not hate the white man simply because you believe he has rejected you. Come on, be creative. Have your own black love that can exist and survive irrespective of the existence or non-demonstration of white love. Do not only take spiritual initiative from white people; accept the responsibility of taking initiative yourself even to

¹¹³Ibid., p. 97.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

the point of proclaiming the Gospel to your white rulers."¹¹⁵

According to Buthelezi, apartheid has "destroyed the spiritual (and the political) vision" of the people, hence the need for Black Theology. What we observed in the citation above is the liberating task of Black Theology to infuse hope and self-determination into the oppressed. Black Theology is even more important in the context where blackness "sometimes means no job no house to sleep in and no vote."¹¹⁶ That is to say, the color factor has been elevated to the status of the ultimate. Consequently, Buthelezi concludes:

"Blackness is a life category that embraces the totality of my daily existence. It determines the circumstances of my growth as a child and the life possibilities opened to me. It now determines where I live, worship, minister and the range of closest life associates."¹¹⁷

This context needs structural change in order to promote social justice and love. And this change can only come about through "the spiritual awakening of the black man toward the message of the Gospel."¹¹⁸ It requires also that the Black release his creative potential and appropriate the power of self-articulation or self-assertion. That is to say, the

¹¹⁵Manas Buthelezi, "Black Theology and the Le Grance-Schlebusch Commission," Pro Veritate, (October 1975), p. 5.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹⁷Manas Buthelezi, "An African Theology or a Black Theology," in Basil Moore, ed., Black Theology: The South African Voice, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1973), p. 33.

¹¹⁸Manas Buthelezi, "Change in the Church" in South African Outlook, Vol. 103, (August 1973), p. 128.

ability to say, "I am black, I am black." That self-articulation, Buthelezi contends, "is the setting loose of the chains of the spirit."¹¹⁹ Put differently, Black Theology enables black people to "discover their God-given potential and to stand in creative relation to white people."¹²⁰ Buthelezi thinks that the church should be a vehicle of societal transformation. But for this to happen the church itself has to undergo radical structural change. It has to change from being a "satelite of white power politics" and its sectarian practice "in order to reflect the whole people of South Africa." For this reason, "the church must release its potential by promoting the reflection of its black constituency in both structure and proclamation."¹²¹ Notably, Buthelezi is directing his concerns toward the so-called multi-racial churches but not toward the independent churches. The independent churches have never been the "satelite of white power politics" because they are exclusively black.

Having discussed the concept of wholeness of life and its implications for the good society, we now turn to Buthelezi's

¹¹⁹Manas Buthelezi, "Black Creativity as a Process of Liberation," in Pro Veritate, (June 1976), p. 16. This was the speech that Buthelezi gave to the African Bank Celebration in Cape Town, March 21, 1975. He emphasized that the African Bank was an example of the "black man's creative and positive action under the economic circumstance where there is no equal sharing of wealth in South Africa."

¹²⁰Manas Buthelezi, "The relevance of Black Theology," in South African Outllok, (December 1974), p. 198.

¹²¹Manas Buthelezi, Change in the Church, p. 128.

theological understanding of African nationalism and how it serves as a goal for an acceptable community. First of all, he draws a distinction between statutory and genuine nationalisms. He explains that statutory nationalism is heteronomous since it has been "created by the government to give moral respectability to apartheid." It sanctions "separation as an alternative solution..." Buthelezi argues that statutory nationalism is immoral in that "it does not promote the well-being of the neighbor...limits the possibilities of attaining that which constitutes the wholeness of life...and narrows your horizon in life as to exclude you from other spheres of human existence which may serve to enrich your life." True, this form of nationalism has been "imposed by force over the genuine national spirit of the people." In the same vein, he says, "genuine African nationalism has been characterized by the spiritual attempt to transcend tribal boundaries. It was outward looking and held as the ideal South African nationalism. It never understood itself as an end. It was a point of departure."¹²²

His understanding of nationalism indicates that genuine nationalism must promote the well-being of the neighbor because "such promotion of the well-being of the neighbor is consistent with the will of God, because God is in the first

¹²²Manas Buthelezi, "The Ethical Questions raised by Nationalism." in Theo Sundermeier, ed., Church and Nationalism in South Africa, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975), p. 100.

place for the well-being of man."¹²³ Buthelezi grounds genuine nationalism in the will of God. He justifies the genuine African nationalism as "a unity movement, a movement from the few to the many; from a limited fellowship to a wider one." In addition, he points out that African nationalism such as PAC and ANC were founded because blacks were excluded from South African nationalism. "They all of a sudden discovered themselves left out. Then they had to start where they were."¹²⁴ In fact, this explains the existence of all black South African liberation movements; they came into being because of the statutory nationalism. The statutory exclusion necessitated the formation of black solidarity in the form of African nationalism

Clearly, for Buthelezi, African nationalism is not a goal or "an end" but "a point of departure." On the basis of this assertion, one can deduce that his Africanist vision of society aims at the creation of participatory democracy, namely a wider community of persons. African nationalism, he reasons, is inherently "outward looking," hence it is closer to the Christian ideal, in that, "it transcends the isolationist and exclusive dictates of natural instincts by widening the horizon of human association beyond the limits of

¹²³Ibid., p. 99.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 100.

race and color."¹²⁵ He adds, "all christian effort concentrates on strengthening bonds of fellowship between man and man irrespective of their color or race."¹²⁶ The phenomenon of black solidarity, he argues, "creates another base for realizing their (black) identity....it may be a first step toward the greater South African nationalism initiated by black people."¹²⁷

Buthelezi appropriates the Christian concept of fellowship as a theological underpinning for his vision of the good society. The concept depicts the actualization of the political struggle as "sharing of power" rather than abdication of power which, in his view "has no moral value." He goes on to say the giving up of power has to be distinguished from the restoration of power to where it solely and legitimately belongs," and this, he believes "may be a moral act of repentance." He concludes that "sharing of power can only exist in the context of love, since it is impossible to share anything with your enemy."¹²⁸ The good society, for Buthelezi, is predicated upon the principle of fellowship based on love. Despite the separate ecclesiastical life, Buthelezi calls upon the church to embody and exemplify the

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 101.

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 103.

¹²⁸Manas Buthelezi, "Giving Witness to the Heart of the Gospel," in International Review of Mission, Vol. 73, 1984, p. 418.

new racial fellowship. He insists, "a racially mixed church service would assail the majesty of the god of racism."¹²⁹

So the idea of fellowship is central as the basis of the good society. Thus, the notion of fellowship may imply a broad inclusion of interracial people which may serve as a political paradigm for an ideal society--"the greater South African nationalism." What seems to create an obstacle, however, is the actualization of this vision, given the exclusivistic premise upon which it is based. In addition to the principle of fellowship, Buthelezi envisions a society based on justice. He believes that "justice belongs to God and not to the discretion of politicians." For this reason, he sees justice concretely expressed in a communal life of sharing, that is, a pooling of God's gifts for common consumption."¹³⁰ He commits himself to work for the society which reflects the "integrity of God's love and justice." Buthelezi places the task of bringing about the good society squarely in the hands of the Blacks. He raises the question whether Christian love and social justice are safe in the hands of the white man. His answer to this question is revealing:

"As far as the violation of social justice is concerned, there is a sense in which one can say that the black man has become a 'Christ' to the white man: he has been 'crucified' so as to bring security and social salvation to the white man.

¹²⁹Buthelezi, "Christianity in South Africa," Pro Veritate (June 15, 1973), p. 4. and idem, "Christianity in My World," Katallagete, vol. 5, no. I (Spring 1974).

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 5.

What counts for his insecurity means security for the white man; his poverty is the yardstick for the white man's affluence. In other words, the white man would not be affluent if the black man were less poor than he is."¹³¹

Here Buthelezi describes what he understands to be the problems of the present society in South Africa. A society organized in this way violates God's love and justice. The good society, for Buthelezi, would be based on fellowship, love and justice for all. For one thing, Buthelezi regards the liberation of the blacks as the starting point for authentic humanity responsible for shaping its own destiny. So, the good society is constituted by liberated political agents who strive for fellowship between Black and White.

Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi

Biographical Sketch

Gatsha Mangosothu Buthelezi, son of chief Mathole and Princes Magogo, was born in August 27, 1928 at Ceza Swedish hospital. His father, a polygamist, had expected a son from among his wives before he married Princes Magogo but with no success. When the birth of a baby boy was announced, the chief said it was too good to be true, just another "Usuthu" lie, and the baby boy was named "Mangosuthu" which means "the lie

¹³¹ Manas Buthelezi, "Change in the Church," Pro Veritate, (September 1973), p. 5.

of Usuthu."¹³² His first name, "Gatsha", means "branch of a tree."

He grew up in the royal family under the tutelage of his uncle, Prince Mshiyeni kaDinizulu, who acted as regent. He received his early education in Nongoma district and then proceeded to Adams College where he matriculated. Adams College was a missionary school, so Buthelezi was also exposed to the tenets of the Christian faith. He received his university education at Fort Hare, but he took the final examination toward his BA degree in Durban. The reason for writing his examination in Durban rather than in Fort Hare was that he was expelled from the University for taking part in an ANC Youth League boycott of a visit of the governor-general, G. Brand van Zyle.

Upon completion of his studies, Buthelezi worked in the Bantu Affairs Department as an interpreter clerk. He resigned his position after a year with the aim of taking articles to become a lawyer. His aim did not materialize, for he was summoned home to Mahlabathini in 1953 because of an impending tribal split due to serious discord over leadership. He was made prime Minister to Paramount chief Cyprian, and he served for sixteen years in that position. When the Zulu Territorial Authority was imposed on the Zulu people, he was elected Chief

¹³² The marriage between Chief Mathole and Princes Magogo was intended to cement a historic association between the "Usuthu" royal tribe, from which the Paramount Chief descends, and the Buthelezi tribe, who were the advisers to the royal family.

Executive Councilor of the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly, in April 1972. Since then, Buthelezi has remained a vocal leader of the Kwa-Zulu nominally independent homeland. At first, Buthelezi was suspicious of the introduction of the Zulu Territorial Authority¹³³, but he later thought he could work within the government structures in order to bring about change. He cites high-ranking members of the ANC, for example Albert Lethuli, who gave him encouragement to enter the homelands' politics. He is at present the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland and the President of the Inkatha Freedom Party, formally known as Inkatha Cultural Organization. In addition, he holds the position of Minister of Police--a position which gives him power over black designated police stations in Natal. Given this background, let us examine his collaborationist societal vision.

Buthelezi's Collaborationist Societal Vision.

Buthelezi is one of the most ambiguous homeland leaders, one whose political vision is subtle and difficult to determine. When criticized for his participation in the homelands, Buthelezi responded, "If I were not here and some other leader had accepted independence for Kwa-Zulu, the struggle would be lost, there would be no hope for a national

¹³³The South African government established this act in 1951 under the Bantu Authorities Act. Under this act, each tribe or region was compelled to establish a Tribal Authority. The established Territorial Authorities prepared a way for what is known today as the homelands.

convention, for a negotiated future for South Africa, and the Whites would do whatever they wished forever."¹³⁴ Further, he claims to appropriate the tradition of resistance embodied in the ANC. Thus, he states, "We blacks in our organizations are in a sense pieces of the ANC jigsaw puzzle."¹³⁵ This may be construed as a claim to his insider role within the tradition of the ANC. His outsider role was expressed when he encouraged the Zulu people to "take as much as they could from the system" and shared the concern that "opposition to it could only be suicidal."¹³⁶ This viewpoint may be a realistic stance on his part, considering the military power of the South African government, and it also provides a justification for his collaborationist vision. Since "opposition to it" (apartheid) could lead to suicide, he decided to "work within the system" for change. In another instance, Buthelezi says, "...we do not expect a sham self-government but the real thing. If the minority of Whites have now [decided] to set up black, separate states, we have no means to resist it, even had we wanted to....We expected sympathetic application of the policy from the Afrikaners, who have a recent history of being

¹³⁴Richard John Neuhaus, Dispensations, p. 242. This is an interview with Buthelezi.

¹³⁵Gatsha Buthelezi, Human Rights and Constitutional Development in South Africa, (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1976), p. 15.

¹³⁶Ben Timkin, Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman, (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons, 1976), p. 78.

oppressed."¹³⁷

His collaborationist vision is predicated upon the belief that "the homelands would have greater potential as a basis of a future South Africa."¹³⁸ Having noted that the homelands were established in terms of the Government policy of Separate Development, Buthelezi argues, "if the homelands and other states are established justly in a manner that **accommodates** the aspiration of the African people and their economic interest, South Africa would have solved her problems through the homeland policy."¹³⁹ He proposes three models through which his collaborationist vision could be accomplished. Here the language changes slightly, for he speaks about states rather than homelands. In fact, what he envisions exists one way or another in South Africa. The models are as follows:

(1) "States in which the interest of some African ethnic group are paramount. (2) States in which the interest of White people are paramount. (3) Special or Federal areas which are multinational in character or in which no particular group interests are designated."¹⁴⁰

The aim of these models, Buthelezi explains, would be to guarantee "every group security " and to ease "interracial

¹³⁷Gatsha Buthelezi, "Challenges of the Seventies," in South African Outlook, Vol. 102-103, (January 1972), p. 4.

¹³⁸Gatsha Buthelezi, White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Future of the Homelands, (Cape Town: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1974), p. 9.

¹³⁹Gatsha Buthelezi, "Toward Federation," in South African Outlook, Vol. 104-105, (March 1974), p. 44. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 44.

tensions in South Africa."¹⁴¹ Interestingly, this kind of arrangement would be done in such a way that the states where "group's interests are paramount does not necessarily mean the break-up of the economic integration achieved in the economy of South Africa."¹⁴² Regarding the political power, he states:

"Political power within each state must be based on popular will. Each state will naturally have a right to determine or draw up a constitution that suits itself as is already happening within the various **homelands governments**. Attempts would have to be made to **ensure** that in our participatory democracy in the **Black States** the educated African elite is included. These are people who would help in the smooth running of the government machinery in these new states: Each state would determine the question of franchise rights for itself. In most homelands any one who has reached the age of 18, male or female, has a vote."¹⁴³

Analysis of his political thought shows that Buthelezi favors the continuation of the Group Areas system as concretely expressed in the homelands system but under a new name, states. To demonstrate his collaborationist vision based on separate development, he says, "the state government, as at present in the homelands, should continue to be held by the chief minister and a cabinet responsible to him."¹⁴⁴

As chief minister, Buthelezi admits his collaboration with the government. He says:

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁴³Ibid. Emphasis mine.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 46.

"...we the Zulus have always cooperated with all Governments in South Africa, even if we abhor their policies. If they want us to carry this (homelands system) out, it must be done sincerely, through and through. They promise us human dignity, but there is only one version of human dignity. If they don't want to share human dignity with us, and they want to give us human dignity separately, that's all right."¹⁴⁵

Here Buthelezi accepts the idea of separate dignities. In support of this thinking, he says that "...if they are giving us our own nation, that's okay; we are not against being given nationhood. But it must be a true nation."¹⁴⁶ But nationhood, it can be argued, is not given on a silver platter; it is born through the struggle.

Buthelezi's collaborationist vision indicates that the society is deemed good where there is political accommodation between Blacks and Whites. In support of this view, he says, "We must not believe those Black spokesmen here and abroad, who say that Blacks are no longer prepared to compromise....Given adequate leadership, with the right safeguards, the majority of both Blacks and Whites are prepared to accommodate each other politically."¹⁴⁷ To this end, he initiated the "Buthelezi Commission" which researched and recommended to the government the creation of Natal/Kwa-

¹⁴⁵Gatsha Buthelezi, The Past and the Future of the Zulu People, (California: California Institute of Technology, 1972), p. 8.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁴⁷Gatsha Buthelezi, "Why the Buthelezi Commission?" (Johannesburg: South African Race Relations Inc., 1982), p. 11.

Zulu "regional autonomy" within the apartheid structure. He believed that this can "demonstrate the possibility for an accommodation for the rest of the country to see. It was never meant to be a black/white Natal alone."¹⁴⁸ His collaborationist vision informs his tactics and strategies within the homeland framework. The government has regarded him as a moderate Black because he claimed to embrace a non-violent approach as a solution to the South African political problems.

Buthelezi's activities give an impression of inner conflict in his attempt to prove that his collaborationist vision serves the struggle for freedom and justice. This conflict is more evident when he called "Inkatha" a "national movement towards liberation" which implies that it is committed to the struggle for the liberation of Blacks. In the same address, he says, in Kwa-Zulu, "we have founded Inkatha, a national cultural liberation movement...." Although Inkatha has the word "national" tacked to it, it remains a Zulu cultural organization. This shows that his collaborationist vision is confined to the homelands, yet, quests for national application. The real conflict is in being both a homeland and a national leader in terms of his vision.

On the public forums, he claims national leadership. He says:

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 11. The government rejected the recommendations of the Buthelezi Commission for political and economic amalgamation of Kwa-Zulu and Natal on a basis of power-sharing.

"There is no Zulu freedom that is distinct from the blackman's in South Africa. Black oppression has no ethnic boundaries. We have a common destiny as Black people. We have indeed a common destiny even with our white country men who have rejected the idea for several generations. There are implications for a just and non-racial society."¹⁴⁹

Buthelezi justifies his collaboration with the government by asserting that he opted for the politics of accommodation/negotiation rather than confrontational politics. To this end, he reasons, the radical non-cooperation of the African Congress and others "challenges the state without engaging the state. It endorses itself out of the institutionalized politics."¹⁵⁰ He claims that his participation and collaboration is "an incursion into the seat of power,"¹⁵¹ which in his view is the basis for the politics of negotiation rather than radical the politics of resistance. We continue to the corresponding theological support of the collaborationist societal vision by focusing on Bishop Isaac Mokoena.

Mokoena's Biographical Sketch.

¹⁴⁹Gatsha Buthelezi, "Facing the Truth," in South African Outlook, Vol. 106-107, (March 1976), p. 35. In that speech he emphasized that Blacks are "concerned first and foremost with liberation. We want to be free from oppression. We want to be free from being unworthy of having a real vote in the country of our birth...We disdain the political role into which the white minority power elite has relegated us."

¹⁵⁰Gatsha Buthelezi, The Future of South Africa: Violent Radicalism or Negotiated Settlement, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1986), p. 5.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 5.

I set out to give a brief biography of Mokoena. Isaac Mokoena was born in September 12, 1927 in Middleburg, Transvaal. He received his primary and high school education at St. Peters and Khaiso respectively. He holds a Licentiate in Theology from D. L. Moody College in the United States and a doctorate of Divinity from "Onyang Academy" in Korea.¹⁵²

Mokoena served as a divisional director in the South African Council of Churches. In 1979 he relinquished his post after he was acquitted on 17 counts of fraud. He taught at the South African college of Independent Churches. He is a member of St. John's Mission Church in Sobokeng, Sharpville. Mokoena was imprisoned for supporting the African National Congress¹⁵³. At present, he is honorable life president of the Reformed Independent Churches Association, which claims to represent 4.5 million Christians. In 1983 he joined the International Council of Christian Churches, a fundamentalist religious organization, which opposes the activities of the

¹⁵²Mokoena's claim that he received a doctorate degree from "Onyang Academy" in Korea is being disputed. Worship says, "he (Mokoena) distributed a curriculum vitae to the reporters in 1986 which listed a number of degrees. He claimed a PhD from "Onyang Academy in Korea. On Investigation it was found that this 'Academy' was in fact produced from a 'deploma mill' run by a small right-wing sectarian group." Vide M. E. Worship, "Right Wing Religion South Africa." This unpublished paper was written for South African Theological Commission in October 3, 1989. The paper is obtainable at the University of Natal Library.

¹⁵³Neuhaus supports the claim that Mokoena spent five years in prison for supporting the activities of the ANC. Vide Richard J. Neuhaus, Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans see it," (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 170-171.

World Council of Churches and the South African Council of Churches. The ICCC is under the leadership of Carl McIntire. He openly expressed his support for ICCC and his opposition against the ecumenical bodies in these words:

"We have seen the good work done by Dr. McIntire and the I.C.C.C. We share your concern and wish to hands with you in the struggle of eradicating the enemies of the Cross. To Churches who are not members of the W.C.C. and S.A.C.C. I want to say it is not sufficient to stay out of these organizations and not speak against their dirty ideologies for if you do not speak against them you condone and if you condone you are part of their system."¹⁵⁴

In January 1987, Mokoena was awarded the Decoration for Meritorious Service by President P. W. Botha. Botha's wife and Vorster's wife were the first women to be honored in this fashion, and Mokoena was the first black politician to receive such an award.

Mokoena's collaborationist societal vision

Politically, Mokoena's emergence on the political scene is fraught with controversies and contradictions. For this reason, he may be regarded as a political outsider. He does not claim his political legitimacy to be based on any of the old political liberation movements. Two factors could be attributed to the rise of Mokoena to conservative political prominence. First, the sanction and divestment campaigns of Tutu and others to try to bring pressure to bear on the

¹⁵⁴Isaac Mokoena, "Report" Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 8.

apartheid government. The government needed someone who had the stature or the rank of a bishop in order to counteract the domestic and international political activities of Bishop Tutu. Second, the violent national upheavals in the country contributed to his rise. In his region, the government needed someone to preach non-violence. In both these instances he became a handy instrument of the government, hence the award of the Decoration for Meritorious Service¹⁵⁵.

Mokoena has not produced a theological justification for his political involvement. His collaborationist view can be deduced from his press statements and his active relationship with the government. The constitution of his party¹⁵⁶ (United Christian Conciliation Party) subscribes to the principles of "fraternity and action." These principles are "to promote human rights, equal opportunity, non-racialism, multi-party democracy, non-violence, free enterprise and social responsibility." The document further states, "social responsibility of those who own property and the means of production must be assured." The constitution gives expression

¹⁵⁵The award was a seal of close political alliance and collaboration between Mokoena and the government. He lauded the government when it declared the United Democratic Front an affected organization, in 1986. The word "affected" organization means that the organization is banned from exercising its political function, and its finances frozen by the state. His political party (The United Christian Conciliation Party, has strongly condemned economic sanctions. See Star, (January 29, 1987).

¹⁵⁶He claims that his party is both relevant and commands enough grass-roots. Yet Mokoena admits that his party was forced "by the situation in the townships" to hold its first meeting in the middle of Pretoria. See The Star, (February 8, 1987).

to "freedom, equality and democratic rights for all can give expression to the people's sovereignty." In terms of the constitution, membership is open to all "who abide by Christian values, regardless of creed, sex and color." Mokoena clarified the membership status when he said, "non-Christians could become members, provided that their values were reconcilable with Christian values."¹⁵⁷ He reiterated the "fraternity of all South Africans of good will in the commitment to personal freedom and distributive justice."¹⁵⁸

He believes that his church stands for the truth. For this reason, he says Blacks must be "warned against the South African Council of Churches and its 'socialization' of the Gospel."¹⁵⁹ He further states that he believes in the "traditional Gospel--the only way to have complete liberation." That conference of his Association of Independent Churches "rejected totally and finally any claim by the SACC, the World Council of Churches, and office bearers of the bodies to speak on behalf of all Blacks in South Africa."¹⁶⁰ He also claims that the SACC has not only "secularized" and

¹⁵⁷The Citizen, (October 7, 1986). All the cited statements come from this Newspaper.

¹⁵⁸The Star, (October 7, 1986). The founders of the Christian Conciliation Party describe themselves as moderates who are tired of intimidation. Their willingness to collaborate and to embrace the rhetoric of the government makes their political legitimacy suspect.

¹⁵⁹The Citizen, (August 7, 1981).

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 7. 6. 81.

"politicize" the Gospel, but more importantly, it has "destroyed the uniqueness of the person of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer." This view leads him and his association "to urge the government to investigate the SACC with a view to having it declared an affected organization." His criticism of the SACC borders on hate rather than merely reflecting deep religious differences. Hence he says, "we consider them to be detrimental to the advancement of trust and understanding among Christian races in South Africa."¹⁶¹

From cursory glance at the government's language one would not be surprised to find that Mokoena has become a black spokesperson for the system. The government has actually investigated the SACC in order to declare it an affected organization--meaning: the organization was politically dangerous and undesirable in terms of the South African security law)--a move which only helped to strengthen the church council. The differences between Mokoena and SACC are both religious and ideological. Religious, in that Mokoena allows for inactive working of the Holy Spirit so that, for him, the Exodus event has no political and religious implications for Black liberation. Ideological in that he has opted to be the voice of the status quo and the prophet of doom. This ideological, stance expresses his collaborationist vision. His reaction to the Botswana raid serves to reinforce

¹⁶¹Ibid., 7. 6. 81.

his pro-status-quo approach. When the SACC condemned the Defence Force raid in Botswana, Mokoena welcomed the raid and said, "no civilized country would allow a neighbor to harbor its enemies who have no respect for loss of life, and I am very grateful that the security forces took this action..."¹⁶² He went on to say "We feel very strongly that the outside world should leave South Africa to solve its internal problems by itself without outside interference."¹⁶³ Interestingly, Mokoena justifies his political involvement in terms of reconciliation with the same justification as does Tutu. Tutu works for reconciliation with justice outside the confines of the apartheid system. Mokoena works for reconciliation within the confines of apartheid.

His accommodationist vision aims at reconciling the society through the maintainance of "law and order at all cost."¹⁶⁴ The real issue remains, this, since he represents predominantly black Christians, whose contact with white people is not possible in church services, what does "reconciliation" practically mean? This point disguises Mokoena from Tutu. Tutu does not theorize about non-racialism or reconciliation because he is the head of the multi-racial church in South Africa. His day-to-day activities serve to

¹⁶²The Citizen, (August 5, 1985). The raid aimed at killing the activists of the African National Congress.

¹⁶³Ibid., 7. 5. 85.

¹⁶⁴The Citizen, (November 21, 1989).

promote the spirit of non-racialism.

In this study, we have discussed the three visions of the good society. We have explained these visions as understood by our selected leaders. In the next chapter, we shall examine the strategies that each of the leaders in this study appropriates or devises to actualize their respective societal visions.

Chapter 2

MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES OF DISPUTES AMONG THE LEADERS

In the preceding chapter, we examined the non-racialist, Africanist and Collaborationist visions of how the good society should be organized. As we have seen, the black leaders we studied have provided their respective visions of the good society with their corresponding political and theological justifications. Now, visions are neither dreams nor irrational appetites; they are the shapers of human thoughts and actions. For this reason, the three visions referred to imply certain strategies and actions. In this chapter, I will attempt to analyze the major political issues which form the basis of disputes among the black leaders, so that their problems, strategies and views on specific issues may be better understood. The issues to be examined are as follows: Civil disobedience, Armed Struggle, Negotiation, Constitution,¹ Land, Sanctions and Homelands.

Our basic presupposition is that the four black political leaders base their strategies and actions on an appeal to some political principles. These political principles are sometimes

¹The term Constitution, as we use it here, points to the vision of the new South Africa, rather than the current racial South African Constitution.

easily related to certain religious principles, thus reflecting, in part, the religious background out of which these leaders emerged. Similarly, the three black religious leaders predicate their choice upon an appeal to some coherent theological concepts in advocating strategies and actions for their respective visions of the good society.

The procedure shall be to deal with each leader separately showing the justification for the specific position he took on concrete political issues.

NELSON ROLIHLEHLA MANDELA

Civil Disobedience

Since the forming of the Congress (ANC) in 1912 and until 1949 with the inception of the Youth League, the Congress had adopted purely a constitutional method of political action. This method included "deputations to see the authorities" and to impress upon them the need for urgent political transformation, "memoranda, and their passing of resolutions."² Having tested the constitutional approach and finding it insufficient, the Congress adopted "more militant forms of political action: eg., stay-at-home, civil disobedience, protests, demonstrations--also including the

²Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, p. 81. For thirty-seven years the African National Congress adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. At that time, the Congress thought that the African demands could be settled through peaceful discussion and negotiation leading to gradual full political rights, but the White government remained unmoved.

methods which had previously been employed by the ANC."³ To be sure, civil disobedience may be viewed as a change of strategy in the struggle against apartheid. The Defiance Campaign of 1952 against the unjust laws represented this new political phase. Mandela charged that the whole life in South Africa created conflict to any thinking African "between his conscience on one hand and the law on the other." He drew his ideas of civil disobedience from Earl Russell, one of the respected British philosophers, who followed his conscience in defiance of the law in protest against the nuclear-weapons policy. Mandela observed that for Russell "his duty to the public, his belief in the morality of essential rightness of the cause for which he stood, rose superior to his high respect of the law. He could do no other than to oppose the law and to suffer the consequence for it."⁴ Similarly, Mandela drew moral courage from Russell in opposing the unjust laws in South Africa. In other words, Mandela's commitment to break the law that conscience tells him is unjust expresses the highest respect of the law. For him, civil disobedience was a refusal to obey a law that violated a high principle of justice. For this reason, Mandela asserts:

"...the law as it is written and designed by the

³Ibid., p. 82. Civil disobedience (strikes, stay-at-home etc.) are an addition to the constitutional method of political struggle. This approach also includes some elements of the constitutional approach, in that the Congress was more than ready to discuss the African political grievances with the government.

⁴Ibid., p. 150.

Nationalist Government, is a law which, in our view, is immoral, unjust, and intolerable. Our consciences dictate that we must protest against it, that we must oppose it, and that we must attempt to alter it.

Always we have been conscious of our obligations as citizens to avoid breaches of the law, where such breaches can be avoided, to prevent a clash between the authorities and our people, where such clashes can be prevented, but nevertheless, we have been driven to speak up for what we believe is right, and to work for it and to try and bring about changes which will satisfy our human conscience."⁵

The law as it exists no longer serves as an instrument of justice, hence civil disobedience is the moral thing to do. He concludes, "men of public morality and conscience....must follow the dictates of their conscience irrespective of the consequences which might overtake them for it. We of the National Action Council, and I particularly as Secretary, followed my conscience."⁶ Civil disobedience does not imply a denial of political legitimacy of the law-making process, but the defiers are themselves placed outside the civil order as non-citizens by the very law they should perceive as legal. For Mandela, this situation sets a potential conflict between moral conscience and the law. He argues, "it is the government, its administration of the law, which brings the law into such contempt and disrepute that one is no longer concerned in this country to stay within the

⁵Ibid., p. 151.

⁶Ibid., p. 152. The Action Council was formed in 1952 to organize and co-ordinate the Defiance Campaign activities.

letter of the law."⁷

Despite the legal disrepute and violent character of the apartheid government, Mandela explained that the Defiance Campaign (civil disobedience) was "based on the principles of passive resistance." As an example of their commitment to a non-violent method, "there was not a single instance of violence in the course of this campaign on the part of any defier."⁸ That is to say, the defiers adhered strictly to the principle of non-violence as their modus operandi. The people were disciplined to avoid "recourse to violence" at all cost. But the government responded to every instance of the non-violent resistance of the African people with an indiscriminate and brutal violence.⁹

Armed Struggle

We have seen that in its quest for non-racial democratic government, the African National Congress adhered to its "tradition of non-violence and negotiation as a means for solving political disputes."¹⁰ The armed struggle marked a radical shift from the constitutional method. Practically,

⁷Ibid., p. 156.

⁸Ibid., p. 165.

⁹Some examples of the history of violence of the government against the Congress are as follows: On May 1, 1950, eighteen Africans were shot to death by police during a strike. On March 21, 1960, sixty-nine unarmed Africans were killed by police at Sharpsville. See Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, pp. 168 & 173.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 164.

armed struggle did not preclude civil disobedience. These methods were two sides of the same coin. Mandela explains the reasons for armed struggle as follows:

"Firstly, we believed that as a result of government policy, violence by the African people was inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity and bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not produced by war. Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of White supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which avoided any recourse to violence when this form was legislated against, then the government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence."¹¹

Mandela reasoned that armed struggle was a way of controlling the anger of the people and avoiding racial hostility. He considered armed struggle as "a legitimate form of self-defense against a morally repugnant system of government which does not even allow peaceful forms of protest."¹² Further, he stated that the "violence we chose to adopt was not

¹¹Ibid., p. 164. Italics mine.

¹²Nelson Mandela, "The ANC and the government must meet to negotiate a political settlement: Letter from Prison to President P. W. Botha July 1989," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990: Intensify the Struggle to Abolish Apartheid, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1990), p. 11.

terrorism."¹³ Clearly, the violent approach was arrived at when all else had failed. The political assessment that Mandela and his colleagues reached was that "it would be unrealistic and wrong for the African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence when the government meets our peaceful demands with force."¹⁴ Despite the intransigence of the government, Mandela asserted that the armed struggle was not planned "in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation and oppression of my people by the Whites."¹⁵ The adoption of the armed struggle strategy did not mean, however, that Mandela had lost focus on his non-racial vision of the good society. The tactic of "Umkhonto We Sizwe"¹⁶ was aimed at the realization of a

¹³No Easy Walk to Freedom, p. 164.

¹⁴Ibid., p.165.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 163.

¹⁶"Umkhonto We Sizwe" [means Spear of the Nation] is a military wing of African Nation Congress. Mandela and his colleagues founded Umkhonto We Sizwe, [in 1961] independently from the ANC, to pressure change through acts of sabotage. Unkotho was later incorporated as the authentic military wing of the Congress when the prospects for non-violent protests were curtailed and political organizations banned. The first explosion took place on December 16, 1961, followed by another one in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The President of the ANC, Albert Lethuli, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize a week before the first explosion. See Fatima Meer, Higher Than Hope: The Authorized Biography of Nelson Mandela, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1988), pp. 419-420. See also Alister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990), p. 244.

common society, where Black and White would co-exist. For this reason, Mandela testified that the "dominant idea (for armed struggle) was that loss of life should be avoided."¹⁷ Mandela argued that White monopoly of political power, and of committing violence against innocent and defenseless people, prepared the ground conducive to the formation of "Ukhonto wo Sizwe." Consequently, it aimed at putting an end to such a state of political and violent monopoly, and "to forcibly bring home to the government that the oppressed people of this country were prepared to stand up and defend themselves."¹⁸

In considering the tactic of armed struggle, Mandela and his colleagues had four forms of violence open to them. There was sabotage, guerilla warfare, terrorism and an open revolution. The choice for sabotage was a logical one, since "it did not involve a loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality."¹⁹ In his view, armed struggle was adopted to serve the realization of the non-racial vision. The tactic sought to destroy power plants, and rail and telephone communications, in order to scare capital from the country. In relating it to his non-violence principle, Mandela explained

¹⁷No Easy Walk to Freedom, p. 167.

¹⁸South African Outlook, Vol. 120, No. 1425, (March 1990), p. 119.

¹⁹No Easy Walk to Freedom, p. 171.

the political aim of "Umkonto We Sizwe" in these words:

"We of Umkonto We Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war."²⁰

From this citation, the armed struggle was a radical strategic move rather than a deviation from the letter and spirit of the non-violence principle. It aimed at achieving "liberation without bloodshed and civil clash." The oppressive conditions of apartheid seem to be the sole reason for the existence of violence. Mandela defended this view upon his release from prison when he said, "ANC's armed struggle...was a defensive action against the violence of apartheid and would continue until apartheid no longer existed."²¹ Once the conditions are removed, Mandela claimed, armed struggle would have no justification for its existence. When the government pressed on Mandela to renounce violence, he reminded the state about the history of the ANC in which the movement "sought peaceful solutions...instead it [government] took advantage of our commitment to a non-violent struggle and unleashed the most violent form of racial oppression this country has ever

²⁰Ibid., p. 171.

²¹The Washington Post, (February 14, 1990), p. A20.

seen."²² In addition, he pointed out, "the government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it."²³ By citing the non-violent tradition of his organization, he makes the primary violence of the state responsible for counter-violence of the ANC and concludes, "it is more than ironical that it should be the government which demands that we should renounce violence."²⁴ More importantly, the government should know that the "organization has no vested interest in violence. It abhors any action which may cause loss of life, destruction of property and misery to the people."²⁵ He categorically rejects the government's call for the ANC to renounce violence, saying, "a government which used violence against Blacks many years before we took up arms, has no rights whatsoever to call on us to lay down arms."²⁶ However, Mandela remains committed to peaceful change while retaining his defensive armed-struggle tactic in place. This means that his peace overtures are informed by his

²²Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 12. Vide New York Times (January 26, 1990) p. A6. Quotation is taken from a statement drawn up by Mandela before his meeting in 1989 with P.W. Botha, then President of South Africa.

²³Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 168.

²⁴Nelson Mandela, "The ANC and the government must meet to negotiate a political settlement: Letter from Prison to P. W. Botha July 1989," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 11.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶South African Outlook, Vol. 120 No. 1425, (March 1990), p. 119.

experience of the intransigence of apartheid.

With the Soweto national upheaval in 1976, we witnessed to a certain extent some radical indications in the change of strategy of the violent approach. With the inflow of the new recruits to the "Umkhonto We Sizwe" as a result of the Soweto School crisis, a two-pronged strategic distinction became evident. The non-violent/civil disobedience tactic (United Democratic Front and Mass Democratic Movement) continued inside the country, while the armed struggle operated externally, making its effects felt throughout the country. This distinction was anticipated when the military wing was formed, but the distinction was never really made clear in the day-to-day operation of the organization. The reason for this confusion was that the sabotage of military installations and other government infrastructures was viewed by the ANC as an advanced form of non-violence, since no loss of human life was involved.

This view changed in practice after the Soweto uprisings of 1976 when the youths who joined the ANC demanded that the war and violence be brought to the White neighborhoods. The intensification of the armed-struggle can be attributed in part to the youths who had experienced and fought the vicious system of apartheid in the streets of the Black townships. Some of the youths had reached a stage where no compromise was acceptable in their struggle against apartheid. Interestingly, Walter Sisulu was struck by the distinction between the

political and the military wing in the ANC, and how the distinction affected and created an obstacle toward reaching an agreement that reflects co-ordinated response to the issue of negotiation with the South African government. In his speech in Lusaka, Zambia, he said in part:

"There are sharp differences between hawks in the movement's military wing, who want to escalate the low-level guerilla war the ANC has waged for the last 27 years, and the doves in the political wing, who believe guerilla war may have to be suspended to get negotiation going."²⁷

This distinction of "hawks" and "doves" explains the two-pronged strategies which were in operation in the struggle for justice and human dignity. Both civil disobedience and sabotage tactics were deemed commensurate with the end: just and non-racial democracy. This approach indicated that Mandela was conscious about means in relation to ends of the struggle. Since the end for which he strove was a non-racial community, the means to that end had, ipso facto, to be peaceful and just, and had to include all races. The peaceful nature of sabotage, according to Mandela, was its focus on government selected installations, and its avoidance of harming human life.

²⁷The Washington Post, (January 18, 1990), p. A26. The italics mine. Walter Sisulu is an old anti-apartheid fighter, who was released from prison last year by the de Klerk government after serving 26 years in prison. Although Mandela did not use the words, "hawks" and "doves," he sought to keep the activities of "Umkonto We Sizwe" and the African National Congress distinct. Umkonto was a small organization created for a particular object, while the ANC remained a mass political organization for the African people. See Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 171.

Negotiation

As we have seen, negotiation is part of the ANC non-violence strategy of solving political disputes. That is to say, the issue of negotiation formed the basis of the ANC tradition. In other words, the decision to participate in the political negotiation aimed at the resolution of the political problems, and the creation of the non-racial democracy is not a deviation from its policy. Mandela initiated the process of negotiation while he was in prison. He considers negotiation a process leading to the "sharing of political power with Blacks."²⁸ An analysis of his negotiation approach reveals three stages.

The first stage aims at the removal of obstacles that stand in the way of authentic negotiations. The obstacles would be removed by: freeing all political prisoners, allowing all the exiles to return, withdrawing troops from the black townships, and lifting the state of emergency. Once these obstacles are removed, Mandela believes, a political climate conducive to preliminary talks about talks would exist.

The second stage involves the preliminary talks which would address the issue of participants at the negotiation table. The Congress admits that "other organizations should be

²⁸Nelson Mandela, "The ANC and the government must meet to negotiate a political settlement: Letter from Prison to P. W. Botha July 1989," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 15; and idem The New York Times, (January 26, 1990), A6.

represented at eventual negotiation on the country's future."²⁹ The statement went on to suggest the election of the constituent assembly as a solution to credible representation to the negotiation table. The logic for constituent assembly, Mbeki argues, is that "you stop all the debates about who is bigger than whom and who is a genuine representative and who is not."³⁰ The third and final stage involves bargaining over the new constitution. The constituent assembly will be responsible for producing a new constitution. Mandela sees the main issue in negotiations as "reconciling Black demands for one man, one vote [Black majority rule] with White fears..." To this end, he believes that "there is sufficient goodwill [between ANC and the government] to reconcile these two points." He believes also that the "ANC is certainly ready to address the fears of Whites."³¹ Underlying his understanding of negotiation is the

²⁹Nelson Mandela, "We are committed to building a single nation in our country," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p 36. He delivered this speech at a Rally in Durban February 25, 1990. Vide The New York Times (May 4, 1990), p. A3. These were public statements by the ANC recognizing that there are other key participants to be included in the negotiation process.

³⁰Ibid., p. A3. Thabo Mbeki is a second senior official of the African National Congress.

³¹Nelson Mandela, "The ANC and the government must meet to negotiate a political settlement: Letter from Prison to P. W. Botha July 1989," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 18; Times Magazine, (February 26, 1990), p. 29. This was an interview with Mandela on his fifth day of freedom. Mandela states that the "role of negotiation would be to seek a 'reconciliation' between Black demands for majority rule and the insistence of Whites on the structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the White minority by the Blacks" see New York

idea of compromise. He understands compromise in its general sense, namely, "accommodating the point of view of the other party." Presumably, "compromise will be necessary when you are negotiating." For this reason, Mandela assures the Whites: "we are prepared to do that" (compromise). One thing is clear to Mandela, "if you don't intend having a compromise, you don't negotiate at all."³² So he goes to the negotiation table with an open mind, ready to hammer out a new constitution for a non-racial democratic country. For Mandela the object of negotiations is not only to bring an end to hostilities on both sides, significant though that may be, but more importantly, to eradicate apartheid and all its forms. For this reason, the ANC's abandonment of the armed struggle should be a consequence of, rather than a condition for, negotiation. That is to say, genuine political destruction of apartheid should evidently render the armed struggle strategy irrelevant.

Constitution

The issues that need constitutional consideration are: (i) Non-racial democracy based on one person one vote, with an electorate derived from a common voters' roll; (ii) a Bill of Rights, independent judiciary; (iii) a Mixed economy, with partial nationalization and redistribution of wealth; and (iv)

Times, (January 26, 1990), p. A6.

³²Ibid., p. 29.

structural guarantees to allay Whites fears of Black domination. I shall deal briefly with some of these issues in order to show Mandela's position on them. The Freedom Charter has addressed some of these issues in a cursory manner. In dealing with some of these issues, we shall constantly refer to the Charter.

(i) One person, one vote, on a common voters' roll. If enacted, one person, one vote, would logically result in rule by Blacks , since the majority population is black. For Whites, one person, one vote, evokes fears of being dominated by a Black majority. Thus there exist black demands for one person, one vote, on one hand and White fears on the other.

Mandela considers "one adult one vote," "the democratic principle." It is based on the "universal equal franchise rights" for all. He criticized the position of the Liberal Party on the same issue, since they stipulated clearly "that political rights based on a common franchise roll be extended to all suitably qualified persons."³³ The criterion for "suitably qualified person" became problematic for Mandela. In his view, the manner in which the Liberals handled this issue made their high-sounding political principle suspect, and reactionary in content.

Mandela views the criticism for Black majority rule by Whites and their Western friends as untenable and a contradiction in terms. He argues:

³³Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 42.

"Majority rule is acceptable to Whites as long as it is considered within the context of White politics. If Black political aspirations are to be accommodated, then some other formula must be found, provided that formula does not raise Blacks to a position of equality with Whites."³⁴

Clearly, he does not accept the political absurdity that would allow Whites to have the monopoly to determine the political formula when they are in power and to deny the same to Blacks when the latter are in power. Mandela makes majority rule the sine qua non for peace and stability. He reminds his audience, "...majority rule and internal peace are like the two sides of a single coin, and White South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability in this country until the principle is fully applied."³⁵ But basing majority rule on a principle rather than using it as a tactic, makes it impossible for Mandela to compromise on the issue. The government's rejection of this principle implies that "it wants no peace in this country but turmoil" Further, he insists that the principle "...is a pillar of democratic rule in many countries of the world. It is a principle which is fully accepted in the White politics of this country."³⁶ For this reason, it should hold true everywhere, particularly in South Africa.

In order to allay White fears, Mandela puts his full

³⁴Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 17.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

weight behind the Bill of Rights. (ii) The Bill of Rights will give legal and constitutional protection to all citizens irrespective of color or creed. The government of de Klerk insists on the concept of "group rights or minority rights."³⁷ This idea of group rights emphasizes the diversity of South African population rather than its common nationalism. The concept of group rights which Mandela rejects as non-democratic is based on the Group Areas Act, one of the pillars of apartheid. Acceptance of this idea implies perpetuation of apartheid. This position demonstrates the divergence of constitutional visions between de Klerk and Mandela. In showing sensitivity to White concerns and his confidence in the Bill of Rights, Mandela states:

"None among us should fear change. The change that must come will lead to the establishment of structures, institutions of social order, which must guarantee the rights of all citizens of our country to decide what happens to themselves, their families and their country. The solution we seek must be based on a common acceptance of the ideals of democracy, the rights of all the people to govern, good standard of living, social justice and peace in a united South Africa."³⁸

Mandela predicates his non-racial democratic rule upon the principle of one person, one vote, where the rights of the minority will be fully protected. The document which became the source for his conception of the Bill of Rights was the

³⁷The Christian Monitor, (May 9, 1990), p. 6.

³⁸The New York Times, (May 3, 1990). Emphasis mine. The citation is taken from excerpts of Mandela and de Klerk's remark at the opening of the talks aimed at the removal of obstacles for negotiations.

Universal Declaration of Rights. The document, he claims, "provides that all men are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection before the law."³⁹ Furthermore, he speaks of "...an entrenched and justifiable bill of rights, which should guarantee the fundamental human rights of all citizens."⁴⁰

(iii) Mixed economy and partial nationalization. The issue of mixed economy and partial nationalization is at the center of political debate. In support of mixed economy and partial nationalization, Mandela cites the sources that influenced his political thought. He says:

"I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. All this has led me to feel that in my search for a political formula, I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East."⁴¹

Mandela seems to be convinced that neither capitalism of the West nor socialism of the East, alone, will be able to address the economic demands of South Africa. For this reason, an appropriate and just system will have to be worked out to meet and bridge the gap of economic inequalities.

Nationalization is the policy of the African National Congress. The Freedom Charter is very explicit on the issue. It calls for "redistribution, but not nationalization, of

³⁹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 166.

⁴⁰Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, pp. 59-60.

⁴¹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 183.

land; it provides for nationalization of mines, banks and monopoly industry, because big monopolies are owned by one race only, and without such nationalization racial domination would be perpetuated despite the spread of political power."⁴² Mandela seems to suggest that political power without accompanying economic power does not make a substantial difference in the social life of the people. For him, nationalization aims at providing Black people with economic power--economic muscle which would otherwise remain in the hands of the Whites. He asserts that the issue of nationalization has been misconstrued by the Whites. He draws support for his assertion from the history of the Nationalist Party, in that "communications have been nationalized; many other sectors of the economy have been nationalized. The Nationalist Party once declared support for nationalization of the mines. All that time, Whites had the monopoly of political and economic power."⁴³ Mandela views the argument against nationalization as a political strategy aimed at denying Blacks economic power:

"Blacks will also have a dominant role in the economic structures of the country. Now the Whites are turning around and saying nationalization is

⁴²Ibid., pp. 178-179.

⁴³Mother Jones (June 1990), p. 25. The article is an interview that Philip Brooks and Ivor Powell had with Nelson Mandela in Soweto following his release from prison. Joe Slovo makes same the point on political and economic monopoly of the Whites. He said, "Whites had monopoly on the right to vote on ownership of land and other economic riches, while Blacks had a monopoly on deprivation and suffering" see The New York Times, (April 30, 1990), p.A6.

not good, you must privatize. Because they have got the economic and financial muscle, they have got the resources to buy the industries that would be privatized. We don't have...[the resources]. We cannot accept that."⁴⁴

As the issue of nationalization is being debated, the government is busy implementing its privatization policy. The government-run companies like the Electricity Supply Commission and Hospitals.⁴⁵ are being privatized. The government's move confirms Mandela's suspicion about the aim of privatization. His main objective is the democratization and deracialization of economic power. While pursuing this goal, he assures the business community about the ANC's economic policy when he says "we can have no desire to go out of our way to bash them and to undermine or weaken their confidence in the safety of their property and the assurance of their return on their investment." He continues, "there should be no debate among us about the centrality of the issue of ensuring a rapidly growing economy."⁴⁶ It is unclear whether this kind of reasoning broadens and compliments or contradicts the idea in the Charter which says, "the national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South Africans,

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁵The Christian Science Monitor, (May 10, 1990), p. 3. In this article, John Battersby makes the point that "ANC-allied groups are suspicious that the government's sudden enthusiasm for privatization is motivated by the desire to sell state assets before the Black rule."

⁴⁶Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 63.

shall be restored to the people."⁴⁷ Whatever may be the interpretation, Mandela is committed to partial nationalization in order to make the principle of ownership possible. This he believes to be the source of genuine political power.

Land

The Freedom Charter says, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White." It goes on to cite a historic fact, "that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace...."⁴⁸ To what extent is the declaration that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White" undermined by that fact of history? If we accept the first statement as moral truth and the second as historical fact, the question arises: (a) On what basis is founded the present occupation of 87% of the land by the white minority? According to the Charter, the answer is robbery. (b) Can the minority lay equal claim to ownership with the indigenous majority? This amounts to asking if the robbed and robber have equal claims. (c) Can a way be found to persuade the white minority to share the 87% of the land with the black majority? The Charter speaks of re-division of the land but no blue print is available to show how this could be achieved.

The Charter says, "all the land [shall be] re-divided

⁴⁷Nelson Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life, p. 51.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 50.

among those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger."⁴⁹ For Mandela, the land provides the people with the means for livelihood. The government system of rehabilitation not only "increased land hunger for the masses of the peasants" but it uprooted and impoverished them, and "completely severed them from their land, cattle and sheep..." thereby turning them into "a huge army of migrant laborers, domiciled in rural locations in the reserves away from the cities."⁵⁰

Mandela's understanding of the land emanates from the Charter's premise of common ownership. What is unclear is how such common ownership can be achieved given the disparity and inequalities that have existed and still exists. This question concerns the practical application of the idea of making real the claim that the land belongs to all the people. It is at this level where the crux of the political matter lies--a level at which it shall become evident whether Mandela is negotiating the terms of Blacks' surrender or a new political empowerment realized in the restoration of the land to the people. Land and economy are among the most important ingredients for genuine democracy. Hence questions of land and economy need to be asked in order to understand the nature of democracy for which people are striving. Otherwise, people are called upon to compromise beyond compromise in the name of an empty concept, democracy without any concrete political and

⁴⁹Bid., p. 51.

⁵⁰Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 44.

material reality for the people. Mandela does not propose how the land shall be restored to the people, since without it any political freedom is meaningless.

Sanctions

Sanctions are the main external political support that has pressured the Pretoria government to accord equal political status to the Black liberation movements. The issue of sanctions is not new in the South African political scene. Mandela called for sanctions for the first time in 1961, at a conference of the Pan-African Freedom Conference of East and Central Africa, held in Addis Ababa. At this conference he said, "we shall ask our millions of friends outside South Africa to intensify the boycott and isolation of the government of this country, diplomatically, economically, and in every other way."⁵¹ A similar call was made by Albert Lethuli, then President of the African National Congress. Considering the increased hardship that such action might bring to Blacks who are already suffering, Lethuli said:

"Economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardships for Africans. We do not doubt that. But if it is a method which shortens the day of bloodshed, the suffering to us will be a price we are prepared to pay. In any case, we suffer already; our children are often undernourished, and on a small scale, so far, we die at the whim of a

⁵¹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 106.

policeman."⁵²

Mandela, like Lethuli, considers economic sanctions a means to an end and not an end in themselves. In pursuance of this objective, Mandela supports the intensification of sanctions: "We call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate apartheid." He warned, "To lift sanctions now would run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid."⁵³ The existence of apartheid prolongs the application of sanctions as a strategy. Thus, he concludes, "sanctions will continue as long as apartheid exists." Referring to the odious system, apartheid, he states, "we must try to solve our problems while we continue to apply our strategies. We have no alternative but to apply sanctions."⁵⁴ Adding, "our policy is clear, we have called on the international community to isolate South Africa and that is still our position."⁵⁵ Mandela uses the political settlement as the legitimate basis for lifting sanctions, hence his insistence that they should be lifted only "when a settlement has been reached."⁵⁶ Speaking shortly after three days of talks to remove obstacles to formal

⁵²Albert Lethuli, Let My People Go: The Autobiography of a Great African Leader, (Johannesburg: Collins, 1962), p. 186.

⁵³Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 23.

⁵⁴The Washington Post, (May 24, 1990), p. A50.

⁵⁵The Weekly Review (Nairobi: May 18, 1990), p. 50.

⁵⁶Times Magazine, (February 26, 1990), p 29.

negotiations, he reiterated his unequivocal position on the issue, that, "sanctions should remain in place now." He added, "we hope that as a result of the agreement which we have arrived at and future development, it will not be necessary for us to call upon the international community to intensify or maintain sanctions."⁵⁷ The statement shows his willingness to consider the status of sanctions only when there is irreversible indication that apartheid is destroyed. He knows that words do not change human circumstance; hence when asked whether apartheid was dead, Mandela replied, "the reality is that I still have no vote."⁵⁸

Frank Chikane, the General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, reinforces Mandela's argument for the maintenance of sanctions. He said, "it would be a grave mistake for anyone to interpret the developments in South Africa as meaning that apartheid is about to be abolished." He added, "...we are not convinced that Mr. de Klerk is yet prepared even to entertain genuine negotiations to bring about an end of apartheid and the creation of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa."⁵⁹ Thus there is a need to be realistic in keeping strategy and vision together. In another

⁵⁷Nelson Mandela, "Now is the time to intensify the struggle," Greg McCartan, ed., Nelson Mandela Speeches 1990, p. 23. He made these remarks in a speech delivered in Cape Town following his release from prison February 1990.

⁵⁸The New York Times, (May 5, 1990), p. A6.

⁵⁹Third Way, Vol. 13, No. 3, (April 1990), p. 11. This was an interview by James Tweed with Frank Chikane.

statement of which Chikane was signatory, he said:

"It is quite clear that irreversible change goes far beyond the beginning of negotiations. There is nothing irreversible about starting negotiations. Rather, negotiations have to be successfully concluded to be irreversible. As yet, negotiations have not even begun --most of the pre-conditions have not been met."⁶⁰

Similarly, irreversibility, for Mandela, implies that the eradication of apartheid is imminent and that negotiations serve, as it were, to guarantee the deliverance of a non-racial democratic society. Hence there is a dependence upon sanctions as one of the major strategies for attaining the desired non-racial democracy.

Homelands.

Mandela regarded "The Homelands" as Verwoerd's tribalism, because it focused on the truncation of the tribes in line with a divide-and-rule policy. The Charter emphasized the idea that South Africa belongs to all the people, while the philosophy of Verwoed stated that "all the Bantu have their permanent home in the Reserves and their entry into the urban areas is merely of a temporary nature and for economic reasons. In other words, they are admitted as work-seekers, not as settlers."⁶¹ The homeland system is based on the

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 11. This quotation is taken from a statement issued by the Southern Africa Coalition lobby of Parliament on February 27, 1990.

⁶¹Optima, (March 1959). The Article cites the words of Dr. W. W. M. Eiselen, then secretary of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. The same words are cited in Nelson

complete separation of Blacks and Whites. Mandela rejects the creation of homelands because it denies "equal rights, or any rights at all, for Africans outside the Reserves." He adds, the system "provides for the division of the African population"⁶²--a technique that disrupts African unity and renders Blacks weak in their opposition to apartheid. The danger of such a division, Mandela argues, is that it creates an artificial distinction between the urban and Reserve Africans. The latter are "treated as outcasts not even settlers..."tolerated only on condition he is for the convenience of the Whites."⁶³ That is to say, the whole system was based on Africans being the objects or tools of the White man. Mandela found no moral basis upon which such a nefarious system could be built. Because Africans were considered things rather than human beings, the system of homelands resorted to "forcible uprooting and mass removals of the [indigenous] people" most of whom, Mandela aptly described as:

"...a nation of landless outcasts and roving beggars, humble 'work-seekers' on the mines and the farms where yesterday they had been masters of the land, the new White masters of the country 'generously presented' them the few remaining miserable areas as reservoirs and breeding-grounds

Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 67.

⁶²Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, pp. 68-69.

⁶³Ibid., p. 71.

for Black labor. These are the Reserves.⁶⁴

In addition to having become a landless people, the Africans were forced by law "to abandon their birthrights as citizens, pioneers and inhabitants of South Africa."⁶⁵ The homelands as designed by the government, he believes, fail to meet the requirements for an authentic self-governing state. He identifies two essential elements of the self-governing states as follows:

"Democracy. The organs of government must be representative; that is to say, they must be freely chosen leaders and representatives of the people, whose mandate must be renewed at periodic elections. **Sovereignty.** The government thus chosen must be free to legislate and act as it deems fit on behalf of the people, not subject to any limitations upon its powers by any alien authority."⁶⁶

Mandela employs these two essentials to evaluate the homelands proposal. Since these elements are absent in the government, he declares it a form of autocracy rather than democracy. He concludes:

"There is no sovereignty then. No autonomy. No democracy. No self-government. Nothing but a crude, empty fraud, to bluff the people at home and abroad, and to serve as a pretext for heaping yet more hardships and injustices upon the African people."⁶⁷

The analysis of the homelands helped Mandela to unravel the

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 71 & 73. The word "Reserve" means "Homelands" in accordance with the Afrikaner's language-manipulation technique.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 71.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 73.

hidden motive of the government, namely "to conceal a policy of ruthless oppression on the [Africans] and of buttressing the unwarranted privileges of the White minority, especially the farming, the mining, and financial circles." He added, "economically, the 'Bantustan'[Homeland] concept is just as big a swindle as it is politically."⁶⁸

The most devastating discovery of Mandela's analysis is the harsh reality that the "Bantustans" [Homelands] are not intended to voice the aspirations of the African people; they are instruments for their subjection. Under the pretext of giving them self-government, the African people are being split up into tribal units in order to retard their growth and development into full nationhood." He continued his observation: "behind the 'self-government' talks lies a grim program of mass evictions, political persecution and police terror."⁶⁹ This prophesy became a reality as the system of apartheid began to unfold.

On the basis of this analysis, Mandela condemned any co-operation with what he called the "last desperate gamble of a hated and doomed fascist autocracy."⁷⁰ Thus, people who served in government-created institutions, such as school boards and Bantu Authorities/Homelands were regarded as traitors, for "only traitors can serve on tribal councils."

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 79.

⁷⁰Ibid.

Mandela reasoned: "these [councils] are a mockery of self-government. They are meant to keep us in a state of slavery to Whites." He concluded: "we shall fight together tooth and nail, against the government's plan to bring Bantu Authorities to the cities, just as our people in the rural areas have fought."⁷¹

Before and shortly after he was released from prison, homeland leaders had been overthrown through coup d' 'etat one exception occurred in the Bophuthatswana homeland, where the government militarily intervened at the request of the homeland leader. The main reason for these coups is the re-incorporation of the so-called independent homelands into South Africa. They (Blacks) view the homelands with great suspicion and contempt. The re-incorporation idea serves to validate Mandela's view that homelands are meant "to keep us in a state of slavery," and foreigners. At a homecoming celebration in the Transkei homeland, Mandela encouraged the homeland not to seek incorporation into racial South Africa, but to wait and be incorporated in a just, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa.

DESMOND MPIOLO TUTU

Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience is for Tutu one of the concrete demonstrations of authentic "witness," as equated with the

⁷¹Ibid., p. 106.

Greek word for martyr. He observed that people have been "brainwashed into thinking that legally and morally means the same thing." Further, "it is illegal in this country for church groups to meet for more than a day without permission." He concluded, "it is eminently not immoral to do so."⁷² Since, legally, right does not imply moral right, the church may run the risk of breaking the law in obedience to God rather than to man, in order to bring Black and White Christians together. He envisaged a civil disobedience program where "Whites coming to Soweto and wishing to accompany him to church, should flout the law demanding that he have a permit-- from such small beginnings a process of disobeying unjust law on a large scale could be built."⁷³ The aim here was to defy the apartheid laws, which legislated against human and Christian fellowship. It can be deduced that, for Tutu, civil disobedience was both a tactic and a principle. A tactic in that it serves in a non-violent way to impress on the present government that it must abandon its immoral law. A principle in that it points to a high law: the law of God, for which absolute obedience is due. In other words, "obedience to God takes precedence over obedience to human beings (Acts 4:19; 5:29)."⁷⁴

⁷²Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 67.

⁷³Shirley Du Bouley, Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless, p. 159.

⁷⁴Desmond Tutu, "Letter From Desmond Tutu To P. W. Botha" in Crucible of Fire: The Church Confronts Apartheid, Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, eds., (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989), p.

Tutu gives theological justification to the principle of civil disobedience when he asserts:

"We are law-abiding. Good laws make human society possible. When laws are unjust then Christian tradition teaches that they do not oblige obedience. Our Lord broke not just human law but what was considered more serious, He broke God's law in order to meet human need--as when he broke the law of the Sabbath observance (John 5:8-14). He paid due regard to the secular ruler in the person of Pontius Pilate but subsequently engaged in a defiance of that secular authority when he refused to answer his questions (Mark 15:3-5)."⁷⁵

This justification helps to focus theologically on the spirit of civil disobedience which marked the "Parliament March" of the church leaders on February 29, 1988. The march was in response to the government's law that had arbitrarily outlawed the activities of the seventeen anti-apartheid organizations. The Parliament March aimed at demanding the restoration of the right to protest. A law which curtails this right, Tutu explains, could not be obeyed because it "removes nearly all effective means open to our people to work for true change by non-violent means..." In addition, the church leaders viewed the restrictions on organizations "not only as an attack on democratic activity in South Africa but as a blow directed at the heart of the church's mission in South Africa...."⁷⁶ In a situation where the law violates the propagation of the Gospel, Tutu posits, "the Gospel leaves us no choice but to

160.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 160.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 9.

seek ways of witnessing effectively and clearly to the values of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ."⁷⁷ In line with this reasoning, Tutu vowed to continue the march, saying, "we are defying, we are obeying God; and we are going to obey God every day."⁷⁸ The commitment to continue acts of civil disobedience is based on the assertion that "this is God's world, ["this" includes the parliament ground] that God is in charge."⁷⁹ This claim is not intended to undermine the authority of the legitimate ruler "who is God's servant to do the subjects good (Rom. 13:4)...[and] who rules for the benefit of the ruled." To such a ruler, the Scriptures encourages us to submit ourselves. The corollary, Tutu points out, "is you must not submit yourself to a ruler who subverts your good."⁸⁰ Ostensibly, this theological rationale seems to have provided legitimate moral commitment to resistance against apartheid.

Tutu acknowledges the weakness of non-violence as due to the episodic character of the church, particularly in its lack of sustained pressure or activity. That is to say, "we do one little thing here, and one thing there, but there is no sustained effort." And he calls on the church "to take up seriously this whole question of violence....All we've been

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. xvi.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 33.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 160.

doing really is preaching it, and it's not been a truly viable alternative to violence."⁸¹ However, two things need to be done in order to maintain the credibility of non-violence. He identifies the two things as (i) "...the business of training as many people as possible in non-violent action and spirituality." And (ii) "...being quite prepared to take the consequences of standing on behalf of God's people."⁸² These two points, Tutu believes, will convince those who insist upon the use of violence to see the alternative in non-violence strategy. Clearly, Tutu emphasizes the need to put the principle of non-violence into practice. That is to say, rather than non-violence being a theoretical presupposition, it has to become a way of life. It must be demonstrated in the heat and tumble of the struggle. To this struggle, he calls the church "to mount a massive campaign of support, through positive non-co-operation with the implementation of immoral, unchristian and unjust laws."⁸³ He argues that the Church must take sides, never be seen "to give legitimacy to a morally illegitimate regime." In this task, he admits, "a Church that takes its responsibilities seriously in these circumstances will sometimes have to confront and disobey the

⁸¹Desmond Tutu, "Deeper into God: Spirituality for the Struggle" in Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, eds., Crucible of Fire, p. 66. An interview with Desmond Tutu.

⁸²Ibid., p. 68.

⁸³Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness: The Struggle for Justice in South Africa, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. M. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986), p. 48.

State in order to obey God."

Armed Struggle

Given the nature of apartheid and the intransigence of those in power, Tutu identifies two options for social change. They are, that change will come about either "reasonably peacefully," or "through bloodshed and armed struggle."⁸⁴ He argues that "It is indisputable that those who are oppressed will be free," because that is "the logic of history."⁸⁵ The issue, however, is how and when. On the question of how, Tutu believes that Whites have to decide. The point that Tutu is making is that Blacks have opted for peaceful change as their history of non-violent protest, delegations, and deputations bears testimony.

Having identified two options for social change, Tutu speaks of two kinds of violence in South Africa. First, "the primary violence of apartheid." Second, "the violence...which emanates from the oppressed black community, either internally or externally."⁸⁶ Under each of these kinds, one is bound to discover more variations of violence but he focuses on the two preceding kinds. The primary violence of the state expresses itself in denial of Blacks of the "South African citizenship,"

⁸⁴Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 127.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 127.

⁸⁶Desmond Tutu, "Freedom Fighters or Terrorist" in Charles Villa-Vicencio, ed., Theology and Violence: The South African Debate, (Johannesburg: Skotaville Publishers, 1987), p. 74.

"uprooting of stable communities," "demolition of habitable dwellings,"⁸⁷ detention without trial, etc. The conditions created by the structural violence necessitate counter-violence from those who are on the receiving end of the system.

Despite the destructive and heinous violence of the state, Tutu does not condone the defensive violence of the oppressed. On the issue of violence he admits that he is "theologically conservative and traditional," adding "I love peace but I am not a pacifist." He espouses his denominational position regarding violence: "We regard all violence as evil (the violence of an unjust system such as apartheid and the violence of those who seek to overthrow it)." He adds, "This is why we have condemned 'necklacing' and car bombs, as well as instances of violence perpetrated by the government and the security forces."⁸⁸ It is unclear what the implied idea of distribution of condemnation and guilt achieves, for it tends to put the primary violence on an equal level with the defensive violence of the people.

However, Tutu understands why the oppressed people resort to armed struggle. For this reason, Tutu openly declared his support for the ANC in its objective to establish a non-racial, democratic South Africa; but he does not

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 74-75.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 76. "Necklace killing" means placing a rubber tire of the necks of those regarded as collaborators with the government, drenching them with petrol and setting them on fire.

"support its methods."⁸⁹ The support Tutu gives to the ANC is unequivocal and he refused to repudiate it when the government asked him to do so. He asserted that the repudiation of the ANC was tantamount to a repudiation of his forefathers, for according to "the laws of this country, they too would be guilty of terrorism. For they fought for their freedom."⁹⁰ This reasoning shows that at the African, emotional and historical level, Tutu identifies himself with the struggle of his people to be free. It is at this level where he claims to understand what led them to resort to armed struggle. But at the theological level, Tutu finds it difficult to support the method the ANC has adopted for the purpose of liberation. Undoubtedly, even at the emotional level, Tutu maintains his principles. The scene where Tutu rescued a black onlooker who was accused of being a police spy, provides an example of his commitment to a method of struggle that is commensurate with respect for the sanctity of human life. Tutu denounced violence whether it came from the government or the black people, for he believed the struggle was just and noble. His denouncement of "necklacing" is plausible because it is an instance of the struggle feeding on its sons and daughters.

At times his position on violence seems to exhibit

⁸⁹Jim Willis and Joyce Hollyday, Crucible of Fire, pp. 37 and 161.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 38.

conflicting inner tension on his part. For example: a twelve-year-old boy said to him, "Father, show me what you have achieved with all your talk of peaceful change, and I will show you what we gained with just a little violence."⁹¹ (This statement simply questions the validity of holding resolutely to what seems to be an ineffective non-violence strategy. In other words, the problem seems to be whether Tutu's method of non-violence has anything to show for its effort.) Reflecting on this issue, he later admitted, "If I were a young Black I wouldn't listen to Tutu any more."⁹²

Negotiation.

Tutu has unequivocally supported the "promotion of detente⁹³ and dialogue" in South Africa as a means of solving internal and external political problems. He encouraged the government to give the internal "dentente" and dialogue [i.e.: dialogue between Blacks and Whites] equal effort. The strategies he devised, be they civil disobedience or

⁹¹Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, pp. 20, 91.

⁹²Quoted in Shirley Du Bouley, Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988), p. 247.

⁹³The word "detente" was brought into political use, at least in South Africa, by B. J. Vorster, then President. This was a basic tact of a policy successfully described as "outward looking." See T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 488. The policy aimed at creating a semblance of diplomatic breakthroughs in arranging personal meetings between the President of South Africa and the Presidents of the neighboring countries, while neglecting to do the same with the authentic black leaders.

sanctions, were all aimed at forcing the South African government to come to the negotiation table with Blacks to hammer out the future of the country. Tutu thought that negotiations should take place within the context of a National Convention. So he urged the government to call the "National Convention, where our common future can be mapped out by the acknowledged leaders of every section of the South African population." To this end, he emphasized, "we believe fervently that the political prisoners in jail, in detention, in exile, must be permitted to attend such a convention."⁹⁴ In calling for negotiations, he appeared prepared for an evolutionary reform. Thus he said, "we urge you, yet again, to negotiate for orderly change." He added: "we recognize that this kind of fundamental change [i.e.:the dismantling of apartheid] cannot happen overnight, so we suggest that only four things need to be done to give real hope that this change is going to happen." This kind of reformist social change is informed by Tutu's understanding of reconciliation. Hence, he declares, "God has given us the mandate to be ministers of His reconciliation."⁹⁵

To effect the ministry of reconciliation four preconditions have to be observed or be initiated by the government.

(i) Commitment to common citizenship in an undivided

⁹⁴Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, pp. 55-56.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 55-56.

South Africa. This point seems, for Tutu, to be essential for peaceful change. To show its importance, he says, "if this does not happen, we will have to kiss goodbye to peaceful change." That is to say, failure to have common citizenship jeopardizes the Black and White relationship, thereby rendering the ministry of reconciliation impossible.

(ii) Abolition of the Pass laws.

(iii) The cessation of all population removals and the uprooting of people. He views this law as totally evil and having caused untold suffering to the oppressed.

(iv) Finally, he calls on the government to create a uniform educational system. Notably, these conditions are similar with those advocated by Mandela above in that they address the fundamental obstacles that need to be removed to allow normal political activity. Both Tutu and Mandela agree that the removal of these obstacles would lead to a process of negotiation between Blacks and Whites.

Should the government implement these points, Tutu promises to commit himself to lending the government his full support, "...for "Black and White [would] walk out heads high to this glorious future together."⁶ Tutu bases his preference for negotiation and dialogue on his understanding of a Biblical mandate. The example of Moses negotiating with Pharaoh for the release of the Hebrew slaves is a paradigm that he often uses in his defence against those who accuse him

⁶Ibid, pp. 56-57.

of wasting time talking to Whites. He also cites the prophets for their dedication to God's message; thus, they "addressed the Kings of Israel time and time again because they were to deliver the message faithfully even if they were being rejected."⁹⁷ To this end, Tutu emphasizes faithfulness to the Divine mandate even to the point of being rejected.

Constitution

Tutu opts for a non-racial democratic constitution which includes all the people of South Africa as citizens. That is to say, his democratic constitution is based on a common citizenship in an undivided country. He defines citizenship in terms of participation in the decision making-process. This view finds support in these words, "when you are a citizen you share through the exercise of your vote in the political decision-making process either directly or through duly elected representatives."⁹⁸ This position is a direct criticism of the apartheid autocratic constitution, which defines citizenship in terms of skin-color and excludes the Black majority from meaningful political participation in order to shape their destiny. The constitution envisaged would promote universal franchise based on the principle of one

⁹⁷Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. M. B. Eerdmans, Publishing Co., 1985), p. 182.

⁹⁸Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, Crucible of Fire, p. 162.

person, one vote, in a "unitary State."⁹⁹ Evidently, he fervently supports the concept of majority rule. In doing so he immediately clarifies the kind of majority rule for which he strives. He declares, "I believe in majority rule, not black majority rule. That is what democracy is all about."¹⁰⁰ While he acknowledges that Whites are outnumbered five to one by Blacks, his vision of majority rule is inclusive. Differently stated, this brand of majority rule which Tutu advocates ideally transcends the concept of majority population as the basis of democracy. In its place we have an emphasis on people or human beings with the gift of "ubuntu" for whom race and skin-color are irrelevant--these are the custodians of true democracy. Tutu arrives at his conception of majority rule through his understanding of humanity being created in the image of God. Through this understanding all distinctions of birth, race and color dissolves. He writes, "all people are created in God's image. Black and White must strive to dwell amicably together as brothers and sisters who are members of one family, God's family. For this I am ready to die."¹⁰¹ The concepts of "God's family" and "God's image" provide the basis for his vision of majority rule. More

⁹⁹In a letter to R. Proctor Sims, July 19, 1980, Tutu supported the idea that South Africa should remain a unitary State.

¹⁰⁰Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 40.

¹⁰¹Desmond Tutu, "Freedom Fighters or Terrorist" in Charles Villa-Vicencio, ed., Theology and Violence: The South African Debate, p. 78.

importantly, he employs the Christological category to demonstrate the depth of human unity. Thus he says "in Jesus Christ we are for ever bound together as one redeemed humanity, Black and White together."¹⁰² Tutu predicates his vision of majority rule upon the redeemed community in which its members discover one another as united in Christ.

He predicted that "we are going to have a black Prime Minister within the next five-to-ten years."¹⁰³ Following his logic of majority rule, one wonders whether Tutu's prediction of a "black Prime Minister," is not itself a contradiction of the very basis of his non-racial democratic argument.

In addition to one person, one vote, Tutu advocates the Bill of Rights, as we have seen in the previous sections. The Bill of Rights does not purport, in his view, "to guarantee groups but individuals"¹⁰⁴

Land

In discussing the land, he takes seriously the fact of history that Whites are not indigenous to the country. History as known and told by Blacks, Tutu confirms, has it that "when the Whites came to South Africa they were welcomed by the

¹⁰²Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 29.

¹⁰³Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 94.

¹⁰⁴Quoted in Richard John Neuhaus, Dispensation: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See It, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1986), p. 143. This was an interview with Desmond Tutu.

indigenous inhabitants, who provided them with fresh fruit and vegetables and the land on which to grow them." At that first encounter he continues, "they behaved like model guests, but with the passage of time they abused their hospitality."¹⁰⁵ The subject of "newcomer" and indiginity is, for Tutu, not a stumbling block for Black and White joint ownership of the land. That is to say, he does not use the fact that Whites are newcomers as the basis for exclusion and access to the land. Hence, he says, "there is enough land for everybody in South Africa. It is just that some people are greedy and at the moment they are also powerful, and so they satisfy their greed at the expense of others whom they think to be unimportant and without power."¹⁰⁶ Tutu identifies two issues that stand in the way of equitable land distribution. They are greed and power. He concludes that, as show of power "the Whites had grabbed a lot of the land. In short, they were masters and intended to keep that position."¹⁰⁷

Consequently, 87% of the fertile land by law belongs to Whites and 13% to Blacks. The loss of the land, for Blacks, implies the loss of land rights also. The progressive loss of land rights, Tutu argues, "...happened through the more sophisticated way of legislation passed through democratic

¹⁰⁵Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 43.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁰⁷Ibid, . p. 44.

process."¹⁰⁸ The process of land dispossession of Blacks is entrenched in the 1913 and 1936 land acts which decreed hugely disproportionate land distribution. Tutu sees the Bantustan/Homeland policy of 1959 as the culmination of the process of Black land deprivation. This policy confined Blacks "to only 13% of the land surface of the country of their birth."¹⁰⁹

Despite what historical evidence indicates, Tutu advocates the co-existence between Blacks and Whites on the basis of justice, which will entail "commitment to change, by agreeing to accept a distribution of wealth, and more equitable sharing of the resources of our land. Be willing to accept voluntarily a declension in your [Whites] very high standard of living."¹¹⁰ The aim here is to change a political system which has made Blacks victims and Whites beneficiaries. In doing so, he believes, a "better South Africa for yourselves, ourselves and our children"¹¹¹ will become true. He declares, that "this is God's world."¹¹² Through this declaration, Tutu negates the claim to the land by any single group, but offers it to all people who are made in God's image. Hence, he concludes, "I believe in an undivided South

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 88-89.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 90.

¹¹⁰Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 44.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 44.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 32.

Africa where all matter because God has created us in his image."¹¹³

Sanctions

Tutu sought to broaden his non-violence strategy by involving the international community in the fight against apartheid. In a 1978 speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London, Tutu vigorously spoke of how foreign investments were used to prop up apartheid. That, when liberation is eventually achieved, "we [Blacks] will remember who our friends were when we fought for freedom."¹¹⁴ Even though they had advocated economic sanctions against South Africa, many Anglican Bishops including Bishop Timothy Bavin, his superior, disassociated themselves from this threatening position.¹¹⁵ Their attitude, however, did not deter him from pursuing what he perceived to be a moral rather than political cause. Similarly, in his visit to Denmark in 1979, Tutu reaffirmed his support for economic sanctions by calling for an international boycott against South African coal. He said, "I find it rather disgraceful that Denmark is buying South African coal and increasing a dependence on South Africa, whereas one would hope that we could get South Africa to

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴"Jail Threat Has Silenced Many," Natal Witness, (July 21, 1978).

¹¹⁵"Bishop Tutu Faces Stormy Meeting," The Citizen, (Johannesburg, November 24, 1978).

having a weaker position in bargaining, so that we could get change as soon as possible." The interpreter interjected, "But if we do not buy coal, for instance, a lot of Blacks are going to be unemployed." Tutu replied, "they would be unemployed and suffer temporarily. It would be a suffering with a purpose. We would not be doing what is happening now, where Blacks are suffering and it seems to be a suffering that is going on and on and on."¹¹⁶ Here Tutu seems braced to reject the argument of those who use the victims as an instrument of their own oppression. That is to say, that "sanctions will hurt those it is supposed to help". In a speech given at the Pretoria Press Club, Tutu distinctly stated his position thus:

"I don't think that I could have aroused greater animosity if I had in fact been guilty of that sort of incitement to racial hatred and violence. In fact what I said [on sanctions] was an attempt to make a sober contribution to finding a solution to our South African problem, without using violence. People are quite happy to talk about so-called peaceful means of change, as long as you canvass methods that everybody knows will be ineffectual; for basically, most Whites want change as long as things remain the same, as long as they can go on enjoying their privileges and their high standard of living. That is why we urge the international community to exert as much political, diplomatic and economic pressure on South Africa as possible, to persuade us to get to the conference table. I love South Africa too passionately to want to see her destroyed, and international pressure may avert that."¹¹⁷

He admits that the call for sanctions is a strategic

¹¹⁶See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the SACC, 1983.

¹¹⁷Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 53. Emphasis mine.

contribution to save the country from catastrophic violent destruction. A further call for economic pressure was contained in a 1981 article in the Washington Post. In the article, Tutu charged that "multinational corporations are not yet involved in the business of destroying apartheid"...Rather than destroying apartheid, he stated, corporations are rendering the chains of oppression "more comfortable."¹¹⁸ Tutu's expectations of the activities of the corporations may demonstrate his fervent belief that the role of the corporations is more than just a profit-making enterprise but rather that they are agents of social and political change. Whether the corporations understood their role in these terms is unclear. On one occasion, Tutu alluded to the moral implications of investment. He said, "Investment in South Africa is as much a moral issue as it is an economic situation."¹¹⁹ He identified two moral conditions upon which investments can be justified:

(1) Workers must be able to live with their families near their work-place [the migratory labor Law based on the Group Areas Act prevents families from living together near their work-place].

(2) Laborers should have mobility and freedom to sell

¹¹⁸Desmond Tutu, "We Who Are Oppressed Will Be Free," Washington Post, (October 17, 1984), p. 15. (excerpts from September 23, 1981, article).

¹¹⁹Sharon Mielke, "S. African Investment Guidelines Denounced," United Methodist Reporter, (August 26, 1983), p. 4.

their labor whenever they choose.

Failure to meet these conditions means that the investors "are benefitting from the misery and suffering of the black people."¹²⁰

In February 1985, Tutu said that if apartheid was not completely eradicated within 24 months, he would be obliged to call for punitive economic sanctions against South Africa. When apartheid was not dismantled within the specified time, he extended the deadline. After being elected the Archbishop of Cape Town, Tutu called the Press Conference to declare:

"I have no hope of real change from this government unless they are forced. We face a catastrophe in this land and only the action of the international community by applying pressure can save us. Our children are dying. Our land is burning and bleeding and so I call upon the international community to apply punitive sanctions against this government to help us establish a new South Africa - non-racial, democratic, participatory and just."¹²¹

Tutu sought to enlist the support of governments and corporate institutions to help dismantle apartheid through an effective non-violent means: sanctions. While he is optimistic about the effect of sanctions in averting the impending bloodbath, he is disenchanted about Capitalism as a viable economic system. He charges, "Capitalism is exploitative and I can't stand that." He further observes, "from my perspective

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 4.

¹²¹Quoted by Graham Leach, South Africa: No Easy Path To Peace, (London: Methuen London Ltd., 1987), p. 154. Leach was the BBC Southern Africa Radio Correspondent.

Capitalism seems to give unbridled license to human cupidity, and has a morality that belongs properly to the jungle--'the survival of the fittest, the weakest to the wall, and the devil take the hindmost....' I find what I have seen of Capitalism and the free enterprise system quite morally repulsive."¹²² Tutu does not suggest the type of economic system that would replace Capitalism. However, he identifies some things that we should guard against in working for a new economic system:

"I long for a society which is not so grasping, not ruled by the laws of rat race, but one in which there is more sharing. I deplore the sort of society which is uncaring and selfish, and hope that we will work for a society that is more compassionate and caring, and values people not because they are consumers or producers, but because they are of infinite value, since they are created in the image of God....If we are not careful it could be that starved men and women will march on empty stomachs, to invade the well-stocked larders of the wealthy."¹²³

Tutu links political change to economic structural transformation. That is to say, non-racial political vision must be accompanied by an economic vision of the same depth, content and character--one that affirms humanity rather than making humans into an object, if it is to have any liberational impact to the people at all.

Homelands

¹²²Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 112.

¹²³Ibid., p. 112.

Tutu attributed the iniquitous system of Homelands to Verwoed, then, Afrikaner President. This policy, as we have seen elsewhere in the discussion, decreed the separation of Blacks on the basis of language and culture. This policy, for Tutu, raises several problems. (1) if the policy is morally plausible, why is it that it cannot be applied across the board. He argues, "Blacks find it hard to understand why the Whites are said to form one nation when they are made up of Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, Afrikaners, French, Germans, English, etc. etc.; and then by some tour de force Blacks are said to form several nations--Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana, etc."¹²⁴ This kind of logic, Tutu contends, is eschewed by the government because it views one race as heterogenous and therefore divisible on racial grounds, and another as homogeneous and racially indivisible. The critical question for Tutu, was "how you could give a semblance of morality to something that had been condemned as evil?"¹²⁵ He believes that the homeland system is not only evil but is "today's Auschwitz racial conflagration in South Africa might well trigger the Third World War."¹²⁶ He urges the government to "abandon the homeland idea altogether, putting it in the dust-

¹²⁴Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 30.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 95.

¹²⁶Richard John Neuhaus, Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans see It, p. 141. An interview with Desmond Tutu.

bin where it belongs."¹²⁷ Such a step, he argues, will be a clear demonstration of the government's intention to bring about change "reasonably peacefully."

(2) In addition to separation of Blacks on tribal basis, the homeland policy further truncates them into urban and rural Blacks. The danger of such a division, for Tutu, is that it distributes material favors that are detrimental to black communal solidarity:

"Some very specially blessed Blacks (urban Blacks) will also be part of this 'gravy train.' Their quality of life will be significantly enhanced, their children are likely to go to good White schools, they will get very good salaries, etc. etc., and they will be co-opted into the system as a Black middle class to be a buffer between the have-Whites and the have-not-Blacks, and being so greatly privileged they will be supporters of the status quo such as you cannot ever hope to find anywhere. This is new strategy of the Nationalist Government. The bitter pill is very significantly coated with sugar. Those who will belong to this core economy and society will be numerically insignificant, and will pose hardly any threat to the power-wielding White group. But what of the rest--the hapless hoi polloi? They will be, and are being relegated to the outer darkness, the limbo of the forgotten."¹²⁸

An analysis of this statement reveals that, inasmuch as homelands perpetuate a process of divide-and-rule where the leaders are co-opted as functionaries of the State, so also the distinction of urban and rural Blacks makes the urban elites the beneficiaries and supporters of the status quo. The rest of the people are relegated to the periphery of

¹²⁷Ibid., pp. 139-140.

¹²⁸Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 96.

existence. Tutu rejects this kind of outcome because of its lack of potential for peaceful change.

Tutu rejects also the system of homelands because of the immense suffering it brings to people through the process of removals and uprootings. He regards the homelands as "dumping grounds" or "resettlement camps", where people are dumped "as if they were potatoes, in largely inhospitable areas, often without alternative accommodation." He continues, "people are starving in most of these resettlement camps."¹²⁹ He compares the government's expropriation of the people's indigenous land to King Ahab's annexation of Naboth's vineyard. In the same way as God condemned the king for taking Naboth's land so also, God is angry at "the cruel act of injustice" done to the black people by rendering them landless and homeless. In addition, the system of homelands makes Blacks aliens and "nobodies...in the land of their birth, for it forces them to abandon their South African citizenship and take on that of Ceskei [Venda, Bophuthatswana homelands], another ghetto of poverty and reservoir of cheap labor."¹³⁰ This way of dealing with human beings as if they were made in the image of God in a lesser degree, Tutu asserts, "contravenes basic ethical

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 96-97. Communities were moved from their indigenous homes to arid areas. The Makgatho people, who were only 50 km from Pietersburg, were moved 100 km away. The Walmer people and others had the same treatment.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 41-42.

tenets."¹³¹

(3) The migratory labor,¹³² a component of the homeland system, adds insult to injury by decreeing a separation between husband and wife. The question of disruption of family life undermines the core of the Biblical injunction that says, "Those whom God has joined together let no man put asunder." Yet the government arbitrarily contravenes "this clear biblical law by making married men into migrant laborers, staying in hostels, and by refusing their wives the right to live with their husbands and the fathers of their children."¹³³ Clearly, the government imposes its authority on matters of morals by challenging the foundation of marriage and family life. But Tutu is convinced that "the authorities will fail because what they are doing is evil and against God's law." On the basis of this conviction, he encourages the church, fathers, mothers and those who are affected by this heinous Act to be "strengthened [in their resolve] to resist

¹³¹Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, Crucible of Fire, p. 158.

¹³² Migratory labor system was employed to control the flow of black workers into the city. Women and children were regarded as "surplus" individuals and therefore excluded from joining their spouses or living with them near their work-place. This attitude was drawn from the Native Affairs Commission of 1921, which declared that "the town is a European area in which there is no place for the redundant Native, who neither works nor serves his or her people but forms the class from which the professional agitators, the slum landlords, the liquor sellers, the prostitutes and other undesirable classes spring." See Report of the Native Affairs Commission for 1921, pp. 25-27, quoted in D. Welsh, "The Growth of Towns," in Wilson and Thompson, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 187.

¹³³Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 42.

what is evil."¹³⁴

ROBERT MANGALISO SOBUKWE

Civil Disobedience.

The preparatory stage for civil disobedience was given the name "Status Campaign." by Sobukwe. The campaign sought to "exorcise [African people of their] slave mentality" by educating them to reject "any indignity, any insult, and humiliation." Africans demanded to be treated with respect by Whites and others. Sobukwe reminded the African people that "they must first think of themselves as men and women before they can demand to be treated as such." As a form of African consciousness, Sobukwe believed that "the campaign will free the mind of the Africa--and once the mind is free, the body will soon be free. Once white supremacy has become mentally untenable to our people, it will become physically untenable too--and will go."¹³⁵ Having focused on African mental consciousness, Sobukwe launched what he referred to as "Soft campaign." Strategically, he explains, "we have chosen soft campaign without any risks, because we fear to challenge apartheid totally--we are aware of the nature and size of the task."¹³⁶ He spoke of "soft campaign without any risks"

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 42.

¹³⁵Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, pp. 31-32. The preceding quotations are taken from this source. "Status Campaign" was a precursor of Black Consciousness.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 32.

because he had apparently not anticipated the callous violent response of the system of apartheid to his Positive Action campaign.

The 1960 Positive Action civil disobedience against the Pass Laws¹³⁷ can be attributed to the non-violent philosophy of Robert Sobukwe and his colleagues. Initially, the African National Congress had planned to defy the pass laws on March 31, 1960. Before their plans could materialize, Sobukwe mobilized his constituency to defy the hated Pass Laws on March 21, 1960. The "dom" [stupid] Pass euphemistically known as "Pass" was regarded as a sign of enslavement of the Africans. Through Pass Laws, Africans were rendered foreigners in their own land. Sobukwe reasons, "I need not list the argument against the Pass Laws. Their effects are well known." He cites "broken homes, tsotsism [thugs] and gangsterism, the regimentation, oppression and degradation of the African,"¹³⁸ as examples of the devastating effects of the Pass Laws. The campaign for the total abolition of Pass

¹³⁷The Pass-Law required all Africans to carry "reference books" or "pass books" at all times. These booklets contain their photograph, their employment records, their encounter with the police, information about their place of origin, and tax-payment records. These passes served as means of ensuring control over the Africans. The freedom of movement for the Africans was severely curtailed.

¹³⁸Robert Sobukwe, "Press Release: Call for Positive Action," announcing the launching of the anti-pass campaign, [n.d.] in Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, eds., From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964, Vol. 3, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), p. 566.

Laws was based on four demands: (1) "...that the Pass Laws be totally abolished." (2) "...that a minimum wage, established by Government legislation, of 32 pounds per month, or 8.3.4 pounds per week which must be paid throughout the country." The other two demands sought assurances from the government that "no workers shall be dismissed as a result of this campaign"¹³⁹ and that the government gives an undertaking not to victimize the leaders of the campaign. The Pass laws and wage inequalities were the main targets for the campaign in a string of other political activities to be planned.

Sobukwe planned the civil disobedience campaign in the spirit of non-violence. To this end, he says, the "campaign is conducted in a spirit of absolute non-violence." For this reason, he regarded the chance to oppose the Pass Laws as "an opportunity to participate in this noble campaign which is aimed at obtaining for African people those things that the whole civilized world accepts unquestionably as the right of every individual." He emphasized the nobility of the struggle when he asserted, "we are ready to die for our cause; we are not yet ready to kill for it." In the same vein, he warned his followers about the importance of human life. That, in the task of human liberation, everyone should remember, he says, "every man's death diminishes me. For I am involved in

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 564. Sobukwe called the Nation to adhere to the slogan of "No bail! No Defence! No Fine!!!" in the act of civil disobedience against the Pass Laws. People were expected to surrender themselves to the police for arrest.

mankind."¹⁴⁰

In a letter to the Commissioner of Police in which he implored him to instruct the Police not to provoke people to violence, Sobukwe made known his non-violence campaign against the Pass Laws. He concluded the letter with these words: "Hoping you will co-operate to try and make this a most peaceful and disciplined campaign."¹⁴¹ One does not write to the official of the government if one is committed to revolution and violence. Sobukwe sought to remove all misconception of the nature of his campaign. So the letter sets the tone of the Africanist's commitment to non-violent change. In fact, the campaign aimed to inspire and to ignite their resolve for relentless struggle against apartheid in all its forms.

The Civil disobedience campaign was the first practical step in the struggle for the eradication of domination, since apartheid was beyond transformation. Sobukwe had predicted that by 1963 South Africa would enter an era of African socialist democracy. This was not to be the case, since all the leaders and activists were incarcerated and the resistance mercilessly crushed, at least temporarily. The people who

¹⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 566-67. This citation is an exact quote from John Donne's most famous passage: "For Whom the Bell Tolls." The preceding citations are taken from the same source.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 565-566. The letter was written to Major-General Rademeyer of Cape Town, on March 16, 1960. The Commissioner did nothing to stop the bloody massacre at Sharpville Police Station, where 69 people were shot in the back among many other casualties. The massacre took place in March 21, 1960.

participated in the campaign were instructed not to resist arrest and to refuse to plead. Each person was expected to respond thus: "The law under which I am accused is made by the white people alone and the accused are Africans alone, and I am not prepared to plead."¹⁴² Whether all those who were arrested adhered to this code cannot easily be verified. The essence of the code not to plead aimed at showing the exclusionary character of the law. That is to say, the law was imposed on the Africans who were not a party to its formulation in the first place. Therefore, respect for such a law implies support for one's dehumanization. The slogans, "No Bail!" "No Defence!" "No Fine!" challenged the moral and legal legitimacy of the authority of the minority government.

What Sobukwe intended to demonstrate by the campaign was that a Law that enslaves and alienates its people cannot be just. Therefore people will not obey it. He was prepared to accept the consequence of his actions. On the morning of March 21, 1960, Sobukwe and his colleagues walked to Orlando Police station where they demanded to be arrested for violating the apartheid law. Although Mandela criticized Sobukwe for ill-timing the civil disobedience, Chief Lethuli, in the spirit of solidarity, burned his pass and called upon his followers to do the same and to stay at home. The Sharpville massacre of the peaceful, non-violent defiers sparked a spate of protests throughout the country. Consequently, the government used the

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 560.

incident as a pretext to declare the state of emergency and simultaneously banned the ANC and PAC from exercising their political activities. It also proscribed anyone who attempted to further the aims of these organizations.

Armed Struggle

The question of armed struggle was not a primary issue for Sobukwe. Its lesser importance or reflection is due to his religious background, and his day-to-day involvement in the life of the church as a lay-preacher. Civil disobedience, as we have seen, was an attempt to blend theory and the practical demands of the people to be free. The urgency of the situation did not blind him to the choice of means for the task at hand. To demonstrate his adherence to the non-violent method, Sobukwe warned his followers not to talk irresponsibly of "bloodshed and violence." He argued that the "only people who will benefit from violence are the government and the police."¹⁴³ He spoke of the reality of violence thus:

"Immediately violence breaks out we will be taken up with it and give vent to our pent-up emotions and feel that by throwing a stone at a Saracen or burning a particular building we are small revolutionaries engaged in revolutionary warfare. But after a few days, when we have buried our dead and made moving graveside speeches and our emotions have settled again, the police will round up a few people and the rest will go back to the Passes, having forgotten what our goal had been initially. Incidentally, in the process, we shall have alienated the masses who will feel that we have made cannon fodder of them, for no significant

¹⁴³Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 34

purpose except for spectacular newspaper headlines."¹⁴⁴

Sobukwe thought that if people adhered to "absolute non-violence" then the first step in the struggle for African independence would have been realized. His rejection of violence was based on the sanctity of life. For this reason, he stated, "we are not leading corpses to the new Africa. We are leading the vital, breathing and dynamic youth of our land. We are leading the youth, not to death, but to life abundant."¹⁴⁵

As we discuss Sobukwe's understanding of violence and its role in the liberation struggle, we should note that two views emerge which express the thinking of Sobukwe during the pre-Sharpville and post-Sharpville periods. During the first period, he urged that the campaign against pass Laws should be undertaken non-violently. That position, however, was short-lived because of the Sharpville masscre. This led him to assert, "We are not hoping for a change of heart on the part of the Christian oppressor."¹⁴⁶

In his address to the commemoration service of the Sharpville massacre, Sobukwe's tone on violence changed significantly. He said to the mourners, "we are gathered here today, to reiterate our resolve to declare total war against

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 31.

the demigod of white supremacy. We are here to say Africa must be free....Africa will be free. We are here to serve an ultimatum to the forces of oppression." In the same vein, he called upon all Africans "to join forces in a determined, ruthless and relentless war against white supremacy."¹⁴⁷ This is clearly a shift from his non-violence position to an armed struggle, or war, as the only path left for the Africans. Sobukwe did not have the chance to translate his revolutionary language into praxis by forming a military wing of the PAC. Considering Sobukwe's language of war, one can conclude that, for him, non-violence was replaced by armed struggle as the principal form of resistance; all other methods became complimentary.

It is unclear what Sobukwe could have done to actualize his new philosophy of armed struggle had he not been incarcerated (he was convicted of incitement in 1960), thereby removing him from the context of the heat of resistance. It must be noted, however, that a group calling itself Pogo¹⁴⁸ emerged soon after his incarceration. Though it was formed not with the blessing of Sobukwe, it represented a more militant element of the PAC which was disgruntled with the moderate

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in The Burning Spear. Supplement, (March 24-25, 1990), p. C. The article was a presentation by Thoko Mkwanazi of the PAC to the 30th Anniversary of the March 21, 1960 Sharpsville Massacre. The commemoration was held at Temple University.

¹⁴⁸ Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1963), p. 14. "The word "Pogo" means "only" or "pure," implying that it is a purely African movement working for the African people."

tactics of the organization.

Negotiations

Sobukwe did not explicitly address the question of negotiation. An analysis of his statements may give us a clue of his views on this question. Two important issues occupied his mind, namely "no compromise" and the "victory" or "triumph" of the African cause. He says, "History has taught us that a group in power has never voluntarily relinquished its position. It has to be forced to do so. And we do not expect miracles to happen in Africa."¹⁴⁹ This understanding of history rules out the possibility of negotiations, since no group negotiates itself out of power. Not only does Sobukwe's historical observation downplay the value of negotiation, it actually puts premium on the use of force as a means of acquiring power. Interestingly, Sobukwe had predicted that South Africa would be free by 1963. Such a prediction was not based on any possible negotiated settlement but on victory through sustained armed struggle. This explains his reliance on the masses as the custodians of the revolution that will consummate the independence of South Africa, in particular, and Africa in general. In support of this view he says, "we want to make the African people conscious of the fact that they have to win their own liberation, rely on themselves to

¹⁴⁹Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 11.

carry on a relentless and determined struggle..."¹⁵⁰

On the question of compromise, Sobukwe pointed out, "we dare not compromise, nor dare we use moderate language in the cause of freedom."¹⁵¹ Practically, any negotiation involves compromise; conversely, the absence of compromise renders negotiation impossible. Despite his rejection of the notion of negotiations, he nevertheless places the idea of "loyalty to Africa" at the apex of ethical value, as the basis of common citizenship. Such a principle is absolutely non-negotiable. In addition, he finds it problematic to reconcile the "interests of the subject peoples who are criminally oppressed, ruthlessly exploited and inhumanly degraded...and the interests of the white ruling class."¹⁵² In essence, he raises the question whether master and slave can actually negotiate. He asserts that only equals can negotiate.

Views similar to those of Sobukwe were expressed by Zephaniah Mothopeng, the veteran PAC President, who was released unconditionally after serving 12 of two 15 year prison terms for organizing and predicting the 1976 Soweto upheaval, when he said, "now is not time for negotiation." He continues, "the only time that negotiation will be acceptable would be when paternalism and elements of colonialism and

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 39.

imperialism are thrown out of the window."¹⁵³ That is to say, the PAC will continue its armed struggle "until the balance of forces are in favor of the African people."¹⁵⁴ Mothopeng does not categorically reject negotiations as such but he believes that certain conditions have to be met. He further states:

"The answer is straight and simple but painful. It means, therefore, we must have the people of Azania on par with the oppressors so they can negotiate on equal ground. It means the position of the oppressor must be brought to the level or even lower than that of the people of Azania."¹⁵⁵

This statement leaves it unclear how Mothopeng hopes to achieve the intended equilibrium of power between the oppressor and the Azanian people short of armed struggle. However, he clarifies his position when he says, "negotiations that will bring positive results will come when our people shall have increased their strength and the fire-power of the oppressor shall have been reduced significantly."¹⁵⁶ This thinking is commensurate with Sobukwe's, who later in life embraced armed struggle as the principle form of resistance and rendered any other method complimentary to it as we have seen. In essence, for Mothopeng negotiation can only take place between equals. The equality he advocates has to be

¹⁵³Christopher S. Wren, "Mandela's Rivals want No Talks with Pretoria," in New York Times, (March 4, 1990), p. 14.

¹⁵⁴Zephaniah Mothopeng, "Not Yet Time for Negotiations," Azania News: The Official Organ of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Vol. 28 No. 4 & 5, (1990), p. 28.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

military in character.

While the position of the PAC on armed struggle is clear, it must be noted (as I have said earlier) that it does not present a categorical rejection of negotiations. Johnson Molambo, the PAC chairman, candidly put forth five political issues which must be resolved in order to create the conditions conducive for authentic negotiations. For Molambo, the removal of the five political cornerstones of apartheid is non-negotiable. They are as follows: (1) The Population Registration Act; (2) The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, on which is based the Group Areas Act; 3) The so-called Bantu Education Act; 4) The tricameral parliament system; 5) The so-called Bantustan."¹⁵⁷

The PAC regards the issue of transfer of power as the only fact that would influence them to consider negotiation. According to Molambo, "our people are fighting for political power." Therefore, he concludes, "if the racist regime is prepared to transfer power to the owners of the land and the producers of wealth, then we are prepared to entertain the

¹⁵⁷Azania News, Vol. 26 No. 4 & 5, p. 35. The PAC accepts the other conditions such as "unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees; the unconditional lifting of the ban on the PAC, ANC and other organizations; the end to the state of emergency; the withdrawal of the racist troops from the township and the return of all political exiles." According to PAC these conditions do not touch the political pillars of apartheid. They "merely reflect a call on the regime to withdraw its reaction to the legitimate struggle of the Azanian people." The five conditions they have suggested are not a substitute to the ones proposed by the International Community; however, they go a step further to show what they consider to be the necessary conditions conducive to negotiation.

notion of negotiation."¹⁵⁸ This statement seems to suggest that, for Molambo, negotiation is possible when the government has been rendered impotent by the armed struggle and is almost at the verge of capitulation. That is to say, when the people are in a position to decide the outcome of such a negotiation, doing so from a position of power rather than of weakness.

Constitution

The constitution of the PAC aims at the unity of "the people into one national front on the basis of African Nationalism. Its principal objectives are "to fight for the overthrow of white domination... and "to work and strive for the establishment and maintenance of an Africanist Socialist democracy recognizing the primacy of the material and spiritual interests of the human personality." The constitution also sets out "to propagate and promote the concept of Federation of Southern Africa, and Pan Africanism by promoting unity among peoples of Africa."¹⁵⁹

Anybody who is an African qualifies to be a member provided he/she "is of the age of 16 and above..." The constitution does not acknowledge sectarianism based on tribe, race or skin-color, hence Sobukwe says, "in a United States of Africa, there will be no "racial groups,"... the concentration

¹⁵⁸Azania News, Vol. 26, No. 4 & 5, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵⁹Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 51.

of the so-called minority groups will disappear."¹⁶⁰ Unlike the apartheid government whose constitution employs race as a category to define who is a citizen or who is not, Sobukwe opts for the term "African" to define membership and inclusion in the political decision-making process. Races will exist, he asserts, but shall not be used as a criterion and means of conferring favors and status. The choice of the term "African" shows Sobukwe's attempt to emphasize geographic location rather than race as the basis of citizenship.

Sobukwe further states that the PAC advocates "a unitary constitution...with all powers vested in central government freely elected by the whole Continent [South Africa] on the basis of universal adult suffrage."¹⁶¹ He espouses a democratic principle based on the belief that "the African majority must rule." He continues, "in the African context, it is the overwhelming African majority that will mould and shape the content of democracy."¹⁶² That is to say, he envisions a kind of democracy based on majority population. Ideally, the term African as an all embracing word sounds plausible in Sobukwe's quest to remove all vestiges of race and skin-color from his political vocabulary; but realistically, it is unclear how he would undertake to make everyone feel and act as an African. It must be noted that while being an African

¹⁶⁰Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 16.

may in part denote a geographic location, more importantly, it denotes a way of life or a way of being in the world.

Sobukwe acknowledges only one type of minority, which poses a threat to the African well-being, namely the Europeans. Historically, he asserts, "the Europeans are a foreign minority group which has exclusive control of political, economic and military power." Hence, their stay is contingent upon "their loyalty only to Africa and accept the democratic rule of an African majority, being regarded as an African."¹⁶³

Sobukwe rejects the concept of "group rights" or "minority rights." Arguing against this idea of minority rights, he says, "We guarantee no minority rights because we are fighting precisely that group-exclusiveness which those who plead for minority rights would like to perpetuate." He concludes, "It is our view that if we have guaranteed individual liberties, we have given the highest guarantee necessary and possible."¹⁶⁴ On the basis of individual rights, which he claims to be the cornerstone of his brand of democracy, Sobukwe hopes to see a political situation where skin-color is irrelevant and in which a white person could be elected to Parliament by predominantly black voters. He envisions a constitution that would safeguard human rights and freedom of all South Africans as individuals, Black and White.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

To this commitment, he says:

"We wish to emphasize that freedom of the Africans means the freedom of all in South Africa, the European included, because only the African can guarantee the establishment of a genuine democracy in which all men will be citizens of a common state and will live and be governed as individuals and not as distinctive sectional groups."¹⁶⁵

Mothopeng supports Sobukwe's thought when he subsumes racial categories under "African." He says "we look at ideas, his loyalty." In addition, the person may be identified by his/her origin rather than "the color of his/her skin." In line with this thinking, he declares, "...there are no Indian people here, but people of Eastern origin, provided they have become Africans."¹⁶⁶ The "doctrine of love, love for Africa" as propounded by Sobukwe is the key and content in determining the shape and the personality of the envisaged converted African. Hence, Mothopeng states, "a person must not say he belongs to a certain grouping. He is an African if his only loyalty is to Africa, and accepts the non-racial democratic decisions of the African people."¹⁶⁷ This seems to imply that the category of "minority" exists only if one extracts oneself from being an African. In essence, by being an African, in Sobukwe's understanding, means that one inevitably belongs to the majority.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁶⁶Zephaniah Mothopeng, "One Person, One Vote will determine who Rules in Azania" [South Africa], Azania News: The Official Organ of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 10.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Land

According to Sobukwe, the struggle of the African people aims at the repossession of the land. He supports this claim when he explains that "the struggle in South Africa is a part of the greater struggle throughout the Continent for the restoration to the African people of the effective control of their land."¹⁶⁸ To demonstrate the importance of the land, Sobukwe ends his speeches with the slogan "Izwe Lethu!" which means "our land." The claim to the land, he asserts, is based on indigenous origin. Speaking about land robbery and political subjugation, he cites a historical fact pertaining to the arrival of the Whites and their settler status. He says, "wave upon wave of European settlers came to Africa and their penetration of the interior involved the loss of sovereignty by the indigenous peoples and the alienation of more and more portions of their land."¹⁶⁹ He also cited the doctrine of "effective occupation" which was responsible for giving license to the Whites to partition Africa as a result of the "rise of industrial capital in Europe and its increased search for raw material and more markets."¹⁷⁰

The history of the appropriation of the land serves, for Sobukwe, as a constant reminder that "white domination was

¹⁶⁸Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 27.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

established by the sword and is maintained by the sword."¹⁷¹ So the struggle, for him, is not based on some abstract formal principles. Rather it is based on concrete reality: the land. The concept "land" is a powerful force in the minds of the people--the more so as they are reminded of and reflect upon their own dispossession. Hence, Sobukwe appeals to the concept of land to galvanize the people to a political resistance. He identifies Whites as the problem. He says, "it is this group [Whites] which has dispossessed the African people of their land and with arrogant conceit has set itself up as the 'guardians' and 'trustees' of the Africans."¹⁷²

This explains the uncompromising position of Sobukwe and other Africanists when it comes to the issue of land. Genuine liberation is understood in terms of repossession. Hence, Mopheng says, "by genuine liberation we mean recognition of the repossession of our land--because the land is the source of all wealth and it is ours because we have been here for time immemorial, even as the colonialists' own history now indicates."¹⁷³ To speak of the land as a source of wealth demonstrates the Africanist's understanding of the land as power, without which any form of political emancipation would be meaningless. The logic here seems to be: acquire the land first, then the political and economic power will follow, and

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷³Azania News, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 11.

not the other way around. Potlako Leballo, then National Secretary of PAC, emphasized the importance of the land when he said, the national struggle "has nothing to do with numbers or laws...the task is the overthrow of the foreign yoke and the reclamation of land of our forefathers." In the same breath, he claims that the "national struggle is a struggle for the recognition of heritage."¹⁷⁴ The words "land of our forefathers" and "heritage" imply that the Africanist claim to the land is based on succession. That is to say, the land really never becomes a possession of any single individual. It is in effect the property of the living, the dead and the yet unborn. For this reason, the Africanists make broad claim to every part of South Africa, thus:

"The African people have an inalienable claim on every inch of the African soil. In the memory of humanity as a whole, this continent has been the homeland of the Africans....Their migration in their fatherland does not annul their claim to the uninhabited parts of Africa [South Africa]. No sane man comes to your house and claim as his a chamber or room you are not occupying. The non-Africans are guests of the Africans...[and] have to adjust themselves to the interests of Africa, their new home."¹⁷⁵

Although the argument appeals to historic fact, one can deduce

¹⁷⁴Potlako K. Leballo, Document 36. "The Nature of the Struggle Today." From Protest To Challenge, Vol. 3, Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, eds., (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1953-1964), p. 500.

¹⁷⁵Quoted in Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology, (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), p. 147.

from it a sense of divine rights of Africans to the land. That is to say, Africa belongs by veracity of historical origin to Africans. As Sobukwe attests, "We are what we are because the God of Africa made us so."¹⁷⁶ Clearly, this is a claim that the land is a gift to the Africans and must be treated as such.

Sanctions

Sobukwe emphasized internal rather than external sanctions. This was simply a matter of priority, although he saw the need for and supported external political pressure at some point. His internal-sanctions strategy was based on his recognition of and almost total reliance upon, the power of the masses. (This belief was drawn from the economic reality of the country in which "the entire economic fabric rests on the indispensable pillars of cheap black labor.") This discovery was, according to Sobukwe, the weakness in the apartheid economic system. On the basis of this analysis, he concluded, "the white minority can only maintain its continued domination by perfecting the techniques of control in such a way as to enlist the active co-operation and goodwill of the oppressed."¹⁷⁷ The aim of the internal sanctions was to dismantle the "technique of control" and to undermine the economic system thereby, rendering the political system

¹⁷⁶Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 12.

¹⁷⁷Ibid. pp. 20-21.

vulnerable almost to a point of dismal disintegration.

The slogans "No bail," "No defence," "No fine" aimed, according to Sobukwe, to "inspire the masses with a heroic spirit." An analysis of these words reveal a calculated tactic for internal economic boycott, however, a follows:

(1) "No bail:" Since Africans, in Sobukwe's view, refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the South African legal system, to pay bail implies financially propping up the very system whose legitimacy one rejects. So the people were urged to withdraw their financial support of the legal system which serve the interest of the status quo in the name of justice. Sobukwe based his moral conviction on the premise that "an unjust law cannot be applied justly."¹⁷⁸

(2) "No defence:" To defend oneself means that one admits one's guilt. For Sobukwe the rightness of the African cause [force of righteousness] speaks for itself and it does not need any defence. On the basis of this conviction, he asserted, "we are not afraid to face the consequence of our action and it is not our intention to plead for mercy."¹⁷⁹

(3) "No fine:" To pay fines, according to Sobukwe, suggest an acceptance of "the charges against us." Such an acceptance and payment of the fines set the process of

¹⁷⁸Quoted in Mary Benson, ed., The Sun Will Rise: The Statements From the Dock by the South African Political Leaders, (London: International Defence Fund and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1981), p. 9.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 9. See also p. 28.

collaboration with the state in motion. His notion of non-collaboration served a strategy to discourage the people not to finance the system which oppresses them, but to overthrow it. Thus, the task to liberate themselves is in their hands.

Sobukwe and his colleagues acknowledged that the struggle has an international dimension, hence they urgently called for the adoption of economic boycotts against South Africa. The statement adopted by the conference reads in part:

"In pursuance of a decision of all [the] African People's Conference, we have supported and encouraged the boycott of all South African goods by countries abroad....It is our opinion that the crippling of the monopolistic South African White economy shall have the effect of bringing back some sense to Verwoed's government of minority rule."¹⁸⁰

Although Sobukwe was aware of the need for external support by way of sanctions, however, he was cautious not to put his full weight on this strategy because of the alleged complicity of "international capitalism and imperialism" in South Africa. He declared, "but because the South African ruling minority is backed by the forces of international capitalism and imperialism, it has become necessary for us to develop an international outlook."¹⁸¹ Whatever the nature and character of the perceived "international outlook," Sobukwe warns, "the lesson of history in the last half-century shows

¹⁸⁰Document 42. "Report of the National Executive Committee of PAC, Submitted to the Annual Conference, December 19-20, 1959," From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 3, p. 552. See also Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 29.

¹⁸¹Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 21.

that we can only get the moral support and sympathy of friendly people: they can never liberate us."¹⁸² This statement is consistent with his reliance upon the masses as the key and cornerstone of the African struggle. In addition, he takes care to show that Africans are likely to receive moral support from friendly people anywhere in the world; but what these sympathetic people cannot do, is to liberate them.

Homelands

Sobukwe's conversation with Mats Holmberg reveals his view of the homelands. He never criticized or repudiated any homeland leader by name in public. However his position about the homelands cannot be doubted. The point of conversation centered around rumor that at his visit to Johannesburg to see a child in 1973, he met Gatsha Buthelezi in a street and instantly lent his support for his (Buthelezi's) collaborative activities. The incident was misconstrued in order to give a semblance of credibility to the homeland system. In his response to the rumor, Sobukwe said, "it was quite difficult to convince some Africans of the futility of seeking short-term concessions, or to stop looking for help from radical, well-meaning Whites, who must rather work politically among themselves and leave the Africans alone to solve their own problems...."¹⁸³ He was unsympathetic and critical to the

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 4.

black leaders who "aim at partial concessions often in co-operation with white liberals or at the behest of the racist government."¹⁸⁴

Sobukwe considered the homelands system a technique calculated to "maintain and develop the relations of dominating and dominated, as well as to condition the minds of the dominated for the unquestioning acceptance of their role as collaborators in the perpetuation of their own domination."¹⁸⁵ He rejected the argument that participation in the homelands structures was necessary in order to change the system from within. What was at stake for Sobukwe was the unity of the African people which PAC committed itself to achieve. He saw the unity of the African people as the only source of power that would enable them to liberate themselves. So the homelands, in his view, aimed at breaking up this source of power. He concluded, "they [Africans] deny the foreigners any right to Balkanize or Pakistanize their country. To any such schemes, programs or policies, the African people cannot be a party."¹⁸⁶ This assertion shows his awareness that the system of divide-and-rule is an antithesis and an affront to African humanity because it seeks

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 40. The concept to "Pakistanize" refers to the country where the process of Balkanization first took place under the British government. It may simply refer to the fact that when Pakistan was first created, it was in two parts, with all of India between. (The Eastern part later became Bangladesh.)

to entrench "sectional arrogance and the continued maintenance of contempt for human worth and disregard for human dignity."¹⁸⁷

STEVE BANTU BIKO

Civil Disobedience

An act of civil disobedience that Biko witnessed and supported was the Soweto upheaval, which took place in 1976, one year before his death. This was a massive act of civil disobedience by Soweto students, which reverberated throughout the country like a powder keg. The students protested against the Bantu Education Law: a policy which decreed the use of Afrikaans language as the medium of instruction. Although Biko was not directly responsible for organizing the students into a formidable force of resistance, he was, however, indirectly responsible for igniting the passion for freedom by shaping and nurturing the revolutionary character of the students through his philosophy of Black Consciousness. In the process of building consciousness, the students soon realized that education in South Africa could not be divorced from politics. They also discerned the political motivation behind the imposition of Afrikaans language in black segregated education. Thus, the students claimed that the Education Law demanded total ideological surrender to the use of the so-called "language of the oppressor" in the black schools.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., p. 40.

When asked the evidence for support among the younger generation, Biko answered: "In a word: Soweto! The boldness, dedication, sense of purpose, and clarity of analysis of the situation--all of these things are a direct result of Black Consciousness ideas among the young in Soweto and else where."¹⁸⁸

He spoke of Soweto as the greatest achievement in that "we have been successful to the extent that we have diminished the element of fear in the minds of the black people." This observation contrasted the "periods 1963-1966" where, Biko asserted, "black people were terribly scared of involvement in politics." He traced the basis of Soweto civil disobedience to the discovery of human pride. To this truth, he said, "the response of the students then was in terms of their pride. They were not prepared to be calmed down even at the point of a gun."¹⁸⁹ According to Biko, two factors were responsible for inspiring Soweto: the conquering of fear and the attainment of authentic personhood [envisaged self]. He regards these elements as "an important determinant in political action."¹⁹⁰

For Biko, as for Students, Afrikaans language and Bantu education represented a contradiction; they both graphically

¹⁸⁸Donald Woods, Biko (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1987), p. 199.

¹⁸⁹Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 145. The preceding quotations are from the same source.

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 146.

symbolized education for domestication and enslavement validating dismal control over every mental and physical aspect of their existence. Biko noted in effect that "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed."¹⁹¹ Therefore, Black Consciousness sought to show that "the mind of the oppressed was not only "the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor" but that it was also a powerful instrument for the self-emancipation of the oppressed. Through civil disobedience against the Bantu education Law, students sought to defend their minds from being manipulated in the service of their subjugation. The defence of the mind as a political consciousness was inspired by an integrity-based belief that "if one is free at heart, no man-made chains can bind one to servitude."¹⁹² Speaking of apartheid and the education it offers black children, Gafoor, a Cape Town high school student, said, "apartheid has become an insult to our humanity. Our whole being rebels against the whole South African existence. The system of apartheid does not allow us to grow to full womanhood or manhood." She concluded, "It is reducing us to intellectual cripples...we, the youth of South Africa, reject the subservient heritage that has been handed down to us."¹⁹³ An analysis of this

¹⁹¹Ibid, p. 68.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁹³ Quoted in Lou Turner and John Alan, Frantz Fanon, Soweto & American Black Thought, (Chicago: News & Letters, 1986), p. 16. Ms. Miriam Gafoor uttered these words to a Supreme Court judge in Cape

statement reveals that the students, unlike their parents, were no longer prepared to acquiesce to the status quo. Their refusal to collaborate demonstrated acute awareness of the latent power of self-emancipation. Biko attested to this fact in these words, "the limits of the tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress."¹⁹⁴

Biko rejected the education law that enforced Afrikaans language because of its false premise that Blacks are inferior and incomplete in their humanity and therefore deserved inferior education. Such a law was not only unjust, it violated human dignity and perpetuated a truncated view of the black people. In addition, he saw those who devised black education as making a false claim of superiority over the intelligence of the Blacks. He was convinced that such a claim was absurd, since "no race possesses the monopoly of beauty, intelligence and force, and there is room for all of us at the rendezvous of victory."¹⁹⁵ So, the Soweto civil disobedience was a rejection of apartheid in all its forms. The students challenged apartheid's erroneous perception and understanding regarding the nature of humanity. In its place, the students called for a political system that would affirm their human dignity and a corresponding educational system that would equip them to participate creatively in a common community. As

Town. She appeared on a charge of public violence and arson.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁹⁵Quoted in Donald Woods, Biko, p. 56.

students were demanding and advocating for both political and educational transformation, the government remained intransigent to change. Biko captured the source of conflict in these words:

"The primary reason behind the unrest is simple lack of patience by the young folk with a government which is refusing to change, refusing the change in the educational sphere, which is where they [the students] are directing themselves, and also refusing to change in a broader political situation."¹⁹⁶

Biko identified the lessons which may be gleaned from the Soweto student upheavals. The students have been able to establish the sources of support and solidarity among themselves and from the community at large. He explained, "they [students] know the degree of dedication they can find among their own members when they are called to action. And they know the kind of responses they will get from the various segments of the population--the youth, the older ones and so on." Regarding future strategies, they know the "response from the government and the white population at large."¹⁹⁷ Despite the vicious and violent response of the government, Biko posited that the Soweto event represents the highest form of non-violent struggle for which he did not "believe for a moment that we are going to willingly drop our belief in the non-violence stance--as of now. But I can't predict what will happen in the future, inasmuch as I can't predict what the

¹⁹⁶Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 147

¹⁹⁷Ibid.

enemy is going to do in the future."¹⁹⁸ Politically, Biko believes that strategies are not devised in a vacuum; they are dictated by the action of the opponent. For this reason, the response of the government to the demands of the oppressed will determine whether violence or non-violence is the appropriate tactic to be adopted or not.

Armed struggle

To understand Biko's view on armed struggle, one needs to take into account the context within which he spoke and exercised some modicum of political expression. As a banned person, the law prohibited him from writing for publication or being found in the company of more than one person. He was constantly under heavy police surveillance. Such a context imposed on him serious impediments regarding free expression on a variety of political issues, particularly armed struggle. Biko often spoke about the creation of a "power block" of the black people to "confront Mr. Vorster and to force on him the decision of war or peace"¹⁹⁹ At a trial in Pretoria supreme court, the judge asked what he meant by this statement. He clarified the statement by showing that the "power block" referred to means black solidarity. That is to say, it had nothing to do with armed struggle. Adding that his organization was not "interested either in confrontation

¹⁹⁸Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 136.

methods, by that meaning demonstrations which lead to definite breaking of the existing law, such that there is reaction from the system...." He asserted that the method of their "operation is basically that of bargaining and there is no alternative to it."²⁰⁰ Biko espoused non-violence strategy in order for his organization to operate above-ground. This approach did not imply that he ruled out the possibility for violence. He left the options open depending on how the government tackled the Black demands. That is to say, he held peaceful means and violence in dialectic tension because of the political reality. While he accepted the non-confrontational character of his movement, he was well aware that the system of apartheid was maintained by violence. This reality would not just fade away by waving a non-violent olive-branch. For this reason, a degree of black violence would be needed to counter white violence. He wrote:

"conflict could only be avoidable if they were prepared to avoid it. Those who are seeking [the] end, that is those who want justice, who want egalitarian society, can only pursue their aspirations according to the resistance offered by the opposition. If the opposition is prepared to fight with their backs to the wall, conflict can't be avoidable. I don't know if this is the final answer."²⁰¹

Here Biko seems to imply that black violence will only be a response to White violence. He explained that many people have "despaired of the efficacy of non-violence as a method.

²⁰⁰Ibid.

²⁰¹Ibid., p. 148.

They are of the view that the present Nationalist government can only be unseated by people operating a military wing."²⁰² This shows that there existed an opposite view in the organization, regarding violent change. "The spectrum goes from peaceful to completely violent" he explained. However, he stated, "we don't have any armed struggle wing at the moment. We'll leave it to the PAC and ANC. We operate on the assumption that we can bring whites to their senses by confronting them [Whites] with our overwhelming demands." He continued "we haven't debated violence so far. We are confined to operating peacefully because we are operating above-ground. He then added, "that doesn't mean that we preclude it [violence]. But there are other ways to promote our liberation, such as crippling the economy."²⁰³ The complex political situation required, according to Biko, multifaceted strategies to be shared among the existing organizations. Though his strategy did not preclude violence, it was not based on violence. Complimenting the existing armed struggle of the main liberation movements, he identified a specific agenda: namely, to undermine the economy of the country. This task can only be achieved when Blacks have reached a stage of consciousness of whom they are. This included their demands, aspirations and, above all, a state of unity and solidarity.

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³An interview John Burns quoted in Donald Woods, Biko, p.

Biko was influenced by Liberation theology; he spoke of "Jesus Christ as a fighting God, not a passive God who allows a lie to rest unchallenged."²⁰⁴ He cited the exchange of Roman money in the Temple as an example of Christ's violent reaction. The implications of the incident in the Temple for the violent struggle remain unclear, except to infer from Christ's action one's commitment to truth and to devise an appropriate response to an already violent situation. The depiction of "Christ as a fighting God," served for Biko, as a moral basis for fighting apartheid, since it is a form of lies. He reminded "all black people that God is not in the habit of coming down from heaven to solve people's problems."²⁰⁵ By this statement, Biko did not discount the relevance of God in human struggle. However, he encouraged people to be masters of their destinies.

Evidently, Biko did not romanticize armed struggle and its accompanied violence as means for political change. If he had had the choice to effect social transformation without violence, he would have done so. He expresses the adverse consequences of violence thus:

"When there is violence, there is messiness. Violence brings too many residues of hate into the reconstruction period. Apart from its obvious horrors, it creates too many post-revolutionary problems. If at all possible, we want the

²⁰⁴Ibid., p. 94.

²⁰⁵Ibid., p. 60.

revolution to be peaceful and reconciliatory."²⁰⁶

Biko made this observation mindful of the violent character of apartheid and the government's obstinacy to render the condition for non-violence impossible. Violence, according to Biko, seemed inevitable, since the possibility for authentic political settlement was ostensibly remote.

Negotiation

Biko operated from the basic assumption that only groups of equal political power can negotiate. This assumption led him to the creation of a united front or "solid group", because he believed that to be the prerequisite for participation in negotiations. Such a united front would enable Blacks to negotiate from a position of strength. Biko regarded power as an important ingredient in Black and White negotiation. He argued that the purpose of a solid group would be "to oppose the definite racism that is meted out by the white society, to work out their direction clearly and bargain from a position of strength." Biko's insistence on Black solidarity reinforced his conviction that "a truly open society can only be achieved by Blacks."²⁰⁷ Negotiation implied for Biko, a process that would ensure transfer of power to Blacks. He stated "...we will have to negotiate....we

²⁰⁶Donald Woods, Biko, (New York: Paddinton Press, 1978), p. 71.

²⁰⁷Ibid., p. 132.

are for a bargaining process." He continued, "but there is no doubt that all other facets of change are being considered, and will progressively find more favor, depending on the intransigence of the system toward change."²⁰⁸

Negotiation is a moment toward which he had to work. The preparation involves educating black people to be able "to articulate what they want, and put it across to the white man, and from a position of strength begin to say--"Gentlemen, this is what we want. This is where you are, this where we are, this is what we want."²⁰⁹ The confidence and awareness of what is needed to be said, Biko stated, was a consequence of Black Consciousness. He believed this philosophy helps people come to terms with whom they really are and their capacity to be the innovators of the new, be it political or otherwise. The process of education as preparation for negotiation, according to Biko, is the utilization of the power of the people by enlisting their authentic support. The support aims at demonstrating to the white society that "...we are speaking for the majority of Blacks in this country."²¹⁰ The issue of representation played a pivotal role in his understanding of negotiation. That is to say, one is empowered and mandated by one's constituency to participate in true negotiations of any kind.

²⁰⁸Quoted in Donald Woods, Biko, p. 127.

²⁰⁹Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 133.

²¹⁰Ibid.

In pursuance of his concept of creating "power block" as a basis for negotiation, Biko said, "I would like to see groups like the ANC, PAC and the Black Consciousness movement deciding to form one liberation group. It is only, I think, when black people are so dedicated so united in their cause, that we can effect the greatest results."²¹¹ For this envisaged unity to be achieved, it may mean that Black liberation movements should begin a process of negotiation among themselves to iron out their different ideological positions. This deduction seems congruent with Biko's political thought, since it would be naive to expect these organizations to decide to merge (principled unity) without prior deliberation about their positions. The plausibility of this strategy is its primacy of negotiations among black liberation tendencies; by that, eliminating, in part, the question of representation at the negotiation table with the white government. It is unclear how such a process could be started and the period it would take to bring about the unity of the three liberation groups. The upshot of this proposition is that it would provide a strong base from which Blacks would "speak with a definite voice and say what we want." He added, the "primary objective [of the consolidated power block is] the total liberation of all Blacks."²¹² More importantly, this strategy would, according to Biko, undermine the

²¹¹Ibid., p. 148.

²¹²Ibid., p. 132.

government's argument about the existence of "moderate" and "radicals" in the black community. This argument has been used as a ploy to polarize black leadership and as an excuse to manipulate them for the purpose of furthering the technique of "divide et impera" or divide-and-rule. The black power-block aims at the promotion of the interests of Blacks at the negotiation table. That is to say, black unity is essential for a non-racial democratic political future.

In conclusion, Biko saw the process of negotiation in two stages, which involve two contending parties: the oppressed and the oppressors. It starts with the formation of a black power base, which is the first stage of negotiation. The first stage would logically lead to the second level, which involves Black and White negotiation of the country's new political structure. He was confident that the strength of the black power base would eventually dictate terms for political outcome. On the basis of his black power-block understanding Biko said, "we believe ultimately in the righteousness of our strength, that we are going to get the eventual accommodation of our interests within this country."²¹³

Constitution

The constitution of Black Consciousness states that membership is open to black students only. This was a working constitution, which served to bring students together and

²¹³Ibid., p. 134.

mobilize them for the purpose of liberation activity. At that stage of the struggle, Whites were excluded from the working Constitution. But Biko envisioned a constitution that would eventually include all South Africans, Black and White. This inclusion would be a logical consequence of Black and White negotiations. This process, he believed, would only happen after Blacks had attained their aspirations of full citizenship. The constitution envisaged will be based on one person, one vote, on a common voters roll. He added, "the attitude is a simple one, open society, one man, one vote, no reference to color."²¹⁴ This means that "there will be a completely non-racial franchise. Black and White will vote as individuals in our society."²¹⁵ He defined the constitutionally open-society as one in which "there can be free participation, in the economic, [and] social [life]...." Evidently, the principles upon which such a society is to be founded, according to Biko, are three:

- (1) Open society.
- (2) One man [person], one vote, and
- (3) No reference to color.

The absence of any one of these elements would render Biko's society incomplete and almost unliberated.

His democratic vision was based on majority population, meaning that "in as much as black people live in Europe on

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 123.

²¹⁵Ibid., p. 151.

terms laid down by Europeans, Whites shall be subjected to the same conditions." This understanding is informed, in part, by his uncompromising assertion that "this country belongs to black people alone." That, "Whites who live in our--who live in this country on terms laid down by Blacks and on condition that they respect the black people. This should not be misconstrued as anti-whitism."²¹⁶ Although Biko understood democracy in terms of majority preponderance, the constitution would recognize the right of the Whites to stay, provided they accepted and respected black people.

To speak of non-racial and egalitarian society implies inherent constitutional protection of human rights. Biko did not believe in minority rights. He argued that in a completely non-racial society there will not be any guarantee for minority rights. The substance of his reasoning on the issue was a logical deduction or outcome from such an endeavor to protect the minority. That is to say, "guaranteeing minority rights implies the recognition of a portion of the community on a race basis." Such a constitutional act, he believed undercuts the principle of non-racialism. He continued:

"We believe that in our country there shall be no minority, there shall be no majority, just people. And those people will have the same status before the law and they will have the same political rights before the law. So in a sense it will be a

²¹⁶Ibid., p. 121.

completely non-racial egalitarian society."²¹⁷

The idea of equality before the law and the same political rights enshrined in the constitution provided, according to Biko, the fundamental individual protection and affirmation of common citizenship. In other words, he contended, that minority rights are genuinely guaranteed and safeguarded when everyone is equal before the law of the land. He assured Whites that, despite what Blacks have gone through, "the black man has no ill intentions for the white man." He added, "the black man is only incensed at the white man to the extent that he wants to entrench himself in a position of power to exploit the black man. But beyond that, nothing more."²¹⁸ Biko seems to be saying that an amicable human relation between Blacks and Whites [non-racialism] is the best guarantee for individual rights, rather than multi-racialism, which opts for group rights.

His rejection of a constitutional guarantee for minority rights is also based on the political reality that it may lead to the creation of "artificial majorities." Such a group is made possible, Biko contended, by "artificial laws," designed to entrench group power. The government used this strategy to declare the white Afrikaner group a majority while dividing the black community into minorities, to give a democratic

²¹⁷Ibid., p. 150. See, Millard Arnold, ed., Steve Biko: Biko's Last Public Statement and Political Testament, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 318.

²¹⁸Ibid., p.150.

appearance of its authority. To avoid this anomaly, Biko advocated "a completely non-racial franchise. Black and Whites will vote as individuals in our society."²¹⁹ The envisaged universal franchise would, according to Biko, transcend consideration of race, color and religion as criteria for citizenship and therefore participation in the decision-making process.

Biko argued that a new constitution of South Africa "cannot be imposed on Blacks by Whites." He believed that the following elements must be present for the constitution to be acceptable:

- (1) "It must be the result of mutual consultation.
- (2) It must stipulate the role of all South African citizens, including the white man after transition.
- (3) White participation is imperative. (4) We favor proportionate representation. (5) The future political system of this country must not be racist in any way. This also means that Blacks must not revenge themselves on Whites, but equity will require a substantial economic sacrifice on the part of the Whites."²²⁰

However, he did not specify the character of the alleged mutual consultation. It is unclear whether it will take the form of a constituent assembly with democratically elected representatives, or a national convention with the state presiding over the deliberations. What is crystal clear, however, is the commitment to the participation of Whites in the organs of government based on proportionate representation

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 150.

²²⁰Donald Woods, Steve, p. 125.

and the denouncement of racism in both society and politics.

Land

In the constitution of the new country, Biko advocated a principle of a non-racial, just and egalitarian society. One wonders how his understanding of the land is consistent with the espoused principles. At the Terrorism trial in 1975-76, Biko reiterated the SASO Resolution 45 which declared that "this country belongs to black people and to them alone."²²¹ Following this claim, can a non-racial, just and egalitarian society be achieved where the land belongs to a particular group rather than to all? In another context, he emphasized the claim to the land on the basis of indigenous preponderance. He criticized Whites for their greed and for having misused their guest status:

"...we black people should all the time keep in mind that South Africa is our country and that all of it belongs to us. The arrogance that makes white people travel all the way from Holland to come and balkanise our country and shift us around has to be destroyed. Our kindness has been misused and our hospitality turned against us. Whereas Whites were mere guests to us on their arrival in this country they have now pushed us out to a 13% corner of the land and are acting as bad hosts in the rest of the country. This we must put right."²²²

While the statement purports to show how the Whites acquired the land and how the land acquisition invariably led to Black dispossession and landlessness or "pushed out to a

²²¹Ibid, p. 121.

²²²Ibid., p. 86.

13% corner of the land...," he accepted the reality that Whites are here to stay. In affirming this fact, Biko said: "...we've got no intention whatsoever of seeing white people leave this country; when I say leave, I mean leave this country." He continued, "we intend to see them staying here side by side with us, maintaining a society in which everybody shall contribute proportionally."²²³ The fact of indigenous origin upon which Biko's view of the land was based and the recognition of common co-existence reinforces the quest for non-racialism founded on justice.

The land was for Biko, the heart of the community. The common ownership of the land symbolizes to the African a "community-based and man-centered society" rather than "individual land ownership," which characterized many of the Western countries. He supported the principle of people's ownership of the land when he said, "the land belonged to the people and was merely under the control of the local chief on behalf of the people."²²⁴ For this reason, land ownership is important for authentic political freedom; it remains a non-negotiable issue. His acute awareness of the land question was informed by his experience of other independent African countries, where political independence had no corresponding land distribution. The African petty bourgeoisie and White land barons conspired to keep the land to themselves at the

²²³Ibid., p. 121.

²²⁴Ibid., p. 43..

expense of the poor. With that keen concern, he said:

"I think there is no running away from the fact that now in South Africa there is such ill-distribution of wealth that any form of political freedom which does not touch on the proper distribution of wealth will be meaningless. The Whites have locked up within a small minority of themselves the greater proportion of the country's wealth. If we have a mere change of face of those in governing positions what is likely to happen is that black people will continue to be poor, and you will see a few Blacks filtering through into the so-called bourgeoisie. Our society will be run almost as of yesterday...."²²⁵

He suggests that a solution for ill-distribution of land and wealth can be achieved by "a judicious blending of private enterprise which is highly diminished and state participation in industries and commerce, especially in...gold, diamond,...like forestry, and of course complete ownership of land."²²⁶ The judicious blending aims at resolving and addressing, in a concrete manner, the equitable distribution of land and wealth.

Sanctions

Biko's analysis of the South African economy reveals that it is based, in part, on foreign investments. The dependence of the South African economy on foreign capital led him to the conclusion that foreign investments propped up the system of apartheid. That is to say, foreign investments are the heart

²²⁵Steve Biko, "Our strategy for Liberation", I Write What I Like, p. 149.

²²⁶Ibid., p. 149.

of the political and economic well-being of the apartheid government. The link of economic investment and apartheid explains both apartheid's source of power and its vulnerability.

Apartheid provided, according to Biko, the conditions within which the humanity of the African employees were to be exploited beyond their capacity to endure. As we have seen, he saw the interdependence of foreign investments and the South African economy. More importantly, Biko saw investments as an endorsement of apartheid by foreign governments. Having made this connection, he viewed "the whole foreign investments as a possible vehicle for generating pressure to sympathize with our point of view so that South Africa can listen...."²²⁷ Thus, economic sanctions was one of the strategies which Biko and his colleagues supported-- even at the risk of being arrested and having to serve long prison sentences. He considered economic sanctions as bringing pressure to bear on the Pretoria government.

When asked what the United States and other nations could do in order to contribute to the struggle for social change, Biko replied, "Washington can exert such economic pressure on South Africa that it will become considerably less profitable to invest in South African industries."²²⁸ Contrary to the

²²⁷Ibid., p. 43.

²²⁸Donald Woods, Steve, p. 126. This was Biko's conversation with Bernard Zylstra in July 1977.

government and homelands views, which support economic prosperity as a political instrument to change apartheid, Biko sees economic constraint as a lever to pressure the government to the negotiating table. He concluded, "if Washington wants to contribute to the development of a just society in South Africa, it must discourage investment in South Africa."²²⁹ He understood economic sanctions as merely a complimentary strategy to the resistance movement against apartheid.

Supporting sanctions against South Africa, Biko was confronted with a patronizing argument: that the loss of foreign investment would hurt the Blacks most. While he acknowledged that Blacks would undoubtedly be hurt, he dismissed the argument by saying, this is nothing new because Blacks **have been** suffering all along. He accepted this fact as part of the price people have to pay for their freedom. He added:

"In a true bid for change we have to take off our coats, be prepared to lose our comfort and security, our jobs and positions prestige, and our families, for just as it is true that 'leadership and security are basically incompatible,' **a struggle without casualties is no struggle.** We must realize the prophetic cry of black students: "Black man, you are on your own!"²³⁰

If apartheid has to be changed, it can only happen, Biko warned, if Blacks were prepared to struggle, and struggle implies sacrifice. Mindful of the cost of sanctions, he said,

²²⁹Ibid., p. 126.

²³⁰Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 97. Emphasis mine.

"we Blacks are perfectly willing to suffer the consequences. We are quite accustomed to suffer."²³¹ He regarded foreign investments as the nerve life of the unjust apartheid economy. Hence he stated, "we Blacks are not interested in foreign investment."²³² In making a connection between investments and apartheid, Biko discovered that until the umbilical cord of dependency on foreign capital, which oils its grinding and crushing wheels of injustice, is cut, apartheid will continue to exploit and oppress its victims.

Homelands

Biko rejected the implementation of the homelands system. He severely criticized Gatsha Buthelezi of Kwa-Zulu, Kaiser Matanzima of Transkei and Lukas Mangope of Bophuthatswana Homelands because of their participation in what he characterized as "the greatest single fraud ever invented by the white politicians." He further stated that "the same people who are guilty of the subjugation and oppression of the black man want us to believe that they can now design for Blacks means of escape from that situation."²³³ He was angered by the obsequious commitment of some black leaders to collaborate in a scheme designed to divide and rule the Black. He regarded the homeland leaders as having "sold their souls

²³¹Donald Woods, Steve, p. 126.

²³²Ibid.

²³³Ibid., p. 83.

to the white man," because of their support of a system that was "working against our very existence."²³⁴ He was suspicious of the homelands approach, first, because it was initiated by those who created the apartheid problem and second, because the it was imposed on the black people from outside. This kind of political heteronomy led him to question the right of the Whites to decide for Blacks, when he asserted, "in a land rightfully ours we find people coming to tell us where to stay and what powers we shall have without even consulting us."²³⁵

Biko analyzed the geographic and economic implications of homelands and discovered to his bewilderment that the homelands scheme aimed at allocating 13% of the arid and unproductive land to 80% of the people (Blacks), and 87% of the fertile land to 20% of the people (Whites). This arrangement was morally unacceptable to Biko, because the homelands were intended to be the labor reservoir and dumping-ground of the black people. He chronicled the real intentions and practices of the homelands in these words:

"To create a false sense of hope amongst the black people so that any further attempt by Blacks to collectively enunciate their aspiration should be dampened. To offer a new but false direction in the struggle of the Black people. By making it difficult, to get even the 13% of the land the powers that be are separating our 'struggle' into eight different struggles for eight false freedoms that were prescribed long ago. This has the overall

²³⁴Ibid., p. 82.

²³⁵Ibid.

effect of making us forget about the 87% of land that is in White hands. To cheat the outside world into believing that there is some validity in the multinational theory so that South Africa can now go back into international sport, trade, politics, etc. with soothed conscience. To boost up as much as possible the intertribal competition and hostility that is bound to come up so that the collective strength and resistance of the black people can be fragmented."²³⁶

The acquiescence of the homeland leaders in what he characterized as a barren and fraudulent scheme convinced him of their lack of understanding about the nature of apartheid. Their argument that participation in the homelands affords them the opportunity to "fight from within" serves only to mislead the people into believing that "something can be achieved through systematic exploitation of the bantustan [homeland] approach." As we have seen, the homelands are an extension of the status quo and serve to perpetuate the oppressive tentacles of the system. Biko derided the homeland leaders for their lack of understanding. In his view, the idea of changing the system from within is not only implausible but a sheer, blatant lie. He continued, "...if you want to fight your enemy you do not accept from him the unloaded of his two guns and then challenge him to a duel."²³⁷ By implication, the willingness to collaborate with the homeland scheme was tantamount to having accepted an enemy's unloaded gun. That is to say, homelands involvement lacks the necessary liberational

²³⁶Ibid., pp. 83-84.

²³⁷Ibid., p. 85.

power.

In addition, he viewed the homelands systems as a divisive ploy intended to "tribalize the struggle" and to impose on the people a vision of truncated freedoms attainable only in the homelands. He dismissed the assertion that the homeland platform could be used in the service of the liberation struggle. The reason for his rejection of the idea is the thought that all participants in homelands are, in fact, playing "the white man's game of holding the aspirations of the black people." That is, homeland leaders are used against the interest of their people and therefore a betrayal of the struggle. With this understanding in mind, he concluded:

"We believe the first principal step by any black political leader is to destroy such a platform. Destroy it without giving it any form of respectability. Once you step in it, once you participate in it, whether you are in the governing party or opposition, you are in fact giving sanctity to it, you are giving respectability to it."²³⁸

Biko admitted that the homelands system is not only a threat to black unity that aims at "the attainment of an egalitarian society for the whole of Azania", but it is also "entrenchment of tribalistic, racialistic" fragmentation of the struggle in form and outlook. As such, the homelands cannot be the basis for future South Africa, hence he

²³⁸Ibid., p. 146.

declared, "we hate it, we seek to destroy it."²³⁹

MANAS BUTHELEZI

Civil Disobedience

As the President of the South African Council of Churches, Manas Buthelezi presided at the meetings of the Council that gave support to planned acts of civil disobedience. Two actions of civil disobedience can be singled out as examples of the council's commitment to effective non-violent means to bring apartheid to its knees. The actions referred to are: "Christians for Justice and Peace, the End-Conscription Campaign and the variant resistance of conscientious objectors."²⁴⁰

This background shows the context within which he had to practice theology, and the importance of the issue both in terms of the witness of the Council and the theological implications inherent in it. In other words, the question of civil disobedience was not peripheral to Buthelezi. In his theological discourses, Buthelezi speaks of civil disobedience as resistance. He considers resistance to apartheid as "doing more than rejecting a given public policy: it is giving

²³⁹Ibid., p. 147. "Azania" is a name for South Africa and is used by PAC and Black Consciousness movement.

²⁴⁰Margaret Nash, ed., Women--A Power for Change: Reports of the Seventeenth Annual National Conference of the South African Council of Churches, (Maitland, Cape: Cson Book Printers, 1985), p. 61.

witness to the heart of the gospel."²⁴¹ By viewing resistance or civil disobedience to unjust laws of apartheid as "a witness to the heart of the gospel," Buthelezi gives theological justification for such an activity. That is to say, resistance against any form of unjust system is "faithfulness to one's calling...and is the basic ingredient of all moral actions."²⁴² He admits that resistance is always accompanied by suffering. He argues, "suffering, like historical martyrdom, is never an experience one should deliberately strive for." He continues, "one can only conceptualize about it while reflecting on the past accumulated experience of all those who dared to live for and after Christ."²⁴³ In other words, participation in the resistance brings suffering and that should not be misconstrued as something we deliberately seek for ourselves or self-inflicting suffering, but the price we have to pay for witnessing for Christ in the world. Here Buthelezi warns Christians to guard against false self-glorification in resisting apartheid. In contrast to self-seeking suffering, he speaks of redemptive suffering. He writes:

"All suffering occasioned by striving to live for others to the point of placing one's life at stake is redemptive. It is redemptive in the sense of

²⁴¹Manas Buthelezi, "Giving Witness to the Heart of the Gospel," in International Review of Mission, Vol. 73, (1984), p. 417.

²⁴²Ibid., p. 417.

²⁴³Ibid.

being, as it were, an installment in either creating the possibility, or effecting the reality, of well-being for others. It is experienced in the course of the rescue effort and is occasioned by external human intervention or the risks surrounding the effort."²⁴⁴

At the heart of resistance, Buthelezi contends, the Christian endeavors "to live for others" and to promote a sense "of well-being for others." Similarly, resistance means "being human for others by means of concrete action models."²⁴⁵ This, according to Buthelezi, is what makes suffering in civil disobedience redemptive. For Buthelezi, Christian commitment is grounded in the Christian faith. Hence, he explains, "faith in Christ is the essential power base for Christian commitment". He adds, "that is why even powerful political oppressors feel threatened by Christians who dare to live for Christ under those circumstances."²⁴⁶

Buthelezi notes that the concept of status confessionis²⁴⁷ provides a theological basis for socio-

²⁴⁴Ibid, p. 417.

²⁴⁵Ibid., p. 418.

²⁴⁶Ibid.

²⁴⁷John W. de Gruchy and Charles Villa-vicentio, eds., Apartheid is a Heresy, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), p. 160-61. The Lutheran World Federation issued a statement condemning apartheid at Dares-Salaam in June 1977. The statement acknowledges that "the situation in Southern Africa constitutes a Status Confessionis This means that, on the basis of faith and in order to manifest the unity of the Church, Churches would have to publicly and unequivocally reject the existing apartheid system." The World Alliance of Reformed Churches made a similar point when it adopted a statement declaring apartheid sin and heresy in Ottawa on August 25, 1982. See p. 168f.

ethical action particularly when the social, economic and political practices have distorted and violated "the nature and the meaning of the Christian faith." In that situation, he reasons, "the church may be called upon to confess or to articulate publicly its faith in relation to the points of distortions created by such practices."²⁴⁸ For Buthelezi a Status confessionis exists for the churches in South Africa which requires Christians to give an account of their faith in Christ by resisting the sin of apartheid. Clearly, he accepts the legitimacy of civil disobedience in a context where the continued existence of an unjust system constitutes a travesty and disobedience to the Gospel of Christ. For this reason, he states, "...in the light of current events,...heresy relates to and violates not only the orthodox but also sometimes the orthopraxis of the church. Apartheid is among the best examples of the later."²⁴⁹

Resistance or civil disobedience, for Buthelezi, is an unavoidable and almost irrevocable response on the part of the Church. Through this act, the Church attempts to translate its deed into a larger pattern of justice. It is also one way of showing its abhorrence of the unjust law of apartheid.

Armed Struggle

Having reflected and analyzed Buthelezi's understanding

²⁴⁸Ibid., p. 419.

²⁴⁹Ibid.

of civil disobedience under the rubric of resistance, we now attempt to fathom and probe his views of armed struggle in South Africa. Buthelezi hardly spoke of armed struggle *per se*. Rather, he has often spoken of violence which he thinks is the core problem in both church and society.

Regarding the issue of violence, Buthelezi acknowledges that civil war exists at the borders of South Africa and its neighbors, where the "freedom fighters" and the South African army engage each other militarily. In pursuance of the border confrontation, he explains, "white young men are exhorted to defend the values of Christianity and western culture at the border against 'terrorists,' who are incidentally black fellow South Africans...."²⁵⁰ Buthelezi's observation leads him to conclude that as the State employs the categories of the "defenders of the values of Christianity" and the "terrorists," so also the Church mirrors the state mentality in its life and witness by uncritically appropriating these categories. Hence, the violent conflict exposes the ambiguity of the Church regarding its collective response to violence. Given the state of affairs, Buthelezi eagerly anticipates that the Church will "take an unequivocal stand of either cursing or blessing the violence of the battle field."²⁵¹ The

²⁵⁰Manas Buthelezi, "Violence and the Cross in South Africa Today," in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, Vol. 29 (December 1979), p. 51. Blacks call men fighting in the borders to liberate South Africa from apartheid "freedom fighters," while Whites call the "terrorists."

²⁵¹Ibid., p. 51.

Church's alleged silence against violence does not imply neutrality on the issue. True, the Church condemns one form of violence, while blessing another form of violence. That is to say, it condemns the violence of the so-called "terrorists," while blessing the violence of apartheid and its machinery. This analysis leads Buthelezi to ask the following questions:

"...Whether South African Christians are as much as against violence as we are made to believe. Is violence really inconsistent with the Cross which is the symbol of so many South African churches? Is violence not in fact part and parcel of the South African Way of Life and a convenient instrument for its defence against supposed enemies."²⁵²

He discovers, much to his dismay, despite what may be said to the contrary, that violence exists under the pretext of national defence, in which young men are trained "in the latest effective methods of killing those who have been officially branded as enemies of the state."²⁵³ Tragically, for Buthelezi, fighting outside the borders of South African may involve or has involved sons of parents who are brothers in Christ. Even though parents may not physically belong to the same denomination, the fact of professing Christ is enough to make them brothers and sisters. Yet, he is saddened by the fact that "most our Churches are in one way or another involved in the military machinery of the country...."²⁵⁴

Buthelezi rejects the use of violence in political

²⁵²Ibid.

²⁵³Ibid., p. 54.

²⁵⁴Ibid.

struggle as "inconsistent with the spirit of the Gospel of Christ." He thinks that only the pacifist churches can "affirm this statement without having a guilty conscience."²⁵⁵ Most of our churches, he believes, are involved hand and glove with the military machinery one way or another. His denouncement of violence is based on his understanding of the theology of the Cross. He argues, "on the cross God transformed the experience of suffering at the instance of unprovoked violence into a medium of redemption." He continues, "not all suffering is redemptive. Most of the suffering in the world is oppressive."²⁵⁶ The difference between oppressive suffering and the suffering of Christ on the Cross is that "those who are on the receiving end of injustice and oppression suffer, but their suffering is oppressive and not necessarily redemptive." And Christ's suffering on the cross was redemptive because it was, according to Buthelezi, "for the sake of others beyond the self. It was suffering which was occasioned by love and the circumstance of the other."²⁵⁷ He reinforces the love-base upon which his theology of the Cross is founded by citing the passage from John, which states, "greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (Jn.15:13)."

²⁵⁵Ibid.

²⁵⁶Ibid., p. 52.

²⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 52-53.

In contrast to his understanding of the power of the cross "as power beyond power," Buthelezi finds it difficult to find this power expressed in naked violence. He notes that violence operates in "a vicious circle." That is to say, violence breeds violence "in the chain of actions without break."

For this reason, he states:

"It is oppressive suffering because it entangles the victim in the chain of his actions without a break. What is true of the individual is also true of society. If a society is fundamentally unjust and there is rebellion and the destruction of the symbols of injustice, suffering will result, but such suffering will be part of the treadmill of perpetrating injustice: a vicious circle."²⁵⁸

Here, Buthelezi seems to reject even the violence aimed at destroying "the symbols of injustice." Does suffering, in his view, imply endurance of all forms of systemic oppression? How plausible is it to equate the violence for the elimination of an unjust and oppressive system with the violence for its preservation. It is unclear how Buthelezi treats these questions in his reflections on violence and the Cross.

He assigns the church an important role in the struggle. This role, he believes, would only be fully exercised if the church discontinues "aligning itself with the political sensitivities of only one group of the South African population."²⁵⁹ This means that the church should operate

²⁵⁸Ibid., p. 52.

²⁵⁹Ibid., p. 55.

above party political lines and assume the spiritual leadership of all South African people, Black and White. With this kind of authentic leadership in mind, Buthelezi asserts that "the obvious stand the church should take is that of calling both parties to the conference table for the purpose of negotiating a lasting political settlement." Otherwise, he warns, "the church will be accused of condoning White resort to violence while condemning Blacks if they resort to exactly the same methods." In addition, he envisions the church's task as being that of "a peace maker and not a party in the business of violence."²⁶⁰ He calls on the church to lead a vicarious life, that is, "to suffer with those who suffer as Christ did when he died for us on the cross," adding, "you cannot give joy to those who are sad without sharing a bit of their sadness."²⁶¹

In a country riddled with violence, Buthelezi seems to give an impression that Christians are above the existing violent conflict. If indeed Christians are not exempt from the violent conflagration, what is the meaning of vicarious suffering when all are equally embroiled and are at the receiving end of the violence of the State?

Negotiation

As we have seen, Buthelezi favors negotiated settlement

²⁶⁰Ibid.

²⁶¹Ibid.

to end the political problems of the country. He employs reconciliation as an appropriate theological concept to describe his understanding of negotiation. It appears, however, that Buthelezi focuses his quest for reconciliation within the ecclesiastical context in particular, and it has far-reaching implications for the general political situation. His focus on the ecclesiastical transformation as precursor for the ultimate socio-political change is based on an often-stated assertion that South Africa is a Christian country. This assertion dictates, as it were, that reconciliation is both a state of being in fellowship and a strategy for solving political disputes.

Buthelezi's choice of reconciliation shows his commitment to fellowship as the end of political activity. This fellowship seeks to enhance human contact. Human contact is, by definition, an antithesis of apartheid. Hence he states, "any deliberate elimination of points of human contact [which is what apartheid has decreed] is a calculated sabotage of the essence of Christian fellowship."²⁶² The concept of fellowship introduces an idea of Christian or political family where, in Buthelezi's words, "in Christ mankind becomes a family, a brotherhood."²⁶³ This political family is based on love and justice, which is the true act of reconciliation. The

²⁶²Manas Buthelezi, "Christianity in South Africa," in Pro Veritate, (June 15, 1973), p. 4.

²⁶³Ibid.

implications of this radical reconciliation is two-fold:

First, Christians "have to see the creation of the external conditions and proper structures of justice which will enable the radicalism of the gospel to bear social, economic and political fruits." Second, he speaks of the "diakonia of reconciliation by politicians" whose aim is to address the structural change of the political system. He believes that it [diakonia of reconciliation] "may take the form of deliberate dismantling of all apartheid structures, repeal of all politically repressive laws, and a declaration of amnesty for all people and political organizations that fell victim to the old laws and to a judicial process that was in force prior to the new dispensation of political reconciliation."²⁶⁴

Although the Church does not practically participate in political negotiations, it nevertheless has an important role to play in keeping its eye focused on justice and to bring its radical witness to bear in this area. That is, to see that the structures that will be created serve the virtues of justice. For Buthelezi, negotiation takes place within the political arena to hammer out the issues regarding the practical eradication of apartheid in all its forms. These will, among other things, include repeal of harsh laws, allowing the exile to return and unbanning the political organizations. Buthelezi

²⁶⁴Manas Buthelezi, "Radical Message of the Gospel," in Margaret Nash, Women: A Power for Change, (Johannesburg: South African Council of Churches, 1985), p. 55.

does not speak about the conditions conducive to negotiation, but he perceives all that needs to be done: for instance, "a declaration of amnesty for all people and political organization..." as a process leading to a reconciled political fellowship in which Black and White citizens claim shared proximity spiritually and politically in a common country.

He argues that an authentic reconciliation addresses the issue of security. He reminds both Christians and politicians alike that "security is what the Gospel is all about... that the theological basis for security is Christ's atoning work." He adds, "it is Christ's act of bringing reconciliation between God and man which counts for security."²⁶⁵ That is, the Gospel gives more liberating security than the laws and arms of the country can provide. Reconciliation as a form of negotiation attempts to remove, according to Buthelezi, the conflict caused by the existence of the "threat and the threatened." His analysis of the political conflict in the country leads to the conclusion that "a deliberate creation of the state of reconciliation is the only reasonable solution short of mutual annihilation or the destruction of the imagined threat by the threatened."²⁶⁶ The uniqueness of the Gospel, particularly its message of reconciliation, is

²⁶⁵Manas Buthelezi, "The Relevance of Black Theology," South African Outlook, (December, 1974), p. 199.

²⁶⁶Ibid.

demonstrated by its power of love to transform an enemy into a friend. Therefore, negotiation serves as a basis for stability and ostensibly guarantees security founded on trust. Buthelezi focuses on the end process, namely a reconciled political community, rather than the logic of the process itself. That is to say, he does not delve into questions of who the participants at the negotiation table are or whom they represent, but tries only to show how effective reconciliation can be for lasting political settlement.

For Buthelezi, negotiation has a pastoral element in that he depicts the black person as the savior of the white person. Since the political crisis is, for the most part, a crisis of faith, he feels that the black person has to muster courage and bring a new message of the Gospel to the white person. For this reason, the negotiation table could become the context within which the Christian virtues are retrieved, shared and finally included in the new constitution.

Constitution

Buthelezi understands constitution as a process by which power is shared in the political community. He contends, "sharing of power can only exist in the context of love, since it is impossible to share anything with your enemy."²⁶⁷ The principle of love underlies his constitutional vision. There

²⁶⁷Manas Buthelezi, "Giving Witness to the Heart of the Gospel," in International Review of Mission, Vol. 73, (1984), p. 418.

are instances, Buthelezi observes, where an aggressor restores political power to the rightful owners. For him, an authentic constitution is one that provides the possibility of "sharing power rather than giving up power."²⁶⁸ It may be inferred that the best example of power sharing is one person, one vote.

He employs the concept of communion (Greek: **koinonia**) to describe the theological basis for a new constitution. He rejects "federation" because "it points to a loose level of association and retained power and autonomy of the ecclesiastical constituents."²⁶⁹ Although he denounced federation as inappropriate in the church, particularly in the Lutheran denomination, one can deduce that such a rejection would also apply in the new South Africa, since it is considered a Christian country. He favors communion because of its power of bonding the people together irrespective of racial and political affiliations. In addition, communion is both "a biblical and theological concept that points to close organic relationships, mutual participation, impartation of life of benefits such as exists among members of a body."²⁷⁰ He contends that a communion relationship provides the

²⁶⁸Ibid.

²⁶⁹Manas Buthelezi, "I Have Heard the Cry of My People: For Life In Communion," in Lutheran World Federation, (May 1990), p. 2. Buthelezi delivered this paper at Lutheran World Federation Brazil assembly in May 1990.

²⁷⁰Ibid., p. 2.

conditions conducive for distribution of power. The conditions that are present in communion are absent in a loose association exemplified by an apartheid constitution. His emphasis on communion as a form of racial transcendence points to a community whose constitution shapes and forms the character of the citizens on the basis of equality and justice. He states, this is the essence "for true or authentic humanity."²⁷¹

The concept of *imago Dei* serves, for Buthelezi, as the theological basis for human rights. The "image and likeness" describe "the truth and unique creaturely relatedness to God." More importantly, "man is a representative of God in the world, and stands and acts in God's stead."²⁷² Buthelezi emphasizes the importance of human beings in the treatment of justice. He argues that "human rights and human dignity form man's quest for self-understanding in the face of dehumanizing facts of modern life." He emphasizes the importance of self and he regards it as "man's elementary possession in this world...."²⁷³ The idea of the self points to a form of individualism. If this is true, then it means that on the question of whether rights should be given to individuals or to groups, the answer seems evident on his part: rights are

²⁷¹Ibid., p. 97.

²⁷²Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation as Wholeness," in John Parratt, ed., Reader in African Christian Theology, (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 97.

²⁷³Ibid.

given to individuals rather than groups because each person is self-constituted. He concludes on the basis of this observation that any human being has "an inalienable right to be himself in the way he wants to be himself....The right to self-hood is elementary to man's humanity." Adding, the "right to self-hood" is the basis of "politics of self" rather than the "politics of the social order."²⁷⁴

The constitution worthy of its name has to restore and protect the right to self-hood. The right to self [power to be truly human] predicated upon the concept of *imago Dei* provides, for Buthelezi, an authentic constitutional rationale to safeguard and uphold the freedom of expression, freedom of political assembly, distribution of God's gifts such as food, land, health and shelter etc.-- to preserve what Buthelezi calls "the sacramental character of life."²⁷⁵ If the constitution gives high priority to these issues, then people may have a foretaste of "the wholeness of life" as Buthelezi envisions it. That is, life as "our place of rendez-vous with God."²⁷⁶

Land

Manas Buthelezi speaks of land as the gift of God and its distribution as God's justice. The argument is that, since the

²⁷⁴Ibid.

²⁷⁵Ibid., p. 96.

²⁷⁶Ibid.

land is the gift from God its distribution becomes an act of justice rather than paternalistic favor from those in power. Land is not only an expression of God's justice but is also life. This means that political freedom finds concrete expression when it is accompanied by land restoration to the landless and uprooted, because land is a means of sustenance. In the previous discussion, we made reference to Buthelezi's concept of "wholeness of life." This idea is not an abstract formal concept, it finds true fulfillment in land. That is to say, land becomes a concrete context where existential life can be lived and experienced. It is the source of food and wealth, and it is a constant reminder that "God is the creator of all things."²⁷⁷

In his argument for the distribution of property, he uses the principle of "the radical sharing of possessions and economic resources" as articulated in the book of Acts (Acts 4:32:-35). This model, he believes, is appropriate for "life in communion [and] has never been surpassed, except for the life of Christ." He continues, "Christ taught us that if one allows it, love can soar above the heights of the sharing of one's life and possession with others."²⁷⁸ It is unclear how the land as a gift of-God at the same time becomes a property to be possessed. Is it not the idea of the land as possession

²⁷⁷Ibid.

²⁷⁸Manas Buthelezi, "I have Heard the Cry of My People: For Life in Communion," Lutheran World Federation, p. 3.

which has contributed, in part, to the destruction and devastation of the earth?

While Buthelezi is aware of the question of the land belonging to the indigenous Blacks, he does not make the distribution of the land contingent upon it. In a similar vein, Mofokeng, who teaches theology at the University of South Africa, speaks of reconciliation to the land. The idea of reconciliation to the land is necessitated by what he calls "systematic uprooting of the black people from their highly cherished and treasured lands which are going on presently in South Africa."²⁷⁹ The process of uprooting has, according to Mofokeng, created a false land-consciousness and alienated "blacks from their land as well as destroying their sense of ownership and value of the land."²⁸⁰ The concept of reconciliation serves to restore a sense of healing and bondedness to the land which has hitherto been illegally stolen from the black people.

Mofokeng, like Buthelezi, has a high regard for the land. His definition of the land as "mother, and black people as sons and daughters of the soil" reflects his African traditional formation. Following this African understanding, Mofokeng explains that "it [land] gives black people an identity and in turn receives identity from them." Like

²⁷⁹Takatso Mofokeng, "Black Christology: A New Beginning," Journal of Black Theology in South Africa, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 11.

²⁸⁰Ibid.

Buthelezi, he believes that "land is the source of livelihood for all people and has, therefore, to be cherished and cared for."²⁸¹ To define the land as mother implies that, in the same way as a mother cannot be mother of all in a biological sense but only in a moral sense, so also the land cannot belong to all. By this definition, if the mother belongs to all it implies a form of infidelity. For this reason, Mofokeng does not understand the land in terms of production but in terms of being "a source of individual and communal health." The relationship between the individual or community and the land is very strong in his thought. He explains it thus:

"We dig our health roots out of it and pluck our tree leaves and tree bucks from trees growing on it. It is also of religious significance as the location of the sacred places where we dialogue with the founding fathers of the black community. There are mountains, ponds, streams and bushes in our country which are still regarded as sacred by many black people today. Tearing the people away from this land is sacrilegious."²⁸²

An analysis of Mofokeng's thought reveals that the land has religious, social and historical significance. Religious, because he regards it as the sacred abode of the ancestors, hence, it is the "bedroom where we put our departed ones to bed." Social, because it provides a sense of rootage and shapes the African personality. And it has a historical aspect, in that it provides a sense of continuity. That is, the relationship of the living and the dead, and how past

²⁸¹Ibid., p. 11.

²⁸²Ibid.

history impacts and informs the present in the quest for a new sense of community.

Buthlezi admits that in the African understanding life and religion belong together. Like Mofokeng, he is conscious of the alienation that apartheid has caused between the indigenous people and the land, through the homeland system and the attendant uprooting process. Evidently, he alludes to the idea of alienation as a result of being "cut off from the His life-giving gifts" [land is included among the life-giving gifts], which constituted a form of "alienation from the wholeness of life."²⁸³

Sanctions

As the President of the South African Council of Churches, Buthelezi was at the center of the sanctions debate. The reason for this was that in 1985 the Council adopted a measure which urged its member churches and individuals to support internal economic divestment to bring pressure to bear on the government. With this measure, the SACC encouraged churches to "withdraw from participation in the economic system that oppress the poor, reinvesting money and energy in alternative economic systems in existence in our region."²⁸⁴ Buthelezi presided over the Council as it deliberated on this

²⁸³Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation as Wholeness," John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, p. 95.

²⁸⁴The South African Council of Churches National Conference Report (1988), p. 214.

issue. From his involvement with the Council, it can be deduced that his thinking on the issue of sanctions reflect, in part, the attitude of the Council to which he was a part.

Manas Buthelezi, considers divestment as the last resort because "the options to follow other paths are eliminated daily."²⁸⁵ This may imply that if other paths for peaceful change were open, then divestment would be an unnecessary strategy. That is to say, the brutal and oppressive character of the system of apartheid and its intolerance of non-violence opposition make the choice of economic sanctions unavoidably logical strategy. Citing the example of his own father when he first left home to seek employment in the Urban Areas, Buthelezi explained that economic investments thrived on a system of perpetual cheap labor. He concluded that his father made "economic investment in this country with his cheap labor. He did not get much, but he was subsidizing the economy of this country."²⁸⁶ He argued that economic investment has not improved the lot of the oppressed people; instead it became a source of poverty, suffering and disempowerment. More importantly, he underscores that suffering and poverty are and have been a way of life in the black community as a result of the cheap-labor subsidy of the Blacks. This analysis

²⁸⁵Quoted in Richard Neuhaus, Dispensations: The Future of South Africa as South Africans See it, p. 139.

²⁸⁶Manas Buthelezi, "The Ethical Question Raised by Nationalism," Theo Sundermeier, ed., Church and Nationalism in South Africa, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1975), p. 103.

undermines the argument of some of the Western leaders who claim that sanctions would inflict greater hardships on the black population. Following Buthelezi's observation regarding the cheap-labor system and its devastating economic effects for Blacks, the argument of Western leaders (Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) does not hold because it is not informed by the existential conditions of the black people. This apartheid-solidarity stance (so called), means that Blacks do not know what is good for them. Buthelezi, like the SACC, favors economic investment as the only effective non-violent method to dismantle apartheid and to bring about alternative social structures which would promote justice, freedom and peace.

Homelands

Buthelezi was born and brought up at Ceza, in Mahlabathini-- now part of the Kwazulu homeland. Having lived there almost all his youth and part of his adult life, he knows by experience what it means to be in a homeland. He says, homeland is "the poorest part of the country...."²⁸⁷ Consequently, his father left home for Johannesburg to seek employment. He says, "I always like to tell the story of my father who, while he was a young man, used to work in the mines in Johannesburg. There were no trains during those days;

²⁸⁷Manas Buthelezi, "The Ethical Questions Raised by Nationalism," Theo Sundermeier, ed., Church and Nationalism in South Africa, p. 103.

no buses, no roads, he would travel on foot from Zululand to Johannesburg."²⁸⁸ The story that Buthelezi told has not changed, in fact it echoes the experience of many black households. At the core of the story is the separation of husband and wife and children. For Buthelezi, the homeland system is theologically and morally unacceptable for it "thwarts God's creative process by not channeling one action for the well-being of the neighbor." Basically, he calls it sin "whatever destroys my life and does not promote my well-being...."²⁸⁹ The Homeland is a labor camp; it does not promote people's well-being. Therefore, it is morally repugnant and unacceptable. Buthelezi formulates his logic thus: Whatever promotes the "well-being of the neighbor, be it 'society' or 'political order', is good. The homeland militates against the welfare of the people as God willed it for them. Therefore, it [homeland] is a sin.

He also rejects the homeland system because it promotes division, on the basis of race, rather than unity. That homeland is, according to Buthelezi, a threat to the ministry of reconciliation because it negates any form of contact among people of different races. In reality, reconciliation is the most revolutionary way of life because it fosters closer human understanding while the homelands system thrives on racial ignorance of each other's humanity based on enforced

²⁸⁸Ibid., p. 103.

²⁸⁹Ibid., p. 99.

separation. Buthelezi uses the theological concept of reconciliation as the basis of his criticism against, and rejection of, the homeland system.

Buthelezi argues that the philosophy of Separate Development, upon which the homeland system is based, is flawed in its theological justification of human distinction and separation. He offers what he considers to be an authentic Biblical teaching in these words:

"The Bible's about creation, [it] has nothing to say about the distinctions between races and nations. God made man--the whole human race--in his image. God gave to man--the whole human race--dominion over the rest of creation. Where differences between people are used as badges or signs of opposing groups, this is due to human sin. Any scheme which is proposed to rectify our disorders must take account of this essentially sinful element in the divisions between men and groups of men. Any scheme which is claimed to be Christian must also take account of the reconciliation already made for us in Christ.²⁹⁰

While the system of homelands emphasizes human separation as the basis of peace and political harmony, Buthelezi believes that true and lasting peace lies in a "faithful and obedient pursuit of reconciliation wrought by Christ."²⁹¹ He attributes the eschewed justification of homeland to "wrong exegetical theology." He argues that this kind of exegesis "leads to wrong politics in as far as politics deals with such

²⁹⁰Manas Buthelezi, "The Christian Institute and Black South Africa," South African Outlook, (October, 1974), p. 163.

²⁹¹Ibid., p. 163.

basic questions as human dignity and social justice."²⁹² Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, Buthelezi believes that the acceptance of the homeland system is not only a denial of the Church but it is also a "demonstration of unbelief and distrust in the power of the Gospel." That is to say, one cannot hold the truth that in Christ we are created for fellowship and still accept the dictates of apartheid regarding human separation. The first proposition promotes our common humanity, while the second "require[s] that the Church should cease to be the Church," since separation and communion are mutually exclusive.

GATSHA MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI

Civil Disobedience

To understand whether or not Gatsha Buthelezi condoned or justified civil disobedience in any way, one needs to familiarize oneself with the context within which he has been functioning. The homeland policy sets laws, rules and regulations for all those who serve therein. In describing the duties, powers, and role of chiefs and headmen, the Kwazulu Act makes the chiefs and headmen the functionaries of the state and the homeland an administrative extension of the white minority government. The Act requires the chiefs and headmen "to maintain law and order and to report to the Government, without delay, any matter of import or concern,

²⁹²Ibid.

including any condition of unrest or dissatisfaction." This collaborative action qualifies the chief or headman to be a "Peace officer" by State designation. In addition, the chiefs and headmen were expected to report forthwith; "the holding of any unauthorized meeting, gathering or assembly or the distribution of undesirable literature in, or the unauthorized entry of any person into his area."²⁹³ Here, the homeland assumes the junior-partner role of maintaining law and order and applying the same law to curtail the freedom of assembly in the same way as does the South African government .

Buthlezi's identification with the apartheid structures is evidenced by his praise of General Johan Coetzee, then Minister of South African police, who mounted a vociferous campaign to suppress the legitimate people's resistance and civil disobedience against unjust segregationist law. At the police graduation in 1987, Chief Buthelezi praised the General and said: "I have never hidden the fact that I have a high regard for General Johan Coetzee, both as the highest officer in the South African Police Force and as a fellow South African."²⁹⁴ Furthermore, Buthelezi asked of the Law and Order Minister, A. J. Vlok, that the Bantustan Police "be put

²⁹³KwaZulu Regulation for Chiefs and Headmen Act (8 of 1974) Clauses (d) and (f) section (vi). Vide Apendix 4 in Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), pp. 230-232.

²⁹⁴From a speech by Chief Buthelezi cited in Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa, (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987, p. 3.

in a position where we can better defend that which badly needs to be defended...I sincerely hope...that the South African Government will not continue to tie my hands at this level of my leadership [as KwaZulu Minister of Police] simply because I am an opponent of apartheid."²⁹⁵ The Bantustan Police under Buthelezi were allowed to arrest freedom fighters and bring them to court in defence of apartheid's law and order. The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly passed legislation authorizing 90 days detention. He explained that the Bantustan police were in the struggle against the "politics of intimidation" of the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front.

Having made the legal and political connections, one expects that Buthelezi's understanding of civil disobedience may somewhat be tempered by his prescribed collaborative role and the pressure that the government imposes on him to exact undivided loyalty. The 1976, 1980, 1986 civil disobedience against the Bantu Education Law, i.e., particularly its imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black schools, provides the context within which Buthelezi' thought on the issue can be seen.

Since the School uprisings were aimed at the creation of a single, compulsory and free education system, this meant that it demanded the elimination of ethnic education of which the KwaZulu Department of Education was one of the symbols.

²⁹⁵Ibid.

Any favorable appreciation of civil disobedience on the part of Buthelezi would have meant an admission of his collaborative function in administering inferior education. Speaking about upheavals in KwaZulu schools in 1979, Oscar Dlomo denied the fact of inferior education when he stated:

"...I have not found any evidence of the unrest relating to political factors...The pupils in Soweto were substantially revolting against the system of Bantu Education...we no longer have that system in KwaZulu...we did away with the act...and replaced it with our own act....And secondly, our schools are not built by the Department of Education and Training, so they cannot be said to be symbols of oppression, as the Soweto kids used to say of their schools."²⁹⁶

One wonders whether the fact of replacing the act implies quality education that is free and non-racial. Dhlomo's statement emphasizes the change of an act without corresponding transformation of the educational institution. The danger, however, is the truncation of the national struggle for equal education. He ignored the truncation of KwaZulu education and felt that the transformation of educational system was only needed in Soweto rather than in KwaZulu. The implication is the separation of the educational needs of the KwaZulu children from those of the rest of South Africa.

When the unrest ultimately shook the KwaZulu schools,

²⁹⁶Kallie Cmapbell Oral History Project (KCAV 158, 166--Oscar Dumisani Dhlomo (September 6, 1979). Oscar is a former KwaZulu minister of education and culture. Quoted in Gerhard Mare and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa, p. 182.

Buthelezi was quick to blame outside agitators and characterized the upheavals as the work of the "misguided children." The language of "agitators" was used by both Buthelezi and the government and served as pretext for the government to crack down on the students' leaders and leaders of other progressive organizations. The National Education Crisis Committee emerged to deal with school boycotts and to create a political atmosphere conducive to the resumption of normal educational activity. Buthelezi felt threatened by the emergence of this committee and accused it of "making South Africa ungovernable," that the call to have pupils go back to school merely served to create the context where students can be mobilized. He said in part:

"The NECC did not assemble itself in Durban to concern itself with matters of education....it suits political organizations aiming to make South Africa ungovernable to have pupils back at school where they can be mobilized....They chose Durban as a venue because they wanted to mobilize black pupils here to do their political work for them. The conference in Durban was aimed at giving evidence that it was possible to attack me from the bases very near to my home...."²⁹⁷

It can be deduced that the threat of South Africa's ungovernability (as a result of civil disobedience and resistance), according to Buthelezi, also challenges the very

²⁹⁷Natal Mercury, (April 2, 1986); Natal Witness, (April 2, 1986). The Soweto Parents Crisis Committee founded in October 1985 under the chairmanship of Bishop Manas Buthelezi was a precursor of the National Education Crisis Committee. In 1985 the students were talking about "liberation now, education later." With the new NECC call for "people's education for people's power," it recognized the need for organized students as the only basis of a force for liberation.

fabric of the homeland political institution. Hence, the claim of being attacked "from the bases very near my home" arises because of his collaborative role which unmistakably makes him and the homeland system inseparable. He misconstrues an attack on apartheid as a personal attack on him.

On another level, he rejects civil disobedience [protest politics] because he feels that it leads to confrontation. He asserts, "civil disobedience invited confrontation. Passive resistance moves invited confrontation."²⁹⁸ He argues that in South Africa, unlike in the United States, civil disobedience does not lead to integration but to violence. He states the problem thus:

"The problem I see with the American perception of protest politics in South Africa is that they see it with the same eyes that they saw protest in the black civil rights movement in the United States. They simply fail to understand that protest politics in the United States led to incorporation. Protest politics in South Africa cannot lead to incorporation."²⁹⁹

He contends that civil disobedience/protest politics in South Africa was "crushed by brutality; protest was radicalized and ever increasingly took on the quality of confrontation." Furthermore, this form of non-violent moral protest, he admitted, elicited the wrath of the State against it. The State employed "Draconian laws to intimidate, ban and

²⁹⁸Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "The Future of South Africa: Violent Radicalism or Negotiated Settlement?" in The Heritage Lectures, (Washington, D. C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1986), p. 4.

²⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 3f.

jail people who do no more than protest...against their exclusion from these (freedom to sell their labor, freedom to live where their children could go to school) God-given rights."³⁰⁰ According to Buthelezi, the moral protest which "turned into community protest" was a direct reference to political activities of the old ANC. In his view, the authentic civil disobedience was conducted by the ANC and it was dismally crushed. He characterizes the kind of politics of protest which took place thereafter as "the radicalization of protest" which polarized the society. He rejects the civil disobedience or protest politics because of its potential for violent confrontation, as we have seen earlier. He explains the connection between civil disobedience and violence thus:

"Protest eventually becomes the means of mobilizing violent action. Protest becomes that which you must organize in order to get people to kill and burn, and when this happens, revolutionaries claim protest as their child. They see protest as the kindergarten of the armed struggle....After June 1976 when the protest met with violent reaction and when the first schoolboy Hector Petersen was shot dead as he walked in front of school mates in a simple school march, violent protest spread. When the spreading of violent protest was crushed by massive state power, there was a vast spin-off of young black refugees fleeing South Africa to escape the brutality of the State. ANC Mission in Exile recruiters for armed struggle had a field day. Radicalized protest suits revolutionaries very well."³⁰¹

Explicit in this statement is the association of the radicalized protest politics and its inherent violence, with

³⁰⁰Ibid., p. 4.

³⁰¹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

the ANC Mission in Exile and its "surrogates" internal political organizations like the United Democratic Front. This claim is expressed in these words: "violent protest must seek a home in violent politics, and this is happening. The ANC Mission in Exile has claimed as its own the violent protest movement in South Africa." He continues, "the violent protest movement in South Africa now proclaims the ANC as the true liberators of the country..."³⁰² Buthelezi believes that civil disobedience/protest politics is ineffective for the following reasons:

(1) "It endorses itself out of institutionalized politics."

(2) It adopts a non-cooperative stance against "some of the country's parliamentary forces working for the same change...."

(3) "Radicalized protest is not only extra-parliamentary, it is extra-institutional."

(4) "Non-cooperation is now a principle of radical protest politics."³⁰³

Since the ANC and other extra-parliamentary organizations failed, according to Buthelezi, because they endorsed themselves out of the institutionalized politics, Inkatha remains the only movement that meets the four criteria. He claims that Inkatha is a product of the same foment that

³⁰²Ibid., p. 5.

³⁰³Ibid., p. 4.

produced June 16, 1976. By making the reasons that influenced the emergence of Soweto resistance equally responsible for the formation of Inkatha, Buthelezi makes the fact of common history a basis of Inkatha's political legitimacy. In support of this claim, he says:

"The same black foment that produced June 16, 1976, produced Inkatha. Inkatha was also fashioned by protest politics, and there is an alternative to both incorporation and to violence. This is the Inkatha option. It is the option of once again establishing a mass democratic organization that now cannot be smashed by the State in the way the State smashed the ANC."³⁰⁴

Buthelezi's understanding of civil disobedience/protest politics is shaped by his perception of evolutionary institutionalized homeland politics. This also explains why the government allows Inkatha to operate above-ground within the confines of the homeland--a context where Inkatha evolved its alleged democratic option. Clearly, he favors homeland constituency as the basis of black mobilization aiming at the politics of negotiation. In contrast to civil disobedience or politics of protest of the ANC and other organizations, which Buthelezi claims are ineffective, Inkatha effectively engages the State. He asserts in part: "Inkatha actually engages the State. That engagement is a far more effective confrontation with the State than violent street-corner protest. We engage the State in KwaZulu and thump the State there."³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴Ibid., p. 6.

³⁰⁵Ibid.

An analysis of his thought on civil disobedience reveals his characterization of Inkatha as the custodian of both the democratic option and the principle of non-violent social change. In the same vein, he brands the ANC as a violence-inspired organization whose political future is predicated on force and intimidation. He concludes:

"[The] History of South Africa has thrown up the radicalized protest movement (ANC, PAC, BC, UDF and others), and it has thrown up Inkatha. Both are products of the same history of the same people, both are legitimate. One can only be finally effective in non-violent change and the other can only be finally effective in violent change."³⁰⁶

It can be deduced from our analysis of Buthelezi's thought that his support of institutionalized protest serves as the basis of what he considers to be an effective strategy for political change. He considers his refusal to participate in the National Council, and the success achieved in stopping the government in its bid to make Ingwavuma part of Swaziland, as concrete examples of institutionalized non-violent activity.

Armed Struggle

We saw how Buthelezi favors the non-violent principle as a viable strategy for social change. He admits that apartheid "has always been enforced on the majority of the people by violence." However, he observes that "counter-violence evokes greater State violence and violent governments always

³⁰⁶Ibid., p. 7.

stimulate an upward spiralling of violence for political purposes. Violent government always leads to violent revolutions."³⁰⁷ Having established the violent character of apartheid, he also discounts the need for counter-violence because of the greater violence of the State. Although he claims that the State is the source of violence, for the most part he regards violence for "party political purposes" as the worst form. In another instance, he puts the State violence and the violence for party political purposes on an equal par. He argues thus:

"The hideousness of violence is at its worst when it is used for party political purposes. The violence which the State uses to enforce apartheid is no more than violence used for party political purposes. Tragically, a great deal of the violence which Blacks have used is also violence used for party political purposes. The good of the State, and the good of the people has been sacrificed by those who wield violence to maim, kill and destroy--whether they be Black or White."³⁰⁸

Buthlezi's characterization of party political violence as the worst form leads him to shift the focus from State violence to party political violence. At this level, he deals with the question of the viability and effectiveness of the armed struggle. He states that the "reality of today is that the South African government has not been destabilized by the forces of violence. It is not on the run from the ANC Mission

³⁰⁷Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of Black-White Power Sharing (Nigeria: Emmcon (TWORF) Books of Nigeria Limited, 1986), p. iii.

³⁰⁸Ibid., p. iii.

in Exile and the United Democratic Front."³⁰⁹ That is to say, armed struggle has not actually worked. It has not produced revolutionary change.

Inkatha, he emphasizes "is vehemently opposed by the forces of violence...because it exercises real political power in South Africa."³¹⁰ He dismisses the ANC's argument for the use of armed struggle as the last resort. While he understands political conditions under which the ANC was forced underground, he rejects its unilateral decision to opt for armed struggle as primary strategy for social change. Buthelezi argues that, since the decision was taken without prior consultation with Black South Africans, "they had no mandate to do it." Given the fact that the ANC was banned and declared illegal before it engaged in armed struggle, it is unclear how such a consultation could have taken place. In South Africa, banned and illegal organizations have no right of political assembly. The freedom of expression is completely curtailed. Can such a social state of affairs be conducive to conducting above-ground political activity?

He rejects the ANC's argument on armed struggle because they deem "any involvement they may have in democratic opposition in South Africa would detract from their main purpose which was to pursue the armed struggle."³¹¹ He

³⁰⁹Ibid., p. xxvii.

³¹⁰Ibid., p. 8.

³¹¹Ibid., p. 25.

thinks that this kind of reasoning is flawed because it lacks true understanding of the nature of the South African situation. That, for the purpose of conducting armed struggle, "no liberated zones can be established and that the transportation of men and weapons on a scale sufficient to mount a serious onslaught against apartheid, presents formidable logistical problems." With this kind of insight in mind, he concludes, "the armed struggle against apartheid has failed for a quarter of a century."³¹² In addition, he discounts the effectiveness of armed struggle because it can never be the basis for an open society. Buthelezi says, "I know of no society in the world where the kind of violence now employed by the ANC Mission in Exile has produced an open, democratic society."³¹³ If the end of the armed struggle is to be evaluated, according to Buthelezi, it has to be on the basis of its ability to create an open and democratic community. Tragically, he does not use the same criterion to evaluate the end of the homeland system. If armed struggle, in his view, has failed to be a means for establishing open society, in what way can the homeland system that is maintained by State violence be the basis of the new community?

In further clarifying the position of Buthelezi on armed struggle, care must be taken to state that Buthelezi speaks

³¹²Ibid., p. 26.

³¹³Ibid., p. 27.

from an apartheid-institutionalized political context and for that reason, his views on the issue in question are unlikely to run against the State opinion. He is also the Minister of KwaZulu police. Does not that position make his criticism of violence suspect? (Moreover, the ANC operates outside of the government political institution, and its position of armed struggle threatens and challenges the government.)

At times, the way Buthelezi speaks gives the impression that he represents the government, for example, "I have again and again said bluntly that if the ANC Mission in Exile is allowed to continue much further along the road they have chosen to walk, White South Africa will adopt a scorched earth policy and unleash the kind of State violence which we have not yet begun to see."³¹⁴ Such a warning can only come from the government representative who is well vested in military logic. Most importantly, Buthelezi ignores a basic question that springs to mind from his condemnation of the ANC: which one should be stopped--the ANC or apartheid? Apartheid is the source of armed struggle and therefore it must be eliminated to render armed struggle unnecessary.

Evidently, Buthelezi seems to be vying for acceptability by both the ANC and the government. This attitude is expressed thus:

"Both in South Africa and abroad I then argued in public that the ANC had been driven underground by South African police brutality and that it was

³¹⁴Ibid., pp.27-28.

understandable that in an exiled position [in which] they were rejected by the West, the Mission in Exile should seek recourse to violence. I accepted that the ANC Mission in Exile having been rejected by the West would naturally tend to seek alliances elsewhere. It was for me understandable that they should start thinking in terms of the application of force against Apartheid."³¹⁵

Buthelezi's acceptance that "the ANC had been driven underground by the South African police brutality" makes both his charges (mentioned earlier) untenable. First, that the ANC did not consult Blacks on its armed struggle option. Second, that the armed struggle was "a road they have chosen to walk."

In the context of growing youth militancy, Buthelezi discouraged the youth from embarking on an armed struggle; instead, he attempted to persuade them to see the wisdom of his non-violence strategy. In a speech at a youth leadership course, he said:

"Even though Inkatha understands the impatience of the youth and the fact that others had no option but to choose the armed struggle, the movement believes that constituency politics and the mobilization of the people will bring about change...I have a duty to warn you as our youth to be careful, and to make a distinction between real bravery and foolish bravado. We admire and praise our brothers and sisters who have died in jail...But we have to admit that we have achieved very little by their supreme sacrifice."³¹⁶

The statement fails to show that no strategy for social change is safe for Blacks (and it has proven to be the case also for

³¹⁵Ibid., pp. 24-25.

³¹⁶Buthelezi Speech (January 27, 1978)--"Opening address: Youth Brigade Leadership Training course" (Mahlabathini).

some Whites). Not only is the armed struggle the primary cause of death among Blacks: there is ample evidence to show that many Blacks have died in peaceful, non-violence marches. Albert Lethuli testified to this fact when he said, "...we die at the whim of a policeman."³¹⁷ The question for the oppressed is not how to avoid death, but whether apartheid can be changed without having to tread the valley of revolution.

Politically, Buthelezi's opposition to armed struggle makes his Inkatha movement attractive to Afrikaners, and oppositional to the ANC. He proposes that the choice for the West is between the violent ANC and the non-violent Inkatha. In 1986 in an address at the Heritage Foundation, in Washington, he raised the question after he had explicitly argued that Inkatha is "effective in non-violent change," while the ANC is "effective in violent change." He then asked, "the West must now decide what they want."³¹⁸

Notably, Buthelezi's stance on violence has not been consistent. In 1977 at the height of the government crackdown of black activists, he saw the necessity of violence to achieve political change. "If so much violence is used to maintain the status quo," he argued, "political realists will come to the conclusion that they should resort to violence to

³¹⁷Albert Lethuli, Let My People Go: The Autobiography of a Great African Leader, (Johannesburg: Collins, 1962), p. 186.

³¹⁸Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "The Future of South Africa: Violent Radicalism or Negotiated Settlement," in The Heritage Lectures, Vol. 81, (Washington, D. C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1986), p. 7.

bring about change."³¹⁹ Ever since, he has advocated accommodation and negotiation, rather than confrontation and violence. The violent confrontation in Natal Province (notoriously known as the killing field) between the supporters of his Inkatha cultural movement and the African National Congress, may test and reveal the extent of his commitment to non-violence.

Negotiation

In our discussion we saw that Buthelezi regards civil disobedience as an unacceptable form of protest politics. Its place is outside the domain of the politics of negotiation. That is to say, civil disobedience and negotiations are mutually exclusive. Similarly, he reasons that armed struggle threatens the politics of negotiation. He says, "the politics of negotiation in South Africa really is under siege." He argues that the ANC's commitment to armed struggle constitute a siege tactic for the politics of negotiations.

Despite the volatile political state of affairs, Buthelezi has put his full weight behind negotiations for a new constitution:

"I see the need to negotiate. I am prepared to negotiate. I have a massive backing which would make my negotiation meaningful, but I would lose all utility to my country if I destroyed my credibility in the process of attempting to get the

³¹⁹Quoted in Study Commission on U. S. Policy, South Africa: Time is Running Out, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, 1986), p. 193.

politics of negotiation off the ground. Negotiations will fail if they do not lead to national reconciliation and a national effort to establish a new and a just society."³²⁰

Buthelezi identifies two important goals of the negotiation process: first, the attainment of "national reconciliation"; and second, the bringing into being of "a new and a just society." But negotiation as a political tactic does not just happen. That is to say, groups and governments negotiate when their interests are at stake. Therefore, negotiation seems to be a way of salvaging political interests. Given Buthelezi's role in the government's sectarian and institutionalized political structure, what would have to happen for the Pretoria government to commit itself to national constitutional negotiations? Would his collaboration with the State in the homeland politics be enough cause for negotiation? It can be noted that negotiation implies some form of equality of power bases, which may include military power and other tactics. One wonders whether Inkatha's constituent power base can be a sufficient cause for negotiation.

This question leads us into an analysis of what Buthelezi actually means by "negotiation". One wonders whether Buthelezi's understanding of negotiation limited to the issue of incorporation of more land into KwaZulu as the condition for his acceptance of the independence of his homeland from

³²⁰Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of Black-White Power Sharing, P. xxxiv.

the Pretoria.

In an attempt to understand Buthelezi's concept of negotiation, we shall examine the Buthelezi Commission's report. The commission focused its attention on regional negotiation for Natal/KwaZulu constitutional power sharing between Blacks and Whites under one authority. The recommendations of the commission were to have far-reaching implications for the future political reality of South Africa. Among other things, the commission was mandated to inquire the "present position of KwaZulu and Natal with a constitutional and political structure of South Africa, taking into account possible or likely future developments and with due cognisance of alternative constitutional forms and models of political organization and development."³²¹ Because of the regional confines within which the commission limited itself, and its implicit acceptance of government-created institutions, issues of importance such as the Group Areas Act, the release of political prisoners, the Land Act of 1913, the independence of the homelands, the Population Registration Act (which requires every citizen to be classified at birth), were not included in

³²¹Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of White-Black Power sharing, p. 77. Buthelezi established the commission in 1980. In a sense, it was part of the government reformist approach, although it was presumably initiated by a black person. It was composed of 46 members; a third of the members came from the business community and a quarter from the universities. The ANC, National Party (NP), PAC, and other extra-parliamentary organizations declined the invitation to attend. The eleven commissioners who served in State structure claimed to represent African, colored, Indian and white political parties.

the terms of reference of the commission. Evidently, Buthelezi's understanding of negotiation is informed by his homeland and ethnic context and has some regional elements to it. He is committed to negotiating for separate nationhood. In the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he expressed his acceptance of the reality of the "homelands" within federation.³²² In pursuance of his regional negotiation, he yields to compromises on key political issues such as, one person, one vote in a unitary state, and land distribution. He advocates federation as a political model that would offer a solution to the political problems of the South African. Speaking of multi-nationalism and Kwazulu in the federal structure he says:

"It means that KwaZulu will be one of the units of this multi-national state and that we will still have the Paramount Chief as the head of KwaZulu state, but then representatives of KwaZulu will also meet in the Federal Parliament in which members from all other states, from Transkei and certain White states, will meet and decide on the future of all people of this country."³²³

The commission apparently prepares a way of positioning KwaZulu/Natal at the political center in the event of an ultimate acceptance of the idea of federation. So, Buthelezi's negotiation package includes federation, single economy, single passport system and freedom of movement from one reserve to another (with reserves now euphemistically called

³²²KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Debates, 4: 133.

³²³Ibid., 5:83.

"states").

Regarding the so-called "preconditions" for negotiation laid down by the ANC, Buthelezi rejects them as unrealistic. He thought that progress on negotiation could be made even if the "preconditions" were not met. What was needed, he pointed out, was both European and internal influences to be brought to bear on the government. Two of the demands set out as conditions for negotiation which Buthelezi rejects make negotiation impossible. The conditions are: (1) The release of all political prisoners and (2) Permitting the ANC and other organizations to operate openly in South Africa. Buthelezi has often called for the release of Nelson Mandela. Yet, he rejects the "preconditions" for the release of all political prisoners and unbanning of political organizations before any authentic political negotiation could take place.

Constitution

Negotiations would invariably lead to the creation of an acceptable constitution for the new South Africa. Buthelezi supports a federal form of constitution. Addressing the Wilton Part Conference in May 1984 in Britain, Buthelezi expressed his constitutional views:

"As a market place politician my own constitutional thinking is dominated by assessments of what is politically practical rather than by what is theoretically ideal. Whatever the future holds, I believe it holds either a unitary state with universal adult franchise as an end product of an armed revolt, or a federal system of government as an end product of the politics of negotiation...I

believe that existing levels of interdependence between race groups make it realistic to hope that through consociational government we could establish a future of federation of South African states which would preserve that which would be lost in an armed revolution."³²⁴

Buthelezi's statement views a federal system as the outcome of the politics of negotiation or non-violence, and a unitary state system as a result of radicalized politics or armed revolution. He also supports a consociational³²⁵ constitutional formula or group representation through leadership elites. He asserts, "consociationalism has much in common with federalism...."³²⁶ The idea of federation came to the public knowledge after a consultative meeting between Buthelezi and Harry Schwart, then Transvaal leader of the United Party, at which they issued a joint statement. The statement, later known as "Mahlabathini Declaration,"

³²⁴Buthelezi Speech, (May 8, 1984), pp, 2; 7-8.--"Federal and Confederal Futures for South Africa" (265th Witon Park Conference, Wilton Park, Sussex, England).

³²⁵ The concept of consociational democracy was first used in the South African political vocabulary in 1970. It found its way into public debate through the work of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (S.P.R.O.C.A.S). The project was jointly sponsored by the Christian Institute and the South African Council of Churches. Consociationalism means power-sharing between groups within the confines of apartheid system. Therefore, it provided no panacea for the country's constitutional problems because deep cleavages of race and class were enforced rather than obliterated. Vide Enrie Regehr, Perceptions of Apartheid: The Churches and Political Change in South Africa, (Scotdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1979), pp. 44, 61, 284. See also Hermann Giliomee & Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation-Building: Contemporary Debates, (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 207 and 215.

³²⁶Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Why the Buthelezi Commission?" Buthelezi Commission Report, (Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1982), p. 2.

committed the two signatories to a federation in which "the identity and culture of the various groups constituting the people of South Africa"³²⁷ would be preserved and safeguarded. The commitment to federation may be interpreted as commitment to the tenets of separate development because it perceives South Africa as a country with a plurality of races that have nothing in common but their residence in that country.

He argues against the unitary state formula because it has not yielded concrete political success. He states:

"We the people of South Africa in this Ex-Colony of Britain, have a British Orientation, which makes us to regard democracy within a Unitary State a' la Westminster as the only constitutional ideal to which all democrats should aspire. All black liberation efforts since 1912 are geared towards pushing the doors of the South African Parliament to enable Blacks to enter the portals of the South African Parliament, in order to share decision-making with their white compatriots. All of you here know the extent to which black efforts to achieve this ideal (Unitary State) have still not been crowned with any success after more than 70 years."³²⁸

Buthelezi is skeptical about the success of the Unitary State system. He equates the failure of black liberation efforts to "enter the portals of the South African Parliament" to the failure of the concept of the Unitary State. Apparently, he confuses the strategy for attaining the

³²⁷Star, (January 6, 1974; Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, (1974), p. 3.

³²⁸Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Why the Buthelezi Commission,"Buthelezi Commission Report, p. 2.

constitutional ideal of Unitary State with the ideal itself. He discredits the system even before it is applied. Buthelezi's option of the federal political formula has nothing to do with its practicability but is an attempt to give Whites the reassurance about their future in the country. One wonders whether using their political scheme to reassure them is the best way to go. For instance, he speaks of some states in which African ethnic interests predominate, some where White interests predominate and multi-national states.³²⁹ If this is not the language of separate development, what is it? The fact that Whites are afraid of the black government is not enough reason to reject the unitary system of government. It must be noted, however, that he defends the federal idea as practical politics in a transitional phase. That is to say, a period where Whites will be initiated into the process of power sharing. How could one be assured that federation as a transitional phase would not be a permanent feature of South Africa, particularly in a country that is known for its ability to coin words and concepts to mean the opposite of what they are intended to mean. For instance, the word apartheid has undergone political metamorphosis; it was replaced by "separate development," then "separate freedoms," "plural democracy," and "vertical

³²⁹Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Political Aspiration: The Federal Idea." Hendrik W. van der Merve et al., African Perspectives on South Africa: A Collection of Speeches, Articles & Documents, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1978), pp. 54-55.

differentiation." What does Buthelezi's concept of federation do to the already loaded political vocabulary? He believes that federation is a realistic basis for the peaceful future of South Africa.

Buthelezi's option on federation as "the future constitutional development of South Africa"³³⁰ is based on a compromised position of the notion of a unitary constitutional system. As we have seen earlier, a compromise on the principle of a unitary political formula logically leads to a compromise on the universal adult franchise. That is, the application of one person, one vote. He claims that one person, one vote, is a recipe for violence. Further, he reasons:

"...one-man-one-vote system in a unitary state would have to be forced on Whites. There is right now violent resistance to it...it (unitary state) must be brought into being by violence, and the level of violence needed to introduce it would be such that the means would destroy the end."³³¹

Buthelezi's choice for the postponement of the principle of one person, one vote, is based on the perceived White violent reaction to its implementation. It is unclear whether his analysis of White politics is such that it assures him of a less violent reaction to federation than to one person, one vote, in a unitary political system.

Given the fact that the government justifies the

³³⁰Ibid., p. 2.

³³¹Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of Black-White Power Sharing, p. xxx.

exclusion of Blacks on the basis that they exercise the vote in their own areas, isn't a compromise on one person, one vote, already an endorsement of the government view? This raises a further concern regarding the process of initiating Whites into power sharing. One would assume that a proper way of accustoming Whites to power sharing would have to be through a process of majority rule itself. Federation ostensibly can not provide the experience that the ideal of a unitary state offers, and it can not be a substitute for it. That is, the practice of universal adult franchise seems to be the appropriate vehicle to initiate Whites into a unitary state, a community where all belong, since most of them (Whites) have been socialized in the politics of separation closely associated with federation.

A Bill of Rights is, for Buthelezi, an important component for his federal constitutional understanding. He supports a Bill of Rights where both the individual and minority are protected. Noting these rights must be protected by a truly independent judiciary, he declares:

"the guaranteeing of individual rights is in fact, in my opinion, one of the best forms of guaranteeing group rights. There is absolutely no reason why such a system could not work if it contained in it a Bill of Rights enshrined in the constitution which made the judiciary truly independent."³³²

He draws his understanding about respect and the protection of

³³²Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of Black-White Power Sharing, p. xxix.

human rights from the Scriptures. He says, "...people should see people as people created in the image of God. There is only one destiny for all mankind...." He continues, "...brotherhood and good neighborliness [are] so important to democracy."³³³

A Bill of Rights which seeks an alternative to apartheid has to address the inequalities of the South African society. Given Buthelezi's regional (KwaZulu/Natal) context, will his adherence to a Bill of Rights imply scrapping of all discriminatory laws in Natal? Will the Bill have an effect in the repeal of the state of emergency? Here, the concept of regionalism subsumed under the sovereignty of the South African constitution renders the broad application of any conceivable Bill of Rights impracticable. In the Rights Document of the KwaZulu/Natal drawn by Indaba whose recommendations Buthelezi supports, article 15 (1) states that "the rights and freedoms...are binding on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all government institutions in the [Natal] Province insofar as they fall within the purview of and flow from the powers and functions developed on the Province...."³³⁴ These rights were to be enforced through the

³³³Ibid., p. vi.

³³⁴The full text of the Rights Document of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba is contained in Walter E. Williams, South Africa's War Against Capitalism, (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 143. Indaba is a Zulu word for the meeting of the wise men on serious and important community affairs. The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proceeds from the Buthelezi Commission. That is, the Commission proposed the need for the Indaba. The Indaba was held on April 8, 1986 in Durban at the

Supreme Court. The issue, however, is how the Supreme Court that enforces discriminatory law can protect the KwaZulu/Natal Bill of Rights?

Land

Buthelezi deems the issue of land very important for his people. The question of land became the basis of his opposition to the self-determination and independence of the KwaZulu homeland, as we shall see in our discussion of the homelands. He galvanizes his people around the politics of land, since it is the source of their livelihood. He argues that "Shaka's country is the rest of Natal." That is to say, "...Zulus have land also in White areas."³³⁵ The claim to the land on the basis of indigenous origin does not imply any form of racism, since he recognizes and accepts brown and White Zulus. He says in part: "We have indicated that if it (land) was given back to us, we would be prepared to accept brown and White Zulus, since we are not racists."³³⁶ Further claim to

initiative of the Natal Provincial Council and the KwaZulu government--a black homeland. Its main objective was to negotiate a new legislative structure for KwaZulu and Natal as a single political jurisdiction, economic, and administrative region with a non-racial constitution. The South African government did not endorse the proposals of this conference.

³³⁵Gatsha Buthelezi, "The Past and Future of the Zulu People," Munger African Library Notes, Issue #10, (California: California Institute of Technology, 1972), p. 9.

³³⁶Quoted in James Leatt, Theo Kneifel and Klaus Nurenburger, eds., Contending Ideologies in South Africa, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: WM B. Eerdmans, 1986), pp. 130-131.

the land seems to be based on specific geographic location. He explicitly makes this point when he says, "the millions of people who live in KwaZulu...live in that land of their birth and in that part of South Africa in which their ancestors and their forefathers died."³³⁷ If this statement is true, why the need for land consolidation in KwaZulu? Following the logic of this argument, consolidation may imply grabbing the land which Whites claim to occupy because it was uninhabited. His call for consolidation of the land may be plausible but is apparently based on unclear historical realities. The realities referred to are: The KwaZulu homeland and the Zulu Kingdom (Ancestral patrimony) realities. Buthelezi confuses one historic reality for another in his understanding of the land. The KwaZulu homeland is a creation of the South African government based on Land Act 1913. Hence, Zulus' claim to the land cannot be based on it, because doing so justifies the existence of the homelands. Clearly, the homelands do not correspond to the land initially occupied by Africans. The Zulu Kingdom reality precedes and transcends the KwaZulu homeland and is the basis for authentic land claim. On the basis of this claim, Shaka's kingdom is the rest of Natal and not just KwaZulu.

Buthelezi accepts land-consolidation as one of the ways of dealing with the land problem for Blacks; i.e., buying land

³³⁷Taken from Buthelezi's speech at Imbali Township, Pietermaritzburg, December 16, 1983.

from white farmers and then giving it to Blacks. In terms of the land Act of 1913 Blacks were allocated to a dry and unproductive 13% of the land. Since, consolidation affected the best land, it became hard politically for the white government to buy from the white farmers to give back. It is this failure, according to Buthelezi, which makes a mockery of the policy of separate development.

For Buthelezi, land is a source of power because without it no sovereignty can be established; hence he states "people cannot govern themselves in a vacuum."³³⁸ He demands that the process of land consolidation be expedited to make the policy of separate development credible.

Addressing the question of land, Buthelezi accepts the indigeneity of Whites in South Africa. He says in the rest of Africa Blacks had a confrontation with Whites as foreign settlers. He argued that was not the case in South Africa, since Whites were indigenous. When challenged about the appropriateness of according Whites the indigenous status or whether he knew the meaning of the word, he replied, "the majority of South African Whites had become as indigenous to South Africa as white Americans and black Americans to America."³³⁹ It is on the basis of Black and White

³³⁸Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Challenges of the Seventies," South African Outlook, Vol. 102-103, (January 1972), p. 4.

³³⁹Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Afrikaner Ascendancy and Challenge of the Seventies," Hendrik W. van der Merwe, et al., eds., African Perspective on South Africa, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 42.

indogeneity that he speaks of South Africa as "our common fatherland." This means that the claim to the land is now based on common ownership rather than separate origins.

Sanctions

Buthelezi is considered an arch opponent of the sanctions campaign against South Africa. He favors expanded economic investment and trade because he believes that foreign investments would empower Blacks in their struggle against apartheid. He explains, "the free enterprise system and enlightened capitalism, leading to a massive development of the S.A. economy, are the things that black S.A. has to accept." He further points out, "in our circumstances, the free enterprise system is the most potent force of development available to us...."³⁴⁰ Indubitably, the capitalist system brought massive economic development. The question, however, is whether the economic wealth is equitably distributed. To this question, Buthelezi contends that the capitalist system creates jobs. In support of his position, he says, "...black South Africans have ranked job opportunities in their list of priorities. They have thus always supported job-creating investments in this country, and it is not true that the vast

³⁴⁰Statement of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Sunday Star (Johannesburg, August 11, 1983).

majority of Blacks support the divestment lobby."³⁴¹ The cardinal issue, according to Buthelezi, is the creation of jobs rather than the distribution of wealth. He cites his own peasant upbringing and the fact that many of his "intimate associates have remained peasants and workers"³⁴² as a motivation for opposing sanctions. In 1976 he expressed his anti-sanction stance when he spoke to the American business executives:

"I cannot bring myself to say to the poor and suffering of this country that I am working for the cessation of foreign investment in South Africa. Investment means increased prosperity and it means jobs for the unemployed, clothes for the naked and food for the hungry."³⁴³

Despite his claim to peasant upbringing and consciousness, he ignores the fundamental question; why is it that his intimate associates have remained at the bottom of the alleged economic development? Suppose we accept it as a fact that Blacks need jobs, since he admits that poverty and suffering exist among Blacks. Does employment for Blacks guarantee prosperity? This is not the case. However, he suggests that investment is equal to "increased prosperity" and a source of political change while divestment implies

³⁴¹Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, "Investment in South Africa," Richard E. Sincere, Jr., The Politics of Sentiment: Churches and Foreign Investment in South Africa, (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984), p. 138.

³⁴²Ibid., p. 135.

³⁴³Quoted in MZala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, (Atlantic Highland, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1988), p. 193.

"decreased prosperity" and retardation of the politics of negotiation upon which his evolutionary social-change is predicated. He admits the possibility for political suffering among his people but he rejects suffering caused by sanctions as futile and thoughtless. He expresses this point thus:

"Some people say that black South Africans must pay the price for their liberation....I too realize that a price must be paid. I know that my people are prepared to suffer. Yet they are not prepared to suffer futilely. I reject the view that you punish white racists in South Africa by killing black people...."³⁴⁴

He considers sanctions a punishment to Whites and a killer of Blacks. Apparently, he considers sanctions the cause of suffering and death for Blacks, rather than apartheid itself. In 1972 Vorster, then Prime Minister of South Africa, said, "each trade agreement, each Bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of our continued (apartheid) existence."³⁴⁵ Buthelezi favors foreign investments because they create the opportunity for jobs, while Vorster regards them as a brick in maintaining the system of apartheid. In 1968 Vorster made it clear that mere employment does not serve as a qualification for citizenship and therefore participation in the decision making process. He said:

"It is true that there are blacks working for us. They will continue to work for us for generations,

³⁴⁴Mark A. Uhlig, ed., Apartheid in Crisis: Perspective on the coming Battle for South Africa, p. 211

³⁴⁵Quoted in The New York Times, (June 15, 1986).

in spite of the idea we have to separate them completely....The fact of the matter is this: we need them, because they work for us...but the fact that they work for us can never entitle them to claim political rights, not now, nor in the future."³⁴⁶

The statement "we need them, because they work for us" expresses Vorster's utilitarian attitude in his political view of Blacks. The policy of separate development embodies this attitude as it not only leaves Blacks without any real political rights, but makes them sojourners whose labor is needed to service the white economy. A similar attitude seems inherent in Buthelezi's thought, particularly in his opposition to sanctions. That is, Blacks are defined in terms of what they do and therefore as objects of labor. In a memorandum to the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, he said "...Blacks in South Africa who have jobs with foreign companies would never be persuaded to relinquish their jobs to further the aims and objectives of those who pursue the divestment lobby."³⁴⁷ This suggests that Blacks would rather have jobs than freedom.

Furthermore, Buthelezi blames the ANC Mission in Exile, the United Democratic Front, Western anti-apartheid movements and some Church leaders (e.g., Archbishop Tutu) for advocating sanctions. He interprets their call as a commitment to

³⁴⁶Barbra Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustan, (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1978), p. 21.

³⁴⁷Quoted in Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda, p. 193.

destroying the South African economy. He separates the South Africa economy from apartheid. In his view, only now have "mining, commerce, industry and banking...become politicized in a way in which they were never politicised before."³⁴⁸ The assertion that "big business in South Africa rejects apartheid [that] it (big business) demands reform"³⁴⁹ has not yielded concrete political results.

It is not sufficient simply to reject apartheid. Working toward its eradication is a commitment to justice in the South African context. For many years apartheid served the interests of the foreign and local companies by providing the conditions for profit making. What amount of altruism can turn any company against a system that promotes its interest? Buthelezi makes a link between economy and social change, but this link has no concrete reference point. That is to say, he does not cite a context where economic investment has actually brought about political and social change. It can be stated that foreign companies have no moral capacity to change foreign political systems. Their aim is to accrue profit, and for the most part, they are subject to the law of the land. Evidently, social change requires political action.

Buthelezi's argument in favor of investment reflects, in part, a defense for the government's financial support for

³⁴⁸Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, South Africa: Anatomy of Black-White Power Sharing, p. 12.

³⁴⁹Ibid., p. xxxiv.

his homeland, since, if sanctions were imposed, the KwaZulu budget would also be affected substantially. He explains, "...the KwaZulu budget of 32 million rand for the current financial year is, despite inflation, hardly a drop in the ocean. Even for our civil service it will be difficult to get the best men in view of this differentiation in salaries on the basis of race."³⁵⁰ It may imply that financial "drops" are better than no drops at all, hence the defense.

Homeland

Buthelezi characterizes his involvement in the homeland politics as "participatory opposition" or "participatory democracy." He assures his critics that serving in the homeland system is not a betrayal of the African cause. Rather, it is a contribution to its advancement. Despite this assurance, the strategy of participatory democracy has consequences that contradict his liberational claim. Buthelezi's acceptance of the position of the Minister of Police--leading an institution that is known for its brutality against the Blacks--contradicts his liberational goal. It should be evident that this kind of institutionalized collaborative action and liberation are mutually exclusive.

At times his pronouncements on the homelands reflect a

³⁵⁰Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "KwaZulu Development," Hendrik W. van der Merwe, Nancy C. J. Charton, D. A. Kotze and Ake Magnusson, eds., African Perspectives on South Africa: Collection of Speeches, Articles and Documents, p. 135.

personal disposition that both rejects and accepts the necessity for homeland system. This kind of political activity quests for an acceptance by both sides of the political spectrum. On one hand, he seeks acceptance and recognition by Blacks who reject the homeland system as a symbol of apartheid colonialism, and on the other hand he seeks acceptance from the white government for whose interest the policy of separate development serves. That is, he has a way of relating to white government.

In March, 1976 Buthelezi strongly rejected the independence of the homelands. In his view, acceptance of the homelands independence means abandoning both one's birthright and participation in the wealth which Blacks created in the country. He said:

"I challenge anyone to prove to me that the majority of Blacks want the so-called independence which is offered to our Reserves now called "Homelands." The people who elected me have given me no mandate to opt for the so-called Homeland. They have toiled for generations to create the wealth of South Africa and do not want to abandon their birthright. They intend to participate in the wealth of the land."³⁵¹

He bases his political legitimacy on the traditional hereditary role and his being an elected political leader (i.e., the will of the Zulu people expressed in a democratic election). He argued that his leadership of the Zulu people precedes the homeland system. That is to say, his leadership

³⁵¹Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "Facing the Truth," South African Outlook, Vol. 106-107, (March, 1976), p. 36.

is not the creation of the South African government. He emphasizes that the mandate from his people excludes opting for the homelands independence. The question is: Was the election conducted within the confines of the separate development constitution or not. If it was, how can the will of the Zulu people be expressed in a sectarian constitution, since the constitution was imposed from outside. That is to say, the homeland policy can never be made to serve the will of the people. In terms of the policy, the homelands, whether independent or self-governing, remain the extensions of separate administrations, controlled and maintained by the South African government.

Buthelezi understands his role of working within the homelands structure as an effective way of bringing about evolutionary change. Although he questions the legitimacy of the policy, he also acknowledges that the South African system is a "massive military-industrial machine and [a] huge bureaucracy, the strength of which renders "simple strategies of protests and rebellion pathetically ineffective."³⁵² Inkatha supports Buthelezi's strategy of infiltrating the system in all fronts when it said: "A system is most easily changed from inside. This is because all parts of a system depend on one another, and if one part presses hard and effectively for change other parts have to follow that

³⁵²Inkatha: Its view points on change and liberation in South Africa, (1983), p. 2.

change."³⁵³ Given the nature of the power machinery of the system, he believes that participation is a very successful tactic.

Through participation in the homeland, Buthelezi accepts the reality of the separate development policy. The acceptance leads ostensibly to an appreciation of the fact that the homelands can serve as a basis for federation. This does not mean that he would not have been open to the idea of federation through some other ways, but the homeland politics gave him the context within which such a notion could better be tested. The homeland politics led him to an appreciation of Verwoed's words of "good neighborliness." (Verwoed described separate development as "good neighborliness.") In the same way as Verwoed spoke of "good neighborliness" within a truncated country so also Buthelezi saw its importance when the policy of separate development shall have been fully accomplished. That is, when more land has been added to the homelands and all the homelands have attained their independence.

He believes that the "homelands" are the only machinery through which he can legally develop his own people meaningfully. For this reason, he explains that "the homeland policy means the emergence of states in which African interests are paramount." he continues, "...each and every group [should] maintain its identity through new

³⁵³Ibid., p. 5.

constitutional and political arrangements."³⁵⁴ This implies that the so-called states would co-operate on certain vital matters of common concern. In his view, "...the emergence of independent homelands is not contradictory to the idea of all the states, white or black, being associated on matters of general concern."³⁵⁵ Here, we see the development of the concept of homelands into states. In the states, interests are divided into common and general. Common interests call for both Black and White participation; general interests are matters in which individual communities will be responsible. In this analysis, the states assume a higher political level than homelands but the results is the same. That is, the idea of states is also based on race, skin-color and culture. To emphasize its homelands character, he says, "attempts would have to be made to ensure that in our participatory democracy in the black states the educated African elite is included."³⁵⁶ This statement anticipates some resistance from the educated African elites to the idea of black and white states. Would it be implausible to suggest on the basis of Buthelezi's political thought that what this formula (the creation of white, black and multi-racial states) accomplishes is to turn into a virtue the fear that Whites have about the

³⁵⁴Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, "White and Black Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Future of the Homelands," Hendrik W. van der Merwe, et al., eds., African Perspectives on South Africa, p. 50.

³⁵⁵Ibid, p. 52.

³⁵⁶Ibid., p. 56.

black government and a common South Africa?

Can it be argued that Buthelezi's emphasis of a "constituent independent states...established in terms of the government's policy of separated development"³⁵⁷ as a basis for solving South Africa's racial tensions seems to reflect the desire for institutionalization of black resistance, rather than changing the political landscape of the country? Certainly, he saw the homelands policy offering an alternative to white domination and providing the opportunity for power sharing. Some argue that this kind of political arrangement (homelands policy) is unconvincing about its potential to achieve its intended liberational end. The merit and demerit of this point are problematic and therefore remain unresolved.

For one thing, Buthelezi advocates one South African economy. The thought about a single economy is based on the understanding that "the economy of South African belongs to all."³⁵⁸ He believes that in a federal system the economy should remain integrated, since both Blacks and Whites contributed in building it. Any political arrangement that excludes Blacks from economic participation, he reasons, would be tantamount to requiring them to sign away their birthrights. He categorically rejected this kind of economic exclusion. The economic system he envisions is known as capitalism with sisa and ubunntu. That is to say, the economy

³⁵⁷Ibid., p. 53.

³⁵⁸Ibid., p. 52.

must 'have a pinch of ubuntu, or Africa communalism and sisa as guiding virtues for the free enterprise capitalist system.'³⁵⁹ These virtues would give the economic system a human face. Exploitation whether by Blacks or Whites, he warned, must be resisted and eliminated from our social and political life.

ISAAC MOKOENA

Mokoena appeared on the political scene very recently and there are issues upon which he has not expressed himself or, at least, no written evidence of his opinions on these issues is obtainable. An attempt will be made in this section to analyze some of the issues that he has had the opportunity to articulate.

Civil Disobedience

He rejects civil disobedience and boycotts as "tumults, the spirit of darkness, of destruction and rebellion against any law and order which is the backbone of a jointly planned future."³⁶⁰ The respect for law and order is the basis of his denouncement of civil disobedience. He believes that law and order is "the backbone of a jointly planned future." It is unclear what this jointly planned future is all about.

³⁵⁹"Sisa" is a Zulu word for sharing. In Zulu custom, Sisa means sharing with a less privileged neighbor.

³⁶⁰Isaac Mokoena, "Report," Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 8.

He also believes that it is not the responsibility of the church to bring about social change. Since civil disobedience opposes the law, Mokoena contends that "it is not the work of the Church to oppose the laws of the country." He continues, "the layman is there to do that. I will only intervene when I see that atheism is being brought into the country."³⁶¹ For him apartheid does not constitute a threat to the Christian Church, as would atheism or communism. That is to say, he regards the ideology of communism imposed from outside as more dangerous than the ideology of apartheid from the inside. He stated that he would never trade apartheid for communism. This was to demonstrate his abhorrence of communism rather than his liking of apartheid. He claims that civil disobedience has produced hate and violence and that the Blacks he represented were willing to work peaceably. In August 1985, in an invitation to denominations and population groups for prayer and consultation, he described the nature of the co-operation with the State in these words: "We feel compelled to publicly declare our preparedness to co-operate with all those in authority who strive for peace in an evolutionary process in order to make this country a home for all peace loving nations."³⁶² In the same report, he emphasizes "...mutual co-operation aiming at building up a commonwealth of nations in South Africa." His use of the word "nations" suggests that he

³⁶¹Ibid., p. 2.

³⁶²Ibid. p. 8. Emphasis mine.

views South Africa not as one nation but a plurality of nations. (This is also the official State view.)

Instead of civil disobedience as a political instrument for impressing on the government the need to bring about change, he opts for co-operation--a process of working within the government structures.

Armed Struggle

Mokoena has not presented a coherent and sustained treatment of the problem of armed struggle. These pieces give a demonstrable development of his thought on the subject. He focuses attention on violence rather than armed struggle. In fact, the word armed struggle does not even appear in his speeches and interviews. Deductively, it can be discerned that his rejection of violence as a political instrument for social change equally applies to the armed struggle. Evidently, a distinction between armed struggle and violence does not exist and he treats both under the rubric of violence.

For Mokoena, there are two sources of violence. First, there is the violence of the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front. Second, there is the violence of "subversive Organizations" supported by the South African Council of Churches/Desmond Tutu. Identifying the sources of violence, he says, "I think the United Democratic Front is wearing the clothes of the African National Congress. I have no doubt about that, because what is really going on here in

South Africa is a war among Blacks."³⁶³

By reducing the UDF to a surrogate status, Mokoena makes both the UDF and the ANC equally violent organizations and, as such, one of the sources of violence in the country. He maintains that the war in the country is "...not a war between Blacks and Whites. It does not affect the White man, and to think that what is going on will bring down this government to its knees--it will not help an inch."³⁶⁴ It is unclear whether Mokoena's criticism of violence is motivated by the fact that it is--to him--morally and theologically indefensible, or because it is directed by Blacks against Blacks. One may ask: Suppose the use of violence did "affect the White man" and would effectively bring the current government to its knees; would Mokoena support or justify its use? To this question he says, "I reject all forms of violence, whether individual or collective, and regardless of political motivation."³⁶⁵

Mokoena's concern about violence leads to the following observation regarding its effects and consequences:

"What is really happening is that Blacks are exterminating one another, people are being influenced to have no respect for life and property, people are being intimidated to reject the people that they have elected, so that a society can be brought about where people will have no representative. I have never seen a society

³⁶³Christian Beacon, Vol. L, No. 30, (September 5, 1985), p. 1.

³⁶⁴Ibid., p. 1.

³⁶⁵The Star, (August 10, 1986).

where people have no representative, where people have to form them. In any civilized society you have leaders."³⁶⁶

This statement reveals some essential threads in his understanding not only of violence but also its true character. To what extent can the so-called Black-on-Black violence be a manifestation of a deeper systemic violence of the state? That is to say, the government's manipulative hand cannot be entirely overruled in this conflict. This aspect, Mokoena does not seem to reflect on in his analysis of violence. True no one should reject "their representatives." But there are two kinds of representatives. The one is imposed upon the people under the guise of pseudo-election; the other is authentically elected by the majority of the people. One of these leaders may be a source of division and violence and the other may be a uniting factor and a source of social stability. Mokoena does not tell us the type of leaders and representatives the people reject. One wonders what criterion he uses to determine what is civilized and what is not. Can a country where the majority of its people are denied a vote and participation in the decision-making process be considered civilized?

In his view, the ANC and UDF are responsible for violence in the black community and are the "mouthpiece of communists." Having associated the ANC with violence, he lays down the condition upon which he would be prepared to negotiate with

³⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 1-2.

it. He explains, "I would be prepared to support the unbanning of the ANC on the condition that they denounce violence."³⁶⁷ In an interview, he made the same point. He maintained that "if the African National Congress would foreswear violence, my party [the United Christian Conciliation Party] would be prepared to negotiate with it."³⁶⁸ Interestingly, the condition of "foreswearing violence" which Mokoena emphasized was similar to the demand the government advanced to the Congress, especially to Nelson Mandela on January 31, 1985. Speaking in parliament, President P.W. Botha offered to release Mandela on condition that he "unconditionally rejected violence as a political weapon." The government used the language of renouncing violence as a basis for freedom, particularly for those in prison. Mokoena uses the same language as a basis for negotiation between the ANC and his political party. It has been argued that Mokoena's appropriation of the government's language of renouncing violence implies that his political program practically identical with that of the government. For example, he publicly supported the raid that the security forces conducted in Botswana.³⁶⁹ In addition, he branded the ANC and UDF radicals and communists, who in his view, used the street

³⁶⁷The Citizen, (August 10, 1986).

³⁶⁸The Star, (November 10, 1986).

³⁶⁹Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2.

committees and funerals to "demonstrate the killing powers"³⁷⁰ of the activists.

Mokoena charged that the South African Council of Churches and Desmond Tutu, former General Secretary, perpetuate violence by giving financial support to the "radicals," "subversives," and "murderers." Accordingly, he regards them as a source of violence in this sense. He claimed that Tutu had "promoted a war of Black against Black and collaborated with the communists."³⁷¹ Mokoena does not give evidence to substantiate his claim and as such this statement may sound reactionary rather than substantive fact. When asked to support his belief that Tutu was promoting war against Blacks, he replied, "it is evident from the recent riots that we are engaged in a war against one another."³⁷² This statement does not tell us whether or not Tutu promotes the Black against Black conflict. To say that "...we are engaged in a war against one another" does not implicate Tutu in any way unless he can show how Tutu promotes the war. By construing Tutu as a promoter of violence, Mokoena drew a conclusion that Tutu did not deserve the Nobel Peace Prize and that an award "to such a man is an insult to the Black Christians of South Africa."³⁷³

³⁷⁰The Citizen, (November 22, 1986).

³⁷¹The Citizen, (October 12, 1984).

³⁷²Sunday Mirror, (June 1, 1985).

³⁷³The Citizen, (October 12, 1984).

In furtherance of his violent claim against Tutu, Mokoena links him with the African National Congress. He presses this connection to make his case credible, since the government has consistently labeled the ANC a violent organization. In his letter of December 7, 1984, he wrote:

"It is an indisputable fact that Bishop Desmond Tutu has openly collaborated with the African National Congress which is a wing of the Communist Party of South Africa, because he has always shown by way of speeches and financial support toward the ANC and also to the unfortunate people (guerrillas) who could not get away from the hand of the Law. In support of this he instructed attorneys to represent robbers and murderers who were convicted in Botswana."³⁷⁴

Mokoena has evidently not established indisputable grounds upon which Tutu allegedly supports violence and promotes Black-against-Black conflict. More is needed from Mokoena to validate his claim. True, the SACC, through one of its departments (Dependence Conference) openly supported the families of the detainees and in some instances provided financial support for their legal defense. In 1982 the South African Council of Churches was investigated by the Eloff Commission--a government-appointed committee. The commission did not establish any connection between either the SACC or Desmond Tutu with the ANC and therefore with promotion of violence. Mokoena's claims here remain problematic; further evidence would be necessary to make a charge of this magnitude

³⁷⁴Isaac Mokoena, "Letter," M. J. Lamola, ed., The Public Profile of Bishop Isaac Mokoena, Occasional Publication No. 3, (Johannesburg: Kanya African Independent Churches Theological Training and Research, 1979-1987), p. 3.

hold.

Early in our discussion we learned about Mokoena's condemnation of both individual and collective violence. One wonders whether this principle equally applies to all situations and circumstances. This question is raised because in one instance this principle did not apply across the board. In 1985 the South African Defense force conducted a raid into Botswana, Gaborone, killing some and wounding others. While the South African Council of Churches condemned the raid, Mokoena praised the South African Defense Force for the mission accomplished. He said in part:

"No civilized country would allow a neighbor to harbor its enemies, who have no respect for loss of life, and I am very thankful that the security forces took this action because these people were not going to kill White people, they were going to kill Black people, their own people."³⁷⁵

Condoning the violence of the security forces while rejecting the violence of other political organizations contradicts the principle Mokoena espouses: rejecting all forms of violence regardless of who employs it. The question of why Mokoena employs racial categories when justifying the use of violence is unclear.

Furthermore, the words, "no civilized country would allow a neighbor to harbor its enemies" were first used by President P. W. Botha as a warning to Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique for allowing the ANC in their countries. Mokoena repeated the

³⁷⁵Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2. See also The Citizen, (May, 7, 1985).

same words after the raid into Botswana had been conducted. The legitimate question to ask is what is the connection between Mokoena and the status quo? He believed that South Africa has the capacity and moral commitment to change. He confirmed this position after his meeting with P. W. Botha. He said:

"I want to believe that South Africa is moving--although people would want South Africa to move faster; but history has already shown that a country that moves too fast can outwalk its boots. If you look at what is happening in Zimbabwe, South Africa must learn that you don't have to do everything overnight. And I think that the steps that have been taken by the President and his government--if they are given the opportunity--will mean that we will live very happily in South Africa."³⁷⁶

To understand Mokoena's perception of change, one needs to put into perspective Botha's position on this matter. Botha's solution for South Africa was based on a separate-development policy. In August 15, 1985, in Durban, Botha firmly restated the solution for the country when he said, "I firmly believe that the granting and acceptance of independence by various black peoples within the context of their own statehood represent a material part of the solution."³⁷⁷ The solution, *inter alia*, includes a rejection of the principle of one person, one vote, in a unitary state

³⁷⁶Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2.

³⁷⁷P. W. Botha, "State President P.W. Botha, National Party," Mark A. Uhlig, ed., Apartheid in Crisis, p. 104. The citation is taken from an excerpt from his speech to the congress of the Nationalist Party in Durban in August 15, 1985.

and accommodation of the rights of the urban Blacks outside of their national states. With this background in mind, does Mokoena's assessment of the government's reformist steps "mean that we will live very happily in South Africa?" Does Mokoena believe that balkanization of the country offers hope for the future? In admitting to the idea of balkanization of the country, he says "...we accept separate development."³⁷⁸ That is, he supports the reformist approach of the government without challenging the fundamental philosophy of separate development.

The problem, for Mokoena, was not the government but the outside world, which keeps on interfering in its internal affairs. The outside world must leave South Africa to solve its problems, he warns.

Constitution

In October, 1986, Mokoena co-founded the United Christian Conciliation Party. Through this Party, he articulated what he understood to be the function of the constitution. That is, the constitution of his Party gave expression to his political and religious thought. He explained that his Party's choice of the rhinoceros as an emblem was because "the rhino will never leave a fellow rhino in trouble. It will fight to protect it."³⁷⁹ In his view, the constitution aims to protect the

³⁷⁸Christian Beacon (September 5, 1985), p. 8.

³⁷⁹Citizen, (October 9, 1986).

other rhinos. Who are the people whom the rhino sets out to protect? Is it those black leaders who are rejected by the people as unauthentic and therefore imposed on them by the apartheid system? This question is important since the founders (Mokoena, Linda, Kunene) of the UCCP have one way or the other been in conflictual relation with the people they claimed to represent.³⁸⁰ Though the constitution was intended to have some far reaching implications, it represented the view point of the "moderate" Blacks.

The constitution, according to Mokoena, advocated open membership to all "regardless of creed, sex and color." However, the constitution used the clause "who abide by Christian values" as a basis for acceptance into membership. On the basis of this provision, he argued that "non-Christians could become members, provided that their values were reconcilable with Christian values."³⁸¹ The adherence to Christian principles confirms a general view that South Africa is a Christian country. Therefore, the norms for political participation have consequently to be Christian. Mokoena states that Christian values are demonstrated in rejecting all forms of violence, whether individual or collective. This

³⁸⁰In November 1986 Isaac Mokoena was abducted, beaten up and dumped in a lonely place near mine dumps for his alleged anti-ANC and SACC statements. In 1985 Thamsanqa Linda had to flee his Eastern Cape township of Port Elizabeth when his home and business were burnt down by people who regarded him as a "sell-out". See The Star, (August 18, 1987). Edward Kunene is former mayor of Soweto. His house was petrol-bombed when he was a major.

³⁸¹The Citizen, (October 7, 1986).

means that the constitution emphasizes the renunciation of conflict and violence as a prerequisite for membership and expression of Christian values. Furthermore, the constitution makes an appeal for conciliation. That is, it envisions a future of free, equal and democratic rights as an indication of the people's sovereignty.

The constitution states that "only freedom of choice and equal opportunities for all are the basis of Christian dignity and economic, social and political justice."³⁸² The principles espoused by the party are fraternity and action. These principles aim at the promotion of human rights, equal opportunity, non-racialism, multi-party democracy, non-violence, free enterprise and social responsibility. Mokoena and others opted for the free enterprise system because they believed it to be an alternative to starvation, misery and under-development, which have riddled most of the African countries.

Among other things, the constitution calls for sharing of the country's wealth and introduction of the welfare system. The constitution expresses the vision of the party in these words:

"All South Africans must be re-instated in their right to share the wealth of that which they have produced. Each shall earn according to his abilities and welfare shall be within the reach of all in need. The advancement of those South Africans who have so far been denied their share to the nation's wealth must have priority, in

³⁸²Ibid., The Citizen.

particular through education, the promotion of small businesses, development co-operation and through the creation of the opportunities for the acquisition of land."³⁸³

The ideas expressed in the constitution are plausible but what is unclear is whether these ideas are consistent with Mokoena's acceptance of separate development. If he accepts separate development, the principles embodied in the constitution contradict it. How does one talk about non-racialism in an ethnic context? In the preceding citation, he speaks of the "nation's wealth." This is apparently a misnomer, since he understands South Africa as a of plurality of nations rather than one nation.

Some have doubted Mokoena's authorship of the constitution for the following reasons: (a), at the launching of the UCCP there were two defenders of the government policy of apartheid: Russell Crystal, then president of the National Students' Federation; and Martin Yuill, former head of the Student Moderate Alliance; (b), three months after the party was launched, the New Nation paper revealed the name of a White man as being the "big brains" behind the writing of the constitution;³⁸⁴ (c), most of the founders of the UCCP have

³⁸³Ibid., The Citizen. Emphasis mine.

³⁸⁴The New Nation, (November 6, 1986). The alleged "big brains" behind the UCCP constitution are: Collin Vale, professor of International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, who works with a section of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria. He also served in the South African Diplomatic Service. Professor Andre Thomashausen of the Institute of International Law, and Graham Levin have also been associated with Mokoena's political party.

been community councilors who served within the government institutions. All these factors combined raise the question of whether this political party was part of the government strategy to groom the so-called moderate Blacks for participation in the Statutory Council--a State-created body to circumvent genuine democratic solution by encouraging a system of divide-and-rule. Our aim is to highlight the problem rather than to solve it.

As far as the constitution is concerned, it contains some fundamental demands. These include "representative and democratic" political participation; an end of privilege on the grounds of race, creed, color or sex; and free political activity.

One wonders whether what the constitution contains are not merely glittering generalities. That is, a technique of promoting something by association with high-sounding ideals. Through these ideals, the propagandist clothe any cause that they want us to accept uncritically without specific proof. This observation is not intended to be a dismissal of the constitutional ideals but to question their practicability, given Mokoena's pronouncement in favor of separate ethnic nations.

Sanctions

Mokoena has been the only (fundamentalist) Christian who vocally and practically opposed the application of sanctions

and divestment against South Africa. He has adopted a two-fold strategy in his opposition to sanctions.

First, he has denounced Bishop Desmond Tutu's claims of speaking on behalf of the Black majority; and, further, he has argued that the overseas donations to the South African Council of Churches are used to prop up radical and subversive individuals and organizations, particularly the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front. Consequently, he has urged the donor agencies, particularly, the West German people, to withdraw their financial support from such revolutionary programs in the country.

Second, he has advocated economic investments for both South Africa and the homelands. The call to stop giving financial aid to the Church could be interpreted as encouraging a form of sanctions and divestment against the South African Council of Churches. While advocating sanctions against the Church council on one hand, on the other hand, he urged countries of the world to increase their investments in the country. In a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van de Griffier, Mokoena wrote:

"Please inform your Parliament that the four and half million black Christians over the age of 18, who are members of the 864 church denominations associated with the Reformed independent Churches Association (RICA), of which I am the honorary Life President strongly resist the call for sanctions, boycotts and divestment campaigns against the Republic of South Africa. We do this because these can only lead to unnecessary suffering and the needless bloodshed of our people. On the contrary, we call for investment and economic development and growth which alone can lead to physical betterment

and advancement of all people in South Africa....Please urge your government, therefore, to step up its investment and development aid to South Africa and to the homelands and to encourage private Dutch firms to do the same"³⁸⁵

Mokoena accepts uncritically the separatist categories of South Africa and homelands as coined by the government. Since he lives outside of the homelands one would question the assertion that he represents the many. In the letter, Mokoena legitimizes his claim to be both a spokesperson of the Black majority and the government. To assert his legitimacy as a voice of the Blacks, he inflates the number of Christians belonging to his association of Churches. The four-and-a-half million he claims has not been proved as an accurate figure.³⁸⁶ Similarly, he lobbies for the government by urging foreign governments to invest in the country. He says, "I would be happy to advise you concerning a number of develop[ment] member projects in South Africa."³⁸⁷

He made similar points in his petition to President Reagan when he said:

"...inform Congress that we oppose all measures that harm the economy of our country. We therefore reject all disinvestment campaigns, trade

³⁸⁵Christian Beacon, (September 2, 1985), p. 2. A full text of the letter Mokoena wrote in May 23, 1983 is reproduced here.

³⁸⁶The Star, (November 12, 1984). Professor G. C. Oosthuizen, head of the Research Institute on Black independent Churches at the University Zululand, dismisses Mokoena's claim to speak for four million Blacks as "nonsense." He concludes that Mokoena "...represents only a small group of a few thousand who belong to Rica-affiliated black churches."

³⁸⁷Ibid., p. 2.

restrictions, economic boycotts and business sanctions, for we believe these will bring unemployment and instability, resulting in unnecessary hunger and suffering and needless bloodshed among our people."³⁸⁸

The arguments he advances against sanctions are those used by government officials and those sympathetic to apartheid. For instance, he uses words such as "unnecessary hunger and suffering" as if unnecessary hunger and suffering do not already exist in the resettlement camps of South Africa. Can he use the suffering of the black people in opposing sanctions without legitimizing the continued existence of the system which produces suffering and hunger? In this instance, it is hard to reconcile the two.

Mokoena and the government believe that economic boom would invariably lead to political change. There is no evidence to support this claim that when Afrikaners are well-off economically, they would likely change their political attitude to Blacks. The question is, since when have Blacks become so important as to be used as legitimation of an argument against their own oppression?

The assertion that Blacks will suffer most if sanctions are imposed became a moral basis upon which he grounded his strategy against sanctions. He argues that "people who are well catered for," who earn "decent salary," who are "able to provide for their children" who "have decent homes and decent

³⁸⁸Isaac Mokoena, "Petition," M. J. Lamola, ed., The Public Profile of Bishop Isaac Mokoena, 1979-1987, (Occasional Publication No. 3, 1987).

clothing," are the cornerstone upon which a nation could be built. On the basis of this argument, he concludes that for the above conditions to exist it requires employment, which must be made possible through increased investments. He claims that sanctions aim at removing the possibilities for jobs. The logic of his thinking is as follows: If there is no job, there is no salary. Consequently, "a person loses his dignity, he lose his self-respect, he become weak, he cannot think for himself. Then he becomes vulnerable for exploitation."³⁸⁹

But the ills that he fears sanctions will bring already exist before their imposition. Therefore, the cause is not sanctions but the unjust nature of apartheid. Apparently, he believes that the apartheid system has the moral capacity to instill human dignity and self-respect. The South African politican reality has shown this not to be the case.

Homeland

One can put some pieces together regarding Mokoena's understanding of the homeland/separate-development policy. Mokoena conceives the homelands policy in ethnic terms. Similarly, Mokoena emphasizes his ethnicity as a point of departure. He says, "I am South Sotho. I value my custom and traditions. That is how I want to raise my children. I would not want to thrust my customs and traditions down the throat

³⁸⁹Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 1.

of another."³⁹⁰ His "personal philosophy" includes a recognition that Whites, Indians and Coloreds are God's children. However, he rejects the idea of being "made a black White man." The reason for his rejection of the idea is that he wants "to remain Isaac Mokoena." He continues, "And I want to fulfil my position amongst my own people."³⁹¹ His emphasis on South Sotho identity seems to support an ethnic social context where his position may be fulfilled. In South Africa there exists a homeland for South Sotho. The rationale that Mokoena employs for preservation of his customs and traditions is similar to the government's claim that a non-South Sotho would not be received and affirmed among people of another ethnic group. This is the government's central argument for separate development.

His support of ethnic development is clearly expressed, and this view of ethnicity is embodied, in the homeland policy. Mokoena does not hide his admiration of Gatsha Buthelezi. He says, "I have a lot of respect for him, because he is faithful, he wants to represent the need of his people....He is definitely a genuine leader." The appreciation of Buthelezi's leadership leads to Mokoena's support for his homeland institution and its problems. He thinks that Buthelezi should "...speak more and more loudly for the introduction of more investments in the homeland." In his

³⁹⁰Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2.

³⁹¹Ibid., p. 2.

view, the investments in the homeland would help combat migrant labor--a legal system that separates "husbands from their wives and children in the cities...."³⁹²

Mokoena's understanding of the homeland is one of containment. That is to say, he does not question the legitimacy for the homeland system, but accepts and supports it. In his support of the separate development policy, Mokoena employs the political categories of race, identity, custom and tradition, rather than theological arguments. He states in part:

"South Africa is being criticized for its apartheid policy. Let me tell you that if it is apartheid we are totally against but if it is apartheid we accept self-development. I am black and want to retain my identity, culture, custom and tradition outside of White interference, the Zulu also wishes to develop himself according to his identity, culture, custom and tradition, therefore I would never wish to be in a White situation foreign to myself and where I do not want to belong."³⁹³

Mokoena does expose his theological position on the question of the homelands. As we know, he claims to represent 4 1/2 million people; does that mean that all these Christians are South Sothos? If the alleged Christians are not all from his ethnic group, since his group statistically is only in thousands, on what theological ground does he justify separate development. Does the act of cross-ethnic evangelism not

³⁹²Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2. The preceding citations are taken from this source.

³⁹³Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 8. The citation is taken from Mokoena's Report reproduced in this newspaper.

nullify the premise of separation of people according to race and culture? It is one thing to recognize the importance of identity, custom and culture. It is quite another to formulate practical ways in which they can serve to enrich our lives together, rather than ways of excluding others from our common political fellowship.

The chart that follows gives a schematic summary of the divergent positions of the leaders we studied. There has been no attempt to discern and to draw implications from these divergencies--or, so far, to account for (explain) the differences.

**SCHEMATIC SYNOPSIS OF POSITIONS
ON SELECTED ISSUES**

ISSUE	STRONG SUPPORT	AMBIVALENT SUPPORT	NEGATION
Civil disobedience	Tutu Mandela Sobukwe Biko Buthelezi		G. Buthelezi Mokoena
Armed Struggle	Mandela Sobukwe	Biko Tutu	Buthelezi Mokoena G. Buthelezi
Negotiation	Mandela Tutu Biko Sobukwe Buthelezi Mokoena G. Buthelezi		
Land (African Control)	Sobukwe Biko G. Buthelezi	Mandela Tutu Buthelezi Mokoena	
Sanctions	Mandela Tutu Biko Sobukwe Buthelezi		G. Buthelezi Mokoena
Homelands	G. Buthelezi Mokoena		Mandela Tutu Biko Sobukwe Buthelezi

Majority Rule	Mandela Tutu Sobukwe Biko Buthelezi		G. Buthelezi Mokoena
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Chapter 3

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL RATIONALE: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

In Chapter 2 major political issues, which formed the basis of disputes among the Black leaders were closely discussed. The purpose of the discussion was to establish what informed the stand the leaders took and the basis upon which each of them justified his respective position on the issue. The positions were not related to one another. The aim of this chapter is to do that. Additionally, we will determine whether or not those understandings have actually promoted or retarded the possibility for co-operative action.¹

The idea of co-operative action implies human association. That is to say, human action is associational. This means that human co-operation is experienced or exercised in the context of community, which is a concrete expression of human association. This inquiry concerns itself with human praxis² as it is carried out by and among human beings. Now,

¹The concept of co-operative action concerns the settlement of problems in a manner that allow the continuation of the differences and even fundamental disagreements. In other words, the word co-operative action suggests toleration of differences and insists on the legitimacy of differences.

²Human praxis: actual and habitual action, practice or doing, as opposed to abstract theory. Theory is an implicate of praxis. Vide George Allan, The Realizations of the Future: An Inquiry into

human praxis can either foster or inhibit human association, by that, rendering co-operative action difficult. The two kinds of actions (i.e: action that promotes co-operation or militates against it) will be the focus of our study to discern their role in the struggle against apartheid. Apartheid is the single political system on which Black leaders concentrate their liberational efforts. They do so from different strategic, ideological, political and theological understandings, hence the urgent need for possible co-operative liberation.

As we have seen, each of the leaders selected subscribed to one of three societal visions: non-racialism, Africanist/Black Consciousness and Collaborationist. Our task at this point is to compare the differences and similarities in their religious and political thought.

A. The issue of Non-racialism

As we have seen above, the leaders studied have different positions on the issue of non-racialism. These positions are depicted accordingly:

Non-racialism as means and ends	Non-racialism as end only	Non-racialism as neither means nor ends
Mandela Tutu	Sobukwe Biko Buthelezi	G. Buthelezi Mokoena

Our analysis of the non-racialist thought of Mandela and Tutu

the Authority of Praxis, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 3.

reveals that their understanding of the good society is predicated upon the inclusion of all races. That is to say, the inclusion of Blacks and Whites serves, in their view, as the basis for a just and democratic society not as a final end alone but as means to that final end as well. For them, the non-racialist vision is to evidence itself both in method and in content; i.e., means and ends are being inseparably bound together. Tutu attests to this fact when he says, "Blacks claim an inalienable right to do things for themselves, in co-operation with their fellow South Africans of all races."³ The idea of co-operation between the races is, for Tutu, the foundation of his societal vision. Hence, he says, "my vision for South Africa is totally non-racial."⁴ The common fatherhood of God, "common baptism" and the fact that "Christ has broken down all that separates us irrelevantly--" provide, for Tutu, the theological rationale for non-racialism. He continues, "in this Jesus Christ we are for ever bound together as one redeemed humanity, Black and White together."⁵ For this reason, Tutu regards non-racial democracy as more than a political experiment; it embodies both spiritual and moral elements.

Similarly, Mandela justifies non-racialism as both means and ends on the basis of the indivisibility of freedom. In his

³Desmond Tutu, Hope and Suffering, p. 31. Emphasis mine.

⁴Ibid., p. 45.

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

first public speech on the Grand Parade in Cape Town in February 11, 1990, hours after he was released from prison, he said, "...I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all."⁶ These opening words seem to lift up the important elements, which should form the foundation of the future political community. That is say, "freedom for all" (Black and White) is the cornerstone of a peaceful and democratic political system. The inseparability of strategy and goal in Mandela's political thought is demonstrated in these words:

"It is our belief that the future of our country can only be determined by a body which is democratically elected on a non-racial basis. Negotiations on dismantling of apartheid will have to address the overwhelming demands of our people for a democratic, non-racial and unitary South Africa."⁷

The practice of non-racialism as both means and ends is exemplified in Mandela's insistence that the negotiating team of the new constitution of the country should be based on a non-racial electoral scheme. In other words, the non-racial vision should be embodied in every phase of Black and White political association. Hence, he said, "I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which **all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.**"⁸ The

⁶Nelson Mandela, "A Humble Servant of you the People," South African Outlook, Vol. 120, No. 1425, (March 1990), p. 209.

⁷Ibid., p. 210.

⁸Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is my Life, p. 181. Italics mine.

principles of harmonious co-existence and equality are, for Mandela, an ideal of freedom with intrinsic universal moral value, upon whose shared possession the future of the non-racial society depends. His commitment to this ideal is firm and resolute. He concludes, "it is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve."⁹ Further, he wrote, "...non-racial society is the only way in which our rich and beautiful country will be saved from the stigma which repels the world."¹⁰

For Mandela and Tutu, the participation of Whites, Indians and Coloreds in the struggle is crucial and it forms the basis for co-operative activity. A continuing question, however, is how Mandela and Tutu propose to deal with the Group Areas (i.e: Homealnds, Townships etc.), in order to bring their process of negotiation in conformity with their non-racial vision.

In contrast to Mandela and Tutu who consider non-racialism as inextricably connected as both the means and ends, Sobukwe and Biko (Africanist/Black Consciousness) regard non-racialism as a final end but not as a present means. Rather they argued that Blacks had to act alone for a time. Thus, sobukwe advocated the exclusion of Indians, coloreds and Whites. Given their material conditions, he argued, Indians and Whites would not be interested in dismantling a political

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰South African Outlook, Vol. 120 (March 1990), p. 202.

system from which they benefitted. He felt that the three racial groups (Indians and Whites) would take over the leadership of African political organizations for the purpose of stalling and watering down the struggle of the African people. Potlako Leballo expressed the Africanist view when he said, "Africans must fight alone! These allies from other groups want to subvert our leaders and water down our nationalism."¹¹ Sobukwe like Leballo argued the struggle is first and foremost the struggle of the African people. But the end for which the African people strove was the establishment of a non-racial society under the banner of the African socialist democracy. Thus, Sobukwe advocated purist African nationalism as vehicle and guarantee for the success of the struggle with a view to establishing a society where "...a man's color will be as irrelevant as the shape of his ears."¹² In order to make the envisioned end possible, Sobukwe believed that the primary task of the Africanist organization was a historical one. In terms of historical evidence, Africans were oppressed and exploited. Consequently, they needed liberation and freedom. Hence, they should take full responsibility for their struggle. Sobukwe argued that following the challenges of African history in which Africans

¹¹Peder Gouwenius, Power to the People! South Africa in Struggle: A Pictorial History, (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 118. At the founding of the Pan Africanist in 1959, Potlako Kitchener Leballo was elected the national secretary while Robert Sobukwe emerged as president.

¹²Mangaliso Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 33.

sought freedom and the restoration of their dignity, the task of the Africanist organization is, among other things:

"To create an organizational machinery for galvanizing of the oppressed, exploited and degraded African masses into a resistible social force bent upon the destruction of all factors and forces that have reduced the stature of man and retarded his growth; and also bent upon the creation of conditions favorable for restoration of man's worth and dignity and for the African personality."¹³

Sobukwe regarded his primary responsibility as the freedom of the African people because he was convinced that:

"...the African people can demonstrate to the world genuine democracy in action, a democracy founded upon the ruins of the material and spiritual conflicts and contradictions of the existing social order, a democracy in which man shall at long last find his true self, a democracy in which the human personality shall blossom to the full."¹⁴

This statement points to the actualized non-racial society based on African values in which humanity is affirmed and enhanced. The struggle for this common humanity, Sobukwe argued, was to be achieved by African unity based on irresistible African nationalism.

In pursuance of non-racialism as an end, Sobukwe employed the concept of "human race" to demonstrate the racial "transcendence" in his political thought. We use the word "transcendence" here in an all encompassing sense. That is to say, he did attach significance to race because, in his thinking, "...there is only one race to which all belong, and

¹³Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 43.

that is human race." He continued, "...there is no race that is superior to another, there is no race that is inferior to another."¹⁵ The racial transcendental principle based on human common origin led to his rejection of the existence of separate races. Thus, he used the concept of human race as a justification for a democratic principle where distinctions of race and tribe and culture were irrelevant--where "every man would be his brother's keeper."¹⁶ The question, however, is whether the habit of racial exclusion in the struggle can, guarantee the end of the non-racial society.

In the same vein, Biko argued for non-racialism as an end only because he viewed the means to that end as a necessary period for Blacks to be schooled in the philosophy of Black Consciousness--a philosophy that addressed the psychological inferiority complex Blacks had acquired as the result of their oppression. The process of raising consciousness could not, Biko contended, be fruitfully carried out in a context where master and slave belonged to same political organization. The reason for this difficulty, according to Biko, was that Whites would always pose as teachers while Blacks remained perpetual students. In order to break this circle of dependency created by white superior ordination, Biko advocated the exclusion of Whites from the liberation struggle as a temporary measure. He considered the act of exclusion as a period of disengagement.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁶Ibid.

The purpose of disengagement was to accelerate the process of consciousness-raising by reflecting on the concrete experience of oppression. Mosibudi Mangena attested to this fact when he said:

"The kernel of their (Biko and others) simple message was that black people are oppressed and brutalized by Whites; that Whites are a united power block while Blacks are a fragmented and powerless mass; that there is an urgent and compelling need for Blacks to organize themselves into a united force if they are to change the pathetic lot; that liberation is an act of self-activity and not an act of charity by any other external being."¹⁷

The period of disengagement aimed at preparing Blacks for self-emancipation and to enable them to face Whites as equals rather than as inferior partners in working for the future of the country.

In our discussion of Biko's period of disengagement as a means, rather than an end in itself, it should be noted that Tutu who favors non-racialism as both means and ends endorses the idea of disengagement. He acknowledges the role of the Black Consciousness and he refers to it as "a movement absolutely crucial to true reconciliation."¹⁸ He also contends that "...no reconciliation is possible in South

¹⁷Mosibudi Mangena, On Your Own: Evolution of Black Consciousness in South Africa/Azania, (Braamfontein: Skotaville Publishers, 1990), p. 10. Mangena was a member of the South African Students Organization and later became National Organizer of the Black Peoples Convention. He was arrested and charged with trying to recruit two policemen for military training. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment in Robben Island. He now lives in exile.

¹⁸Desmond Tutu, Crying in the Wilderness, p. 41.

Africa, except reconciliation between persons." He continues, BCM "merely seeks to awaken the Black person to a realization of his worth as a child of God, with privileges and responsibilities that are concomitant of that exalted status."¹⁹ The Black Consciousness Movement appeals to Tutu for two reasons: (1) its emphasis on restoration of human dignity invested with special worth as the child of God; (2) its emphasis on reconciliation as the political end. Tutu's support of the success of the BCM is based on his conviction that it embodies some theological and evangelical elements: Black humanity and reconciliation.

Bringing Tutu's acknowledgement and support of BCM implies his awareness of the erosion of the human dignity of Blacks through separate educational system, removal and dumping of Blacks in dry areas and the indignities associated with the pass books system. Tutu is committed to non-racialism as both means and ends because of the context within which he operates. He also understands and appreciates the restorative task that BCM has to do in the name of the same end: non-racial society. In a sense, this appreciation provides the basis for dialogue, which may open up the possibility for co-operative action.

As opposed to an understanding of non-racialism as both means and ends supported by Mandela and Tutu, and another form

¹⁹Desmond Tutu, "God Intervening in Human Affairs," Missionalia, vol. 5, (1977), p. 115.

of non-racialism considered as an end propounded by the Africanist/Black Consciousness, Gatsha Buthelezi's understanding of non-racialism is greatly influenced by his homeland context. Now, let us examine the collaborationist (Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena) understanding of non-racialism. Gatsha Buthelezi perceives non-racialism as a form of **separate development**. For this reason, he does not make any demand, for South Africa to be a non-racial or integrated society. As we mentioned elsewhere, Buthelezi believes that separate development can serve as a basis for future South Africa. He speaks of "White Zulus." This merely illustrates his understanding of non-racialism. Adding that "Those Whites prepared to become citizens of independent Zululand...would be regarded as "White Zulus" and have the "right to stand for Zulu parliament."²⁰ That is to say, Gatsha Buthelezi's form of non-racialism finds expression in the Zulu homeland, rather than in the whole of South Africa. Hence he declared the following:

1. "the future of independent State of Zululand would be run on completely non-racial lines. 2. Those Whites prepared to become citizens of independent Zululand, and commit themselves to working towards the best future of this country, would be regarded as "White Zulus." 3. [White Zulus would be] accorded full political rights, and including the right to stand for Zulu parliament."²¹

His defense of separate development as a form of non-

²⁰Sunday Times, (August 29, 1971). See also South African Outlook, (January 1972), p. 16.

²¹Ibid.

racialism is also illustrated in his division of South Africa into three distinct areas or autonomous states. He uses interests as the criterion for determining who should or should not belong to the suggested areas. He speaks of "states where the interests of African ethnic groups are paramount, states in which the interests of the Whites are paramount" and finally, states where "no group interests are designated."²² We mentioned this type of division of states in our discussion elsewhere. The aim of restating this point is to demonstrate how he understands non-racialism in separate development terms. In addition, he also understands it (non-racialism) in terms of its multinational character outside the homelands. The latter understanding is influenced by the fact that many Zulus have become urban dwellers. For this reason, he accommodates them within a different political scheme which has a semblance of non-racialism. In fact, the urban situation dictates that a solution be found, since they (black urbanites) do not belong to the Homelands. The government consulted the homeland leaders in trying to find a solution for Blacks living outside the homelands. Buthelezi's designation of one part of South Africa as an area which is "multiracial in character" supports the assertion that he does not make demands for a non-racial country. Buthelezi's employment of categories such as "African ethnic" and

²²Gatsha Buthelezi, "Towards Federation," South African Outlook, (March 1974), p. 44.

"Whites" implies that he considers Africans in ethnic groupings and Whites as a homogenous group. The implications of this kind of designation is that it renders non-racial society impossible except in cases where Black and White interests are the same or where Whites happen to live within the homeland boundaries and choose to accept their new status. Without these instances, Buthelezi gives no support for a racially integrated South African society.

Unlike Buthelezi, Mokoena addresses the question of non-racialism only indirectly but his motivation and Buthelezi's are somewhat similar. Mokoena rejects non-racialism on the basis of his strong tribal identity or consciousness. On the basis of his cultural and traditional identity, Mokoena says, "...I would never wish to be in a white situation foreign to myself and where I do not want to belong to."²³ Mokoena emphasizes his "South Sotho" identity. For instance he says, "I am South Sotho." Through this tribal designation, than Black consciousness which is a more general designation, Mokoena elevates tribe and custom to a point of being an instrument of division and separation, rather than unity and bondedness. This phenomenon cannot be ignored by those who are interested in the future of the country for ideologies tend to take ethnic manifestations. That is, political conflicts assume ethnic overtones. The issue, however, is how to

²³Isaac Mokoena, "Report," Christian Beacon, Vol L, No. 30, (September 5, 1985), p. 8.

overcome tribal and cultural differences from becoming barriers that hinder the actualization of common community.

Mokoena's form of non-racialism leads him to support separate development and to express his rejection of "white situation" as foreign. By implication "white situation" means a non-racial context. On another occasion, Mokoena said, "it was time for all South Africans to work out a new constitution at a national convention." He continued, "hatred for the Afrikaners, or all Whites, will not help Blacks or mend injuries of the past and it will certainly do nothing to end apartheid."²⁴ It is unclear, given his emphasis on tribal identity, how the call for a new constitution and self-defeating hatred would lead to a complete structural transformation. Since non-racialism is a threat to his cultural and traditional living, Mokoena views change in terms of separation. That is to say, he calls for the cessation of hatred against Whites and fostering a spirit of understanding. And he leaves the societal structures untouched. One such structure is the homeland because it promotes one's "culture, custom and tradition". Hence, he rejects non-racialism because it will, in his view, transform him into "a black White man"--something he strongly detests. He concludes, "...I wouldn't want to be made a black White man."²⁵

²⁴The Citizen, (November 25, 1986). See also Christian Beacon, (December 11, 1986), p. 7.

²⁵Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2.

B. The New Constitution

Interestingly, the positions we examined on non-racialism also affect the leaders' perceptions about the constitution of the new South Africa. Like their views on non-racialism, there exists three constitutional positions:

Non-racial constitution	Africanist/Black Consciousness constitution	Federal constitution
Mandela Tutu	Sobukwe Biko Buthelezi	G. Buthelezi Mokoena

Mandela and Tutu support the non-racial constitution for the new South Africa. For Mandela, the Freedom Charter forms the blue- print of what the constitution of the new country should look like. The elements inherent in the Freedom Charter form the foundation of the non-racial constitution. They are as follows: "the people shall govern" (Black and White), "equal rights," sharing of the country's wealth, sharing of "the land among those who work it," "equality before the law," and "equal human rights"²⁶ etc. Mandela considers majority rule "a pillar of democratic rule in many countries of the world." For this reason, he concludes, "majority rule and peace are two sides of the same coin." This formula, he claims, raises Blacks to a position of equality with Whites."²⁷ To this end, the implementation of this formula

²⁶Nelson Mandela, The Struggle is My Life, pp. 50-53.

²⁷Ibid.

was a source of stability, he said. Clearly, he favors majority rule, which safe-guards the rights of the White minority. The structural guarantees will be devised to ensure that majority rule does not imply the domination of Whites by Blacks. The operative political principle that Mandela appropriates is non-racialism based on justice. Mandela does not entertain any compromise of this issue (majority rule based on one person, one vote in a unitary state) because he regards the principle as essential for non-racial constitution. However, he is willing to compromise on other issues but not majority rule based on one person, one vote.

Similarly, Tutu believes in the virtues of democratic freedom such as equality before the law, justice, Bill of rights and the principle of one person, one vote. That, these elements be embodied in the constitution of the new South Africa. Therefore, he reasoned, it was the responsibility of the good citizens to work for the restoration of these virtues. More importantly, Tutu urged the people to preserve and protect the democratic virtues when they are achieved. He argues that the constitution is for all in the same way as the struggle for human rights and rights belong to all: Blacks, Indians, Whites and Coloreds. Tutu's Credo sums up the elements of the constitution:

"I believe in a democratic, non-racial society and so I believe in majority rule, not black majority rule, but majority rule. I believe in adult suffrage, for that, we are told, is an unalterable features of true democracy. I believe in a common citizenship for all South Africans in a

unbalkanized South Africa."²⁸

The principles enunciated here are derived from his acquaintance with the democratic political thought. This establishes an explicit correlation between his theological and political thought.

Unlike Mandela and Tutu who propose a non-racial constitution, Sobukwe and Biko operate from an Africanist/Black Consciousness constitution that is exclusive in character but aims at the actualization of a non-racial society. They have no clear position on how the new constitution should look like²⁹. That is to say, their current constitution, unlike the Freedom Charter, is more functional in that it focuses on changing the political system. Rather than being a blue print for new South Africa, the Africanist/Black Consciousness deals with the consolidation and mobilization (day to day strategies) of the Africans to become an effective political force for liberation. Sobukwe and Biko understood the functional constitution in terms of strategy, rather than in racial terms. This strategy was based on their understanding that liberation of South Africa was the task of the Africans. That is, the right of self-determination for the African people. In

²⁸Quoted in Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala, eds., Hammering Swords into Ploughshares, p. 39.

²⁹Sobukwe and Biko cite constitutional elements such as Bill of Rights, equality, freedom and justice. The issue that they have not address is the form of the envisaged constitution.

the struggle, Sobukwe contended, people would leave "all dross of racialism and similar evils behind." Consequently, Africans would become "purer and purer" and to appreciate that:

"There is only man in the world,
And his name is All men.
There is only one woman in all the world,
And her name is All women!"³⁰

The transformed agents in the struggle for liberation should, according to him, embody the virtues of justice and freedom. That is to say, Africanist Socialist democracy was, in Sobukwe's view, more than a political experiment; it was a moral and spiritual enterprise, which required both "mental and physical discipline."³¹ Sobukwe believes that the constitution of the new South Africa must address the vexing question: "how man shall live with fellowman in fellowship, in harmony and peace." He asserted that the answer lay in the person's recognition of the "primacy of the material and spiritual interest of his fellowmen, and must eliminate the tendency on his part to uphold his own interest at the expense of those of his fellowmen." He concluded, "it is within such a set-up that the human personality can develop and that respected for it can be fostered."³² Similarly, Biko supported a constitution that would foster a spirit of community and nurtured the virtues of "ubuntu" or humanness.

³⁰Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p.

33.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., p. 41.

For Biko and Sobukwe, the constitution was instrumental in shaping the character of the citizens. Hence, it should promote human development in the sense of upholding "the material, intellectual and spiritual interest of the individual."³³ The constitutional differences between the non-racialists and the Africanist/Black Consciousness narrows at the point of supporting the actualization of the non-racial society. That is to say, they agree that non-racial constitution offers the possibility for harmonious co-existence among races. For this reason, Sobukwe, Biko and Buthelezi advocate free participation in the decision making process, one person, one vote, no color consideration, equal rights as the basis of the constitution of the new South Africa.

This leads us to a discussion of the federal constitution. As we saw, the non-racialists and the Africanist/Consciousness differ in strategies, which also affect their constitutional positions to a certain extent, but they agree about the end of the new community: non-racial country. In contrast, the collaborationists opted for federal constitution as a better example of their non-racial form of separate development. However, there is a point of commonality between the non-racialists, Africanist/Black Consciousness and the collaborationists. For example Mokoena supports open membership but with some provisions for non-Christians. He

³³Ibid.

advocates the freedom of choice, equal opportunities and the promotion of human rights. In the similar manner, Gatsha Buthelezi calls for a Bill of rights, independent judiciary, promotion of human rights etc. Unlike the non-racialists and Africanist/Black Consciousness, who strive for the actualization of these constitutional elements within South Africa as a whole, the collaborationists see the application of these elements only within the context of separate development. In other words, issues such as the Bill of rights, freedom of choice should only apply to groups, rather than to South Africa as a nation. This constitutes a major point of difference. In addition, the collaborationists reject the principle of one person one vote. In fact, federal structure is, for them, an attempt to circumvent the problem. The implications are that the acceptance of separate development makes the principle of one person, one vote less attractive, since their idea of federation is based on ethnic groups that share the same language and culture. The Africanist/Black Consciousness, like the non-racialists reject the federal constitution. Sobukwe expressed his rejection of the idea when he said, "they (Africans) hold the granting of "rights" (including designing social political systems) on the basis of ethnological origin to be entrenching of sectional arrogance and continued maintenance of contempt for human worth and disregard for human dignity."³⁴ The criterion for

³⁴Ibid., pp. 39-40.

designing the federal constitution seemed, in Sobukwe's view, to promote sectionalism and therefore a violation of human worth and dignity.

C. Civil Disobedience

Having discussed three forms of non-racialism and their corresponding constitutions, let us consider the issue of civil disobedience. Here the three camps are reduced to two. That is to say, the non-racialists and Africanist/Black Consciousness agree about the need and the role of civil disobedience in social change. For instance, Mandela supports civil disobedience because apartheid law does not serve the promotion of justice. That, the law should be measured by how it succeeds or fails to dispense justice. In the same vein, Tutu predicates his support for civil disobedience upon his insistence in obeying God first. That is to say, he believes very strongly that obedience to God takes precedence over obedience to human beings, particularly if the human law is in conflict with the dictates of the Divine command. A law that decrees human relations on the basis of skin-color cannot, according to Tutu, be just. In the cause of his ministry, he gathered enough evidence (removals, migratory labor system etc.) from which he concluded that apartheid was immoral and unchristian. Tutu reasons, one should disobey the state in order to obey God.

Biko advocated civil disobedience because of the unjust

educational law, which decreed inferior black education. Similarly, Sobukwe supported civil disobedience because he believed that a law that enslaved and alienated its people cannot be just. Hence, disobeying such a law implies an appeal for high moral law. Manas Buthelezi understood civil disobedience as resistance and giving witness to the heart of the Gospel. This understanding is informed by his theological conclusion that apartheid is a sin and heresy and that its existence seriously threatens the integrity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

In contrast, the collaborationists reject civil disobedience. Gatsha contends that civil disobedience constitutes an occasion or breeding ground for violence. Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena agree on this point. He points out that civil disobedience does not lead to integration but to violence. Mokoena was quoted as having sent a letter to the President of South Africa (P.W. Botha) in August 8, 1985, in which he "repudiated civil disobedience and the violence it has produced...."³⁵ The main difference is that the non-racialist and Africanist/Black Consciousness leaders focus on the law and how it has been made to serve the perpetuation of injustice, rather the preservation of justice. The Collaborationists, however, focus their attention on the threat that civil disobedience strategies have for the political structure within which he (Gatsha Buthelezi) works,

³⁵Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 1.

and a political system to which he (Mokoena) relates in a special way. That is to say, the closer or distant proximity from which these leaders stand in relation to apartheid determines their response to it. Hence, the collaborationists see civil disobedience as the source of violence in the same way as the government. Yet, the non-racialists and Africanist/Black Consciousness, who stand and function outside of the apartheid created institutions, favorably consider civil disobedience because of its liberational possibilities.

D. Armed Struggle

Now, let us consider the issue of armed struggle and the positions the leaders took. Under armed struggle, three positions are noted. That is, Mandela and Sobukwe give strong support for armed struggle. Tutu and Biko give ambivalent support. And Manas Buthelezi, Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena reject the use of armed struggle against apartheid.

Both Mandela and Sobukwe took positions in favor of armed struggle when the doors for peaceful change were closed and the prospects for negotiated settlement eroded. These two men were shaped by a non-violent tradition of political resistance. So that their support for armed struggle signify a radical shift from the non-violent traditional orientation. Mandela considers armed struggle as a defensive act. To characterize armed struggle as a defensive act implies that the source of violence is the State. He argues that as long as

the apartheid system exists, which in his view, is the primary source of violence, the defensive violence will remain necessary. So, the removal of one (apartheid), nullifies or renders the existence of the other (armed struggle) unnecessary. Mandela was well aware of the effect of violence on human character. In deciding for an appropriate means of defense, Mandela and his colleagues opted for sabotage, rather than open revolution. In principle, Mandela claims that the movement has "no vested interest in violence. The value of human life, struggle for "undivided and peaceful non-racial State"³⁶ remain the cornerstone of his understanding of the good society.

In same manner, Sobukwe contended that armed struggle was necessitate by white supremacy. Since armed struggle aimed at the eradication of white supremacy, its destruction would nullify the need for armed struggle. More importantly, Mandela and Sobukwe drew the attention of the world to the source of violence, which expressed its naked and callous venom in the Sharpville massacre and lent justification to their support for defensive armed struggle.

In contrast, Tutu and Biko express ambivalent support for armed struggle and they do so for various reasons. In an interview on the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Tutu

³⁶South African Outlook, (March, 1990), p. 199.

declared "...I am a man of peace but I am not a pacifist."³⁷ For this reason, while he rejects violence, he argues that "...even if your child misbehaves...that child does not cease to be your child." That is say, those involved in armed struggle "do not cease to be our brothers and sisters."³⁸ Tutu constantly refused to answer the question of armed struggle because he felt it was always pressed from the side of the enemy, namely, the violent state. The reason for this was that they (Whites) wanted to hear their version of armed struggle echoed and their positions reaffirmed by him. This, he refused to do. He felt that they who perpetuated and sponsored legislation that harmed the black people and maintained the violent policy of apartheid had no moral legitimacy to condemn armed struggle. Hence, he said, "...let us condemn violence, and I would like us even more than condemning the violence that is sort of outside, to condemn the structural violence that is in this country."³⁹ Tutu was aware that the debate on violence tended to focus on external violence of the armed struggle, rather than the structural violence of apartheid to which armed struggle was a defensive response.

To demonstrate his ambivalence towards armed struggle,

³⁷Ernie Regehr, Perceptions of Apartheid: The Churches and Political Change in South Africa, (Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1979), p. 275.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. 277.

Tutu said, "there may be a time when we have to take up arms and defend ourselves."⁴⁰ Should sanctions fail to pressure the government to change apartheid, Tutu warned "that the Church would have no alternative but to say it would be justifiable to use violence and force to overthrow an unjust regime."⁴¹ From these statements armed struggle is clearly justified as a defensive act. Although he rejects both the primary violence of the State and the responsive violence of the victims, Tutu empathizes with and understands those who argue that they have adopted armed struggle as a last resort. For this reason, he publicly supported the ANC in its objective for South Africa. Subsequently, he welcomed Mandela and his wife to spend a night at the Bishop's court in Cape Town, hours after he was released from Pollsmoor prison. This was not just a pastoral act, but a political one as well.

Tutu also admits that the situation in the country is already violent. The importance attached to non-violent form of struggle, he reasoned, should not be viewed as a form of escapism from confronting the evils of apartheid. That is to say, non-violent struggle does not shun away from confrontation. In other words, christian love embodied in non-violence implies conflict, rather than harmony. However, he argues too that violence has the capacity of producing a

⁴⁰Quoted in Shirley Du Bouley, Tutu: Voice of the Voiceless, p. 244.

⁴¹Ibid. Vide Cape Times, (June 2, 1986).

corresponding violent state of character, which is not commensurate with the end of a just and compassionate society. Tutu's ambivalent support of armed struggle puts him in the same camp with Biko, rather than in Manas Buthelezi's negative side.

Biko like Tutu did not adopt a categorical position on armed struggle. Strategically, Biko rejected violence in order for his organization to operate above-ground. In addition, he wanted to raise the consciousness of the black community before the government banned his organization. Biko accepted the argument that armed struggle was a defensive act. For this reason, he contended that White political action would dictate whether the solution would come about by violent or peaceful means. Hence, he said, "...I can't predict what the enemy is going to do in the future."⁴² Neither did he rule out the possibility for violent conflagration nor did he reject the peaceful change. Either one of the options is open. The political behavior of the government could, in his view, create a climate conducive to social change. Given the intransigence of the government, Biko argued that violence was inevitable. Though Biko and Tutu are in the same camp, they derive their motivation for their ambivalent support for armed struggle from different sources of influence. Tutu draws his understanding from Scriptures, while Biko, though not alien to the Scriptures as an Anglican communicant member, he drew his

⁴²Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 149.

ambivalent support for armed struggle from his study of the White attitude towards change and his own practical encounter with those who enforced apartheid laws, either in prison or in the courts of the land. Put differently, his ambivalent support of armed struggle was a strategic move.

Manas Buthelezi categorically rejects violence as inconsistent with the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Unlike Biko and Tutu, he finds no middle ground other than a complete rejection. However, he is mindful of the fact that the church in South Africa has over the years supported the State sponsored violence both in and outside the country. He calls upon the Church to take seriously its peace-making ministry, by that, bringing the warring parties to a negotiation-table. Although Manas Buthelezi's position in this issue is similar to that of Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena, their reasons for their respective positions differ in their reasons against armed struggle.

Gatsha Buthelezi rejects armed struggle because he characterizes it as the politics of violence. Given the military power of South Africa government, Buthelezi believes that armed struggle will not overthrow the government. In addition, even if armed struggle were to succeed, he argued, armed struggle would usher in the Marxist government with its policy of nationalization--a policy he immensely abhors because it spells doom for the system of free enterprise, which he supports. Notably, Gatsha Buthelezi's views on armed

struggle are influenced, in part, by the fact that he is the Minister of Police--a position, which brings him closer to the government view on armed struggle. The point, however, he only directs his opposition to armed struggle, and not to the structural violence of the State. That is to say, he is incisive in his opposition to violence of the oppressed while he is silent about the violence of apartheid.

Like Gatsha Buthelezi, Mokoena also rejects armed struggle. He believes that it is the work of a few radicals who are inspired by communism. He argues that the majority of Blacks are in favor of peaceful change, not revolution. For this reason, armed struggle aims, in his view, at promoting Black on Black conflict. In which case, he concludes, the victims of armed struggle are Blacks and not Whites. While condemning armed struggle, Mokoena supports the violence of the State, particularly in its pre-emptive strikes in the neighboring African countries against the ANC bases. Mokoena congratulated the security forces for having raided Botswana in 1985. This is a concrete example of his support of the violence of the State. He openly said, "...we are grateful that the security forces took this action...."⁴³ Although Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena operate in different contexts, (Gatsha Buthelezi, homelands, and Mokoena, urban) they both condemn armed struggle but keep silent on the structural violence. This constitutes a point of commonality.

⁴³The Citizen (May 7, 1985).

E. Negotiation

Our discussion on armed struggle naturally leads us to an examination of the positions the black leaders took on negotiation. A cursory glance at our chart shows all the black figures in one camp. Their being in the same camp does not necessarily imply that they hold similar views on negotiation. True, they agree about the necessity for negotiation as a means of solving political disputes. This agreement explains why they are in the same camp. All the other leaders (Mandela, Tutu, Sobukwe, Biko, Manas Buthelezi) with the exception of Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena, understand negotiation as a process that must be entered into between the government and authentic black political leaders most of whom were either in prison or in exile. The implication is, for this process to take place, the government has to release the political prisoners and allow the exiles to return to the country. That is say, they understood negotiation as a stage to be reached by the government and the leaders of the liberation movements. For these leaders, the stage of negotiation could be promoted by various factors: the intensification of armed struggle, sanctions, civil disobedience etc. That is, people do not simply opt for negotiation. Political pressure and when the interests are at stake ostensibly drive political parties to negotiation. So, these leaders kept on pressurizing the government by enlisting external help and by mounting decisive internal resistance. Biko understood this fact, thus he

emphasized the creation of the black power-block as an essential point of departure for negotiation.

In contrast to the five leaders mentioned above, Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena understood negotiation as a process already set in motion. Gatsha Buthelezi characterized institutionalized homeland politics as politics of negotiation. By that, he meant homeland politics was and had been about negotiation and a way of engaging that State effectively. Instances of negotiation are exemplified in (though no success was attained) KwaZulu-Natal-Indaba⁴⁴--a conference whose aim was to form a multi-racial government in Natal Province. The conference was convened at the initiative of Gatsha Buthelezi. The constant high level consultations between the homeland leaders and the government gave a semblance of some of dialogue, which culminated in a form of negotiation about pseudo-independence of the homelands from Pretoria.

Like Gatsha Buthelezi, Mokoena advocates negotiation. He too sees negotiation already in process in the manner he relates to the State. In August 1985 he met with President P. W. Botha. After the meeting he commented that the government was moving with reforms. In November 1989 he led a delegation of religious leaders, who claimed to represent seven million Black Christians, to meet with State President De Klerk. Mokoena and his group appealed to the State President that

⁴⁴KwaZulu-Natal-Indaba was convene in April 8, 1986.

"... moderate Blacks first be consulted before the state of emergency was lifted."⁴⁵ For Mokoena and Gatsha Buthelezi such meetings represented a significant negotiation process. They cannot understand why people discredit them for hobnobbing with the government. The government designed this tactic to show that it was open to dialogue and consultation yet in reality it was a monologue. For the other five leaders, negotiation is yet to be decided upon--a stage to be reached. Yet, for Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena, negotiation is in process, since they constantly relate to the government.

F. Land

Let us now consider the issue of land. When talking about the land, we are concerned primarily with the African control of the land. Our chart indicates that under the issue of the African control of the land the leaders are distributed in two camps, instead of three. Sobukwe, Biko and Gatsha Buthelezi have strong support for African control of the land while Mandela, Tutu, Manas Buthelezi and Mokoena have ambivalent support.

For Africans land is not just an economic entity. No monetary compensation would undone the damage caused by alienation of the people from the land. The land belongs to the living, the dead and the yet unborn. It passes from generation to generation. Anybody who is a member of the

⁴⁵The Citizen, (November 21, 1989).

community has a rightful claim to the land. The King holds the land in trust. Hence, persons become trustees of the land allotted to them. The leaders who have strong support of the land will exhibit some of the strong elements of the African traditional understanding of the land to a fuller degree while those who have ambivalent support are ostensibly alienated from this understanding.

Sobukwe, Biko and Gatsha Buthelezi are in close contact with the African tradition relative to the issue of the land. Sobukwe, for instance, considers the liberation struggle as basically for the control of the land. The aim of the struggle, he reasoned, was "for the restoration to the African people of the effective control of the land."⁴⁶ He wanted effective control not of just one part of South African land, but the whole country. On the basis of this understanding, Sobukwe espoused the principle of non-collaboration with the oppressors and the so-called "colonial settlers." The repossession of the land, according to Sobukwe, implied the acquisition of power. That is, he understood the land as power and wealth. At the end of every speech, Sobukwe shouted, Izwe Lethu meaning our land. This demonstrates the importance of the land in his political thought. Because of his strong support of the land, Sobukwe disagreed with the Freedom Charter's standpoint that "South Africa belongs to all...." This was interpreted by Sobukwe and others to mean that the

⁴⁶Mangaliso R. Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 27.

land is for sale. He responded to the Freedom Charter in this way:

"These "leaders" (Mandela and others) consider South Africa and its wealth to belong to all who live in it, the alien dispossessor and the indigenous dispossessed, the alien robbers and their indigenous victims. They regard as equals the foreign master and his indigenous slave, white exploiter and his African exploited, the foreign oppressor and indigenous oppressed. They regard us as brothers the subject African and their European overlords."⁴⁷

He saw contradictions in the idea that "South Africa belongs to all." The contradictions were inherent, first, in what he called indigenous powerlessness and foreign dominant power. Second, that in an African sense belonging was a state of well-being enhanced in community. Sobukwe believed that "imperialism or colonialism" did not necessarily justify common belonging. In this context, Sobukwe found it difficult to reconcile belonging that involved "foreign master and indigenous slave." Third, that, the "interests of the subject people " were in sharp conflict with "those of the ruling class." Consequently, the struggle of the African people was embodied in the land, Sobukwe submitted, could not be reconciled with the interest of the white rulers. The land and the status of the African people were, in his view, inextricably intertwined. That is to say, the struggle that did not lead to the African control of the land was meaningless. Put differently, Sobukwe considered the land an

⁴⁷Mangaliso R. Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 39.

important political galvanizing issue. When one evokes it, it brings memories of dispossession, uprooting, and alienation from the source of life, power and sustenance. The land meant, in his view, more than the soil or geographic space but a sense of dependence and bondedness with life itself.

Like Sobukwe, Gatsha Buthelezi supports the idea of African control of the land. But Gatsha Buthelezi's Zulu consciousness limits his claim to African control of the land only within the bounds of the government designated homelands. His collaborative activity with the government puts him in direct opposition with Sobukwe. Yet on the basic idea of African control, these men agree. They differ on the part of the land to be controlled. For Sobukwe, "South Africa belongs to Africans" while for Gatsha Buthelezi "Zululand belongs to Zulus." Gatsha Buthelezi's support of consolidation of the homelands as a condition upon which he bases his acceptance of the nominal independence of KwaZulu homeland betrays any claim to the whole of South African land.

Biko, like Sobukwe, believed that the "country belongs to black people and to them alone," and for that reason, they had to be in control of it. The right of the black people to control the land, accrues, in Biko's view, from the African indigenous origin. This understanding does not imply a total rejection of the non-racial co-existence. For this reason, Biko wrote, "Whites who live in this country [could do so] on terms laid down by Blacks and on condition that they respect

the black people."⁴⁸ He continued, "...we wanted to remove him (white man) from our table, strip the table of all trappings put on it by him, decorate it in true African style, settle down and then ask him to join us on our own terms if he liked."⁴⁹ The table here represents the land. The "true African style" denotes the system of government designed and constituted in accordance with the African virtues of community, respect and human relations. In order for these virtues to be preserved, Biko believed that Blacks must gain control of the land.

Although Sobukwe, Biko and Gatsha Buthelezi have strong support for African control of the land, they differ in the nature of support.

In contrast to the leaders mentioned above, Mandela, Tutu, Manas Buthelezi and Mokoena have ambivalent views of the land. Mandela is influenced, in part, by the ANC philosophy, which states that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White."⁵⁰ Mandela's adherence to the philosophy of non-racialism alienates him from the African traditional understanding of the land at this point. One may ask, what is Mandela's criterion for determining such a common belonging? Since the land cannot, in terms of African understanding, be bought or sold. How does Mandela justify that "South Africa

⁴⁸Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 121.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 69.

⁵⁰Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk To Freedom, p. 17.

belongs to all, Black and White." In addition, the land is passed from generation to generation. If the idea of common belonging cannot be justified by an appeal to the African traditional understanding of the land, then one has to find such a justification from outside. It is unclear whether Mandela accepts the idea of common belonging based on the fact of conquest or purchase of the land.

While Mandela appreciates Sobukwe's understanding of the land--he insists that it "belongs to all" and rejects the unfair distribution of land as executed in the 1913 Land Act. This means that he considers the land as that which should be shared. Mandela speaks of non-racial distribution of the land while Sobukwe emphasizes only African ownership. To say the land belongs to all does not solve the problem of land inequality. Equally important, to say that the land belongs to Africans only does not solve the reality of land distribution since Whites are there to stay. When all is said and done, the question remains, how do Mandela and Sobukwe undertake to deal with the problem. Both have not given any blueprint or suggestions regarding the solution to this vexing problem. At stake is 87% of the land. Will the Whites be prepared to share it? Under what circumstance will they be prepared for equal and just distribution of the land. These questions affect equally all leaders, who have strong or ambivalent support of the African control of the land.

Tutu and Manas Buthelezi are religious leaders who are

unclear about where they stand regarding the traditional understanding of the land. It is interesting that theologians come together with a mutual ambivalent about the key element in African traditional thought: land. Their ambivalent support for African control of the land has emanated, in part, from the influence of western thought and custom. According to the western understanding, land is an economic entity. That is to say, the land can be bought and sold. The Africans believe that the land is a mother. Hence, it cannot be bought or sold. Both men do not seem to support the western view either. Tutu shares Mandela's non-racial understanding of the land. Tutu's advocacy of non-racial society implies an acceptance of the idea that "South Africa belongs to all." However, he justifies the equitable distribution of the land based on the fact that both Blacks and Whites are made in the image of God. This understanding does not allow control of the land by one group. Similarly, Manas Buthelezi believes that the land is a gift from God. The implication being that, as a gift from God, no single group can claim control of it. He emphasizes equal distribution of the land as an expression of justice. Mokoena on the other hand is silent of the whole issue of African control of the land.

G. Sanctions

On the issue of sanctions the leaders fall into two

camps; namely that of Mandela, Sobukwe, Biko, Tutu and Manas Buthelezi strongly supporting sanctions and that of Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena condemning sanctions as counterproductive. For the first time, the leaders in the same camp share similar convictions about an issue. The supporters of sanctions argue that sanctions serve to pressure the government to join the negotiation table with Blacks thus avoiding a political conflagration and violent bloodshed. Manas Buthelezi considers sanctions as a last resort, while Tutu regards sanctions as the last non-violent means to bring about peaceful political change. He states sanctions are merely a symbolic gesture by the world community against injustice and oppression. So, the support for sanctions is, Tutu argues, a choice for peace, rather than violent confrontation. Mandela, Sobukwe, Biko and Manas Buthelezi hold the same view on sanctions.

Unlike the above leaders Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena oppose sanctions against South Africa. Before Gatsha Buthelezi got seriously involved in the homeland political structures, his views on apartheid were virtually the same as those of any ANC members.⁵¹

⁵¹For instance, he expressed his abhorrence of apartheid in a manner that any ANC leader would have done. He said in part: "Therefore we tell the Prime Minister today that the policies of his government are unacceptable to us, we tell him that **he will never persuade the majority of us to accept his policies** because we all know that 1. The government's economic position is designed to perpetuate the privileged position of Whites. 2. The government's social policy makes humiliating assumption about the black man's dignity. 3. The government's political policy is the

Ten years later at the height of the divestment debate, Buthelezi rejected sanctions and supported increased investment in South Africa saying black people will suffer most if sanctions were implemented. He continues to oppose sanctions despite his claim that the "government's economic position is designed to perpetuate the privileged position of Whites." In the same speech he said, "we Blacks do not believe that our society can be defended morally or theologically." He continued, the system is "morally repugnant, dehumanizes them and mock God Almighty for creating us Blacks, also in his image."⁵² Despite the apparent contradiction in his thought, Gatsha Buthelezi supports increased investments. Adding that sanctions would irretrievably harm the economic base, increase unemployment and poverty and diminish the prospects for non-violent resolution of the political problems. He also rejects socialism, since he believes it will not lead to economic boom. That is to say, he considers economic prosperity and political change as inextricably connected.

Similarly, Mokoena vehemently opposes Tutu both at home and abroad on the question of sanctions. At home, the government allocated him unlimited time on the SABC-TV to

moat around besieged white self-interest. 4. The government's foreign policy pursues ends which support apartheid and discrimination. Vide Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, "Facing the Truth," South African Outlook, Vol. 106, (March 14, 1976), p. 36.

⁵²Ibid.

criticize Tutu relative to his position on sanctions at a time when it was illegal or treasonable for anybody to discuss the issue.⁵³ Internationally, he has visited heads of states like Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan to encourage their respective countries to increase their investments in South Africa. He praised Ronald Reagan for opposing Tutu on the issue of sanctions and claimed that he represented four and half million congregants. In addition to the visits, he wrote letters for the same purpose.⁵⁴ In 1987 the State President, P. W. Botha, awarded him the Declaration for Meritorious Service. Some of Mokoena's critics linked his pro-sanctions activities with the award. Clearly, his understanding of the good society was shaped by his close association or relationship with the government. Like Gatsha Buthelezi, Mokoena supports the free capitalist system while Tutu abhors or loathes it. As we saw earlier, Tutu favors an economic system that has a human face, which is not

⁵³Rev. P. Makhubu, General Secretary of African Independent Churches, objected to unlimited exposure of Mokoena on the SABC-TV. In one of the interviews, he accused Tutu of promoting bloodshed among Blacks. Mokoena declared his support for apartheid thus: "I will never sell communism for apartheid." Vide M. J. Lamola, The Public Profile of Bishop Isaac Mokoena, p. 2.

⁵⁴In 1986 he wrote a petition to President Ronald Reagan requesting the Congress to oppose all economic measures against South Africa. In May 23, 1983 he wrote a letter to Mr. van de Griffier, the Commissie Buitenlandse Zaken in Nederland, to stimulate investment both in South Africa and the homelands. Vide a full text in Christian Beacon, (September 5, 1985), p. 2. In September of the same year, he had a brief meeting with Vice President George Bush. At that meeting Mokoena appealed for increased investments in South Africa, particularly in the homelands. Vide Christian Beacon, (September 19-26), p. 1.

essentially motivated by sheer greed and profit at the expense of human well-being.

The discussion on sanctions leads to a consideration of the leaders' position on the issue of homelands. This explains some of the differences on the issue of sanctions. That is, the leaders outside the government created structures supported sanctions while those leaders who related to the government in a special way or participated in government's institutions tended to oppose sanctions for reasons similar to those espoused by the government. On the issue of homelands the leaders selected for our study occupy two opposing camps. On one hand, Gatsha Buthelezi and Mokoena occupy the camp that gives strong support for homelands. On the other hand, Mandela, Tutu, Sobukwe, Biko and Manas Buthelezi vehemently oppose the homelands system. One might have expected Biko to be in the same camp as Gatsha on this issue because of the potential in the homelands for creating Black power base--an idea that Biko supported. But this was not the case. Biko knew that the homelands were not created by Blacks but, rather, were constructed as a means of maintaining the present structure of black dependency on White South Africa. For this reason, Gatsha Buthelezi's nationalism is not self-determinative. In fact, his nationalism is viewed with scorn and suspicion by those who wanted it as reflected by President P. W . Botha who said, "Buthelezi is a product of the policies

made possible by this government."⁵⁵ He went on to say, "Inkatha is its own type of Broederbond for the Zulu people."⁵⁶ That is, Gatsha Buthelezi is indebted for his office to the government, while Inkatha is a replica of the Afrikaner Broederbond (Circle of Brothers). This undermines the basis of Gatsha Buthelezi's nationalist claim.

However, Gatsha Buthelezi argued that his decision to participate in the homeland system was precipitated by his desire to serve his people. In support of this view he said:

"At present we find that the challenge is to do the utmost one can do towards the development of our people. The 'homelands' are the only machinery through which one can legally make this attempt in South Africa. It might rightly be said that the most we can achieve in this direction would be a nibble at the edge. This I consider much better than folding arms and crying about it...."⁵⁷

Further, he stated that the homelands formula would serve as a basis for the new South Africa. We can deduce from this statement that Gatsha Buthelezi, like other homeland leaders, cites commitment to the service of the people as the basis for his collaborationist orientation. He seems to overlook the fact that service can be either for domestication or for liberation and freedom. His appointment as Minister of Police

⁵⁵Pieter-Dirk Uys, ed., P. W. Botha in His own Words, (Cape Town: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 142. He said these words in a speech in November 3, 1983.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Gatsha Buthelezi, "My Role within Separate Development Politics." Hendrik W. van der Merwe et al, African Perspectives on South Africa, p. 458.

in KwaZulu makes him virtually a functionary of the state. Historically, oppressive governments have often co-opted indigenous leaders who possess some modicum of traditional authority and power, for the purpose of collaborative activity via a dependent alliance. Gatsha Buthelezi is such a leader. In addition, he has chieftaincy status, which makes the traditional Zulus tolerate his collaborative action. Mokoena, like Gatsha Buthelezi, supports the homeland because it helps to preserve his cultural customs and traditions. The implication is that an integrated society would threaten both his cultural and traditional purity. Hence his emphasis, "I am a South Sotho."

The opposition against homelands is constant and unanimous among the leaders outside of the government bodies. There is a single thread that runs through the collective opposition against the homelands. Biko considered the homelands as an instrument of black political fragmentation, thereby rendering Blacks powerless. He argued, that the homelands systems gave a false impression that Blacks were oppressed as Zulus or Pedis. The political reality was, he contended, that Blacks were oppressed as a group. He characterized the homeland leaders as puppets and stooges in the pay-roll of Pretoria. Similarly, Sobukwe condemned the homeland system as a futile exercise of seeking short-term concessions. He castigated the collaborationists as

participating in the "perpetuation of their own domination."⁵⁸ In the same fashion, Mandela considered homelands policy "fake system or tribal self-government..." aimed at "...fostering tribal division in the segregated backwater Reserves."⁵⁹ In an interview, Mandela was asked about the future of the homelands. His reply reflected an understanding of what led them (homeland leaders) to serve in the government structures. However, he called upon the homeland leaders to join the struggle. He said in part, "...some of them, although disagreeing with their policies, are quite innocent and they are men who have served the community in some way or another."⁶⁰ The idea of joining the ANC implies an acceptance of the ANC as an umbrella organization. Gatsha Buthelezi objects to this, since he considers himself a leader of a significant constituency: Inkatha Freedom Party⁶¹ formally known as Inkatha Cultural Organization. Inkatha Freedom Party was launched in July 1990,

⁵⁸Mangaliso R. Sobukwe, Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, p. 21.

⁵⁹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, p. 67.

⁶⁰South African Outlook, (March 1990), p. 213.

⁶¹ In mid-September 1990 the ANC invited Gatsha Buthelezi to a forum of the homeland leaders in an attempt to address the question of violence. He was, like other homeland leaders, invited in his capacity as the Chief Minister of KwaZulu--a Pretoria created rather than as the President of Inkatha Freedom Party. He has turned down the invitation insisting that he can only attend if invited in his capacity as the President of Inkatha. He favors this designation because he seeks recognition as Mandela's political equal. He insists on meeting Mandela as the leader of Inkatha, not Kwazulu.

in order to compete with the ANC.

Like Mandela and others, Tutu and Manas Buthelezi also oppose the homeland policy. For Tutu and Manas Buthelezi the homelands policy has engendered population removals, migratory labor and influx control laws. The population removals are evidenced, in their view, by the Mokgopa and other communities who were unjustifiably removed from their ancestral homes, in order to give way for white settlement in the name of homelands consolidation scheme. They characterized the homelands as labor reservoirs where migrant laborers were recruited leaving behind their wives and children. For this reason, Tutu and Manas Buthelezi opposed the homelands on moral grounds: (a). that, the policy dehumanizes people by treating them as objects of labor; (b). that, the policy destroys black family by legally separating husbands, wives and children; (c). that, the policy causes untold suffering by removing people from their homes; (d). that, the policy robbed black people of their South African citizenship, thus making them aliens in their own country. For Tutu, the homelands system was at variance with the Gospel of Jesus Christ--the Gospel teaches that humanity is created in God's image and encourages respect for the sanctity of human life.

Before we conclude this discussion, let us briefly look at the organizational strategies to discern the possibility for co-operation among the leaders. The ANC has strong urban support and moderate rural support. The Africanist/Black

Consciousness has a strong rural support, particularly through its commitment to the indigenous land, and has moderate urban support. Inkatha has a strong Zulu rural support and has no corresponding urban support. This evidence suggests a common base of support for Inkatha and Africanist/Black Consciousness. This common rural base may give rise to some form of alliance between them, rather than, between ANC and Inkatha, but this is hard to tell. In July 1990, the ANC organized stay-away campaign in Natal aimed at pressuring the government to dismantle the homelands such as KwaZulu and to strip Gatsha Buthelezi of his powers. The ANC asked the Pan African Congress to join the campaign. PAC and its related organizations refused to join saying "we cannot lend our support to any campaign from any quarters should the outcome thereof be division and further violent clashes among the oppressed or if it leads to a misdirection of the struggle away from the principal enemy."⁶² Following this conciliatory statement, the PAC called for a meeting between Mandela and Gatsha Buthelezi and offered its good offices to help mediate the conflict. Both Mandela and Gatsha Buthelezi have not responded to PAC overtures for mediation aimed at black solidarity.

⁶²These words were expressed at a Press Conference by Benny Alexander, the PAC Secretary General. Vide The Washington Post, (July 2, 1990), pp. 13-18.

CHAPTER 4

TSIMU EVENT: CONSTRUCTIVE APPROPOSAL

FOR POLITICAL COALITION

Introduction

The issue of co-operation is not just a political problem among Mandela, Sobukwe, Biko and Gatsha Buthelezi, but it is also a theological one because the theologians we have considered in this study seem to be confined to their respective alliances and, consequently, have not given much thought to co-operative activity among the latter.

The concept *tsimu* refers to an event in which people from different political, tribal and church backgrounds come together for a common task." They bring their skills and tools to accomplish the task before them. This event exists among the various tribes of South Africa. The Tsongas call it *tsimu*. Among the Pedis and the South Sothos, the event is known as *letsemo* respectively. Both the Zulus and the Xhosas call it *ilima* or *amalima*. Monica Huner defines the term *ilima/tsimu* as "...work parties for planting."¹ True, there is an element of work involved, but "ilima" or "tsimu" is more than just work parties per se. It is an event which summons the

¹Vide Monica Huner, Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact with Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 74.

collective energies both religious and political to a common community task or responsibility.

The "tsimu" political coalition differs, in some respects, from the Black theology espoused by Tutu and Manas Buthelezi in both breadth and depth. That is, it can become the basis for Africanization or indigenization² of Christian theology. Tutu accepts the idea that Black theology and African theology are "soulmates" but he has not integrated the two. Manas Buthelezi has rejected the role of African culture in theology claiming the inadequacy of its "ethnographic approach." He relies heavily on Black liberation theology based on "anthropological approach," which ignores the African religio-cultural context: i.e., the African social location.

By appropriating "tsimu," we do not imply any opposition to Black liberation theology. Rather, our aim is to provide a solid grounding for it in the African culture, which is a prerequisite for any emancipatory praxis in that context. In other words, *tsimu* provides a boundless communitarian context, within which divergent political discourses, motivated by common desire for freedom and religiously grounded justice,

²Africanization or indigenization are interchangeable terms meaning that "there is a distinction between the 'core of the Gospel' and Christianity, the latter subsuming the former but including cultural elements which came with Gospel through the missionaries." Thus Africanization advocates that the Western cultural vestments or elements... "should give way to the African culture, thereby placing the gospel message in a relevant setting." The proponents of Africanization accept the immutability of the core of the Gospel. Vide Kwesi A. Dickson, Theology in Africa, (Mary Knoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984), pp. 116-117.

can be shaped and enhanced. Tsimu recognizes that Black theology has significantly helped the church to identify and describe the nature of the political evil and morally justify its participation in the struggle for justice. Before then, Black theologians and church leaders used the same dominant language of the white theologians and church leaders. For this reason, "tsimu" has an important contribution to make in becoming the basis for uniting Black Theology and African Theology in a political program that goes beyond sectarian and tribal social enclaves.

It is worthy to note that some of the proponents of Black theology put political liberation over traditional and cultural reality. This obsession ignores and renders the totality of the African culture marginal. We argue that both political and cultural aspects of life are extremely essential for Christian theology to be relevant to the Africans. Mosala is critically aware of the deficiency Black theology suffers by ignoring culture as the starting point of its discourse. He writes, "commitment to a people's liberation is reflected by commitment to their culture." In addition, he unequivocally asserts:

"...without a creative reappropriation of traditional African religions and societies both African and Black theologies will build their houses in the sand. A Black Theology of liberation must draw its cultural hermeneutics of struggle from a critical reappropriation of black culture just as African Theology must arm itself with the political hermeneutics that arise from the contemporary social struggles of black people under

apartheid capitalism."³

Similarly, Shorter explains the interrelated importance of liberation and culture thus:

"A man is not only liberated from something; but he is liberated for something else. In this case the African is liberated to become--not a European, or a white South African--but to become more fully himself, and in deciding that he is, he must become conscious of the values of by which he lives, whether or not he recognizes their origin in his tradition."⁴

Indubitably, *tsimu* provides the basic premise on which both Black theology and African culture are inextricably bound and creatively related in order to discover a relevant and authentic African Christianity. To be sure, *tsimu* is broad enough to serve as a forum where matters of culture, socio-economic and political issues are considered essential or primary for African theological discourse.

Social Context and Procedure

Clearly, apartheid forms the social context for all political and theological thought in the South African situation and its eradication is the common aim of all the theological and the political leaders studied in this inquiry. Yet there appears to be little complement in the strategic

³Itumeleng Mosala, "The Relevance of African Traditional Religions and Their Challenge to Black Theology," in Itumeleng Mosala and Buti Tlhagale, eds., The Unquestionable Right to be Free, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990), pp. 98-99.

⁴Ibid., p. 29. We shall return to the issue of liberation as the discussion progresses.

means for achieving such a goal. We contend that co-operative activity among the black leaders is a necessary condition for the abolition of apartheid.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a moral foundation in support of such a co-operative venture; a foundation deeply rooted in the traditional African culture. Hence, we shall inquire into the African concept of Tsimu as a useful resource for effecting a political coalition that is both morally and religiously justified.

Notably, different kinds of coalitions exist. Wolf distinguishes two major types: (a) **dyadic**--"involving two persons or two groups of persons--or (b) **polyadic**--involving many persons or group of persons."⁵ The polyadic type seems to be relevant to our inquiry, since we are concerned with a political coalition that involves a plurality of tribal groups (both rural and urban) as well as a diversity of political philosophies as represented by the leaders studied above. Drawing heavily on the **tsimu** concept we aim to describe and advocate what we call "tsimu" coalitional politics as a practical solution to the problem of political conflict among black South African leaders.

Our procedure will be as follows: first, to show the plural nature of the country's political landscape; second, to present the cultural, political and African traditional

⁵Eric R. Wolf, Peasants, (New Jersey, Englewood: Prentice-Hall, INC., 1966), p. 81.

religious practice of **tsimu** (both its ancient and modern practices); third, to discuss the relation of African and Christian symbols as they relate to the issue of co-operative action. It is important to note that we seek a political coalition that enables a working unity while retaining a diversity of political philosophies and affiliations. As will be shown, we seek an ethic of community wherein diversity of persons and philosophies is affirmed.

Plural Political Context

As we have seen, the leaders selected for our study have exhibited divergent visions and strategies for social change. One would have expected them, at least, to stand together before the common enemy: apartheid. Such divisions among leaders naturally lead, in part, to rivalry and factional fighting--a cause which only benefits the oppressive government rather than the struggle for liberation. Deeply concerned about the inability of black organizations to form a united front, Archbishop Tutu recently committed himself to convening a black summit, the need for which he expressed thus:

"The political leaders of blacks need to meet urgently to plan a joint strategy on negotiations, to adopt a code of conduct in political dealings and decide on how to handle the factional violence and to promote unity and peace....My invitation will be to all leaders of a **substantial** black political movements...the importance of which would be undisputable, so that our people would judge leaders who **refuse to attend as enemies of unity,**

peace and liberation."⁶

One cannot prematurely judge the political effects the envisaged black summit might generate. However, Tutu's concern merely underscores the need for a political coalition.

Evidently, co-operation is not just an abstract formal idea. There is some basis for it already. As we saw in the chart provided in Chapter 2, there is evidence of a measure of co-operation between the ANC and PAC on the issues of sanctions, negotiation, homelands and majority rule. They are not in agreement, however, on the question of land.

Gatsha Buthelezi's collaborationist relationship with the government creates resentment among alternative political organizations. Yet political reality cannot be circumvented, namely, that even if the government were to abolish the homelands, Gatsha would still remain in that locale. That is

⁶Christopher S. Wren, "Tutu to Convene a Black Summit," The New York Times, (October 18, 1990), p. 10. Italics mine. Since Tutu's announcement for a Black summit two historic events have occurred: (1) In November 3, 1990, Tutu convened of all black political groups to explore the possibility for a broad political coalitional basis for negotiation with the government. The ANC, PAC and Azanian Peoples Organization (37 delegates representing 11 major political groupings) were in attendance except Gatsha Buthelezi Kwazulu and Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana homelands. At the end of the meeting a statement calling for "peace, discipline, and the creation of a culture of tolerance was released. Vide The Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 1990, p. 3; and (2) In November 5, 1990, the largest general conference of black and white Churches convened at Rustenburg, South Africa, to consider common strategy and ecumenical venture beyond apartheid. Both Tutu and Khoza Mgojo (a Methodist leader) linked authentic reconciliation to restitution, i.e., returning of the land to the indigenous owners. Vide New York Times, November 6, 1990, p. 12., idem The Rustenburg Declaration, November 1990, p. D8, "Restitution and a Commitment to Action.

to say, Gatsha's political orientation is not totally dependent on the government policies. His founding of Inkatha, a Zulu based political organization, has effected his independence. Confident of his political base, Gatsha has demanded to meet Mandela on one to one basis to address the violent carnage in Natal and Soweto. Mandela convened a meeting of Homeland leaders to which Gatsha was invited in his capacity as one of the tribal homeland leaders created by Pretoria. He declined the invitation favoring a primary meeting between the leaders (in this case he and Mandela) whose groups were involved in violence before including other leaders. Gatsha insists on being invited in his capacity as the president of Inkatha Freedom Party, rather than as a homeland leader. Gatsha's insistence indicates his awareness of the unpredictable future of the homelands but confident about the political viability of Inkatha.

Indubitably, there are irreconcilable issues among the leaders. The question of the new constitution for South Africa is still unresolved for all the groups. PAC and ANC have been respectful of each other. Gatsha has refused to recognize the present ANC. That is, the ANC after the 1960 calling it the ANC in exile. The implication is that the ANC in exile has no political mandate from the people. He respects the ANC prior to 1960 when it was under the leadership of Albert Luthuli: a Zulu chief.

The issue, however, is whether or not co-operation is

possible, given their differences. It may be argued that these differences could be achieved through negotiation. That is to say, putting a high premium of black negotiation may be fruitful for long term political stability among the contending black political groups. Such negotiation would aim at establishing "...a plurality of forms of democracy contains the promise of more meaningful participation of several levels which are otherwise reduced in importance."⁷ The question is whether the ANC and PAC are open to a plural democratic culture. It must be noted that you can have great differences and still have co-operation. That is, the ground for coalition (co-operation) lies in making the coalition serve the interest of the community, rather than sectarian ones. For this reason, we need to explore the resources that would promote and enhance the creation of political coalition. Now, let us examine the resources of African culture as expressed in the concept of "tsimu."

Cultural, political and Religious

Practice of Tsimu

In order to understand the importance of "tsimu," one needs to put it in its proper cultural context. The idea of "tsimu" is as old as the African community itself. That is to

⁷Jean Cohen, "Discourse Ethics and Civil Society," David Rasmussen, ed., Universalism VS Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990), p. 100.

say, the idea is not ahistorical or alien to the South African traditional reality. Indubitably, **tsimu** is a fundamental moral principle in African traditional life. In or through **tsimu** we discover a story of the community together--a story of empowerment for a new social praxis directed against the systemic injustice of apartheid. **Tsimu** is a community par excellence. Here community is not an abstract idea; it means being in relation--a way of life. Apartheid is a negation of this reality. It fragments and destroys the community. In essence the concept of **tsimu** is the basis of justice and peace. Thus, the absence of community implies the absence of justice and peace. **Tsimu** refers to a community where people recognize that they have been given to each other. That is to say, they are a gift to each other to promote each other's well-being. They affirm each other in a solidarity of purpose, respect and sharing who they are and what they have. For this reason, apartheid is the antithesis of **tsimu**.

As indicated above the concept **tsimu** is universal among South African tribal groups. Schapera confirms and acknowledges the history of "tsimu" cultural event among the Ngunis and the Sothos. He stated that "in all the tribes there is also found the work party (Nguni, ilima; Sotho, Letsema).⁸ So, in all the tribes "tsimu" is considered an event. That is, it attracts "crowds of people, the mixing of the sexes and the

⁸I. Schapera, Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa: An Ethnographical Survey, (London: George Routledge & Sons, LTD., 1937), p. 151.

refreshments, give even to hard work an atmosphere play. There is conversation, and songs...."⁹ Furthermore, Hunter observes that "working in company is a great incentive."¹⁰

Various occasions in African rural contexts necessitate "tsimu," promote both intra-group and extra-group support and solidarity. The "tsimu" event involves a collective participation in planting, weeding and harvesting, in which neighbors, friends, relatives and the community come together to help each other by contributing their skills and tools to do the task in hand. For "tsimu to come about, four necessary conditions should exist: (1) a community characterized by bondedness; (2) a major task, be it political or social issue; (3) the task or issue should concern the promotion of the common good: justice; and (4) the task or issue should have moral breadth to summon the collective efforts of the community. The idea of solidarity and participation best defines what "tsimu event" is all about. That is to say, the best political institution is one that allows its members active participation in decision-making processes.

Consequently, Schapera contends that the "tsimu" event was not only limited to friends and relatives. That, "more

⁹Monica Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, p. 90. The concepts of "play" and "conversation" are similar to Gadamar's. Vide Hans-Georg Gadamar, Truth and Method, (Second Revised Edition), (New York: Crossroads Press, 1989), pp. 101, 383-388.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 90.

generally the assistance of the outsiders was invited."¹¹ Regarding what they had to bring to the "tsimu", Hunter explained:

"One umuzi (village) possesses a plough, another yokes and skeys, another a chain, and each may contribute a yoke of oxen. Each umuzi supplies a boy or a man and they each plough the fields of the contributor in turn. There is not strict ratio of what each must provide, but each gives what they have got....Often the same imizi (villages) work together for years."¹²

Clearly, "tsimu" was not only limited to plowing (ploughing), weeding and reaping, in some cases, it involved thatching the roof of someone's house, which had been blown away by a storm, "building the framework or wall of a hut..., fencing a field or cutting timber, are almost invariably done by several people in co-operation to save time and energy."¹³ In addition, Hunter cited other occasions, which called for co-operative community ventures, such as "building a school or a church."¹⁴ These two projects, like other community tasks, involved both Christians and indigenous non-Christian citizens. This cross-religious participation demonstrates the universal outlook of "tsimu" event. Where preparing of beer was required to provide refreshments, Christians were free to prepare tea or soft African beverage (mageu).

¹¹I. Schapera, Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa, p. 151.

¹²Monica Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, p. 88.

¹³I. Schapera, Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa, p. 151.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 91.

It might be asked, who was qualified to convene "tsimu?" The answer is "anybody with a big task on hand with which he and his household alone cannot cope, or he wishes to complete soon...."¹⁵ Women were equally qualified to invite people to the "tsimu" event. The idea of giving an opportunity to anybody to convene and host "tsimu" aimed at broadening the leadership base. That is to say, the leadership was diversified and yet it provided an opportunity for co-operative action. They devolved the leadership as a practical way of dealing with leadership monopoly and the personality cult. Through this practice people learned to support what is right, rather than who is right in their deliberations. In addition, "tsimu" safeguarded exploitation of one person by another.

Since, the "tsimu" co-operative activity aimed at the enhancement of the welfare and the common good of the whole community, murderous, violent and disreputable persons were not qualified to convene "tsimu." In other words, the moral character of an individual played an important part in considering who should participate or not. A good standing in the community was considered sufficient moral criterion or qualification. Good standing in the community was embodied in good neighborliness. Motlhabi attested to the primacy of neighborliness when he said, "neighborliness was at the very

¹⁵I. Schapera, p. 151.

center of traditional African morality."¹⁶ In the same vein, Mbiti characterized amicable interrelations among people "implied also a good standing with God." That is to say, "to be right with God means being in right relation with men."¹⁷

If two families were in conflict, and thus hindered the possibility for co-operative action, the community would initiate a ritual of reconciliation to resolve the strained relationship. Practically, if one member of the community had grievously offended another, the offender was tried in the community court and if found guilty, was fined. In passing judgment, the chief or senior elder always emphasized "we do not hate you, but we hate your deeds." This means that the community court set out to affirm the humanity of the offender while imposing a sentence appropriate to the offence committed. In addition to the fine, the offender was expected to bring an animal (goat) to be slaughtered in the community court. The spilling of the blood of the animal and the sharing of common meal by both the offender and the plaintiff become a seal of reconciliation. The feast of reconciliation permeates the entire community, and a new relationship emerges that restores community life. Mbiti asserts that "this

¹⁶Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The Concept of Morality in African Tradition," Buti Tlhagale & Itumeleng Mosala, Hammering Swords into Ploughshares, p. 94. See also T. B. Soga, Intlalo KaXhosa, (N. P.: Lovedale Press, 1974), p. 102. "We Africans are deeply friendly and neighborly family by origin." Translated by Mokgethi.

¹⁷John S. Mbiti, Concepts of God in Africa, (London: S.P.C.K., 1970), p. 250f.

act of reconciliation is approved by God" and the two persons are "bound together as friends."¹⁸

Properly construed, "tsimu" served as a basis for tribal transcendence in that it provided an opportunity for cross-tribal experience and interaction in the context of work. It also created the climate conducive to learning the languages of other tribes. These examples can be seen in the inter-tribal "tsimu" among the Tsongas and the Vendas, who lived at close proximity in the Northern Transvaal. The same could be said of the Pedis and Tsongas at Shiluvane and Bushbuckridge areas in the Eastern Transvaal. Some vestiges of the impact of "tsimu" can be seen today in these areas, although much of the cross-tribal reality had been, to some degree, destroyed by the homeland system, which decreed enforced separation of tribes on the basis of language and culture.

The concept of "tsimu" is deeply rooted in a religious worldview. In the African traditional religion "there was no separate community of religious people, because everyone who participated in the life of the community automatically participated also in its religion." Thus the "whole rhythm of daily life was a liturgy that permeated such commonplace things as eating, drinking, love-making (work) etc."¹⁹ John Mbiti says that, "religion is found in all areas of human

¹⁸Ibid., p. 250.

¹⁹Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation and Wholeness," John Parratt, A Reader in African Christian Theology, p. 95.

life....it has dominated the thinking of African peoples...it has shaped their cultures, their social life, their political organizations and economic activities."²⁰ In the same vein, Setiloane maintains that African position supports the belief that "all aspects of life (its totality) are spheres of Divine in all its intensity-and one ignores this at one's own risk."²¹

The all pervasiveness of religion in all spheres of human life is essential for African traditional religion. Any form of activity, be it political, communal or labor was considered sacred in the sense that both religion and life belonged together. For this reason, at the beginning of any ploughing season, the community dedicated the seeds before any member convenes "tsimu." Often, the ritual of dedication remained the responsibility of each family or village. This was the first step which the community performed to obtain the blessings of ancestral²² spirits. Further, the ritual aimed at enhancing

²⁰John Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1989), p. 9.

²¹Gabriel M. Setiloane, "Salvation and the Secular," Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala, eds., Hammering Swords into Ploughshares: Essays in Honor of Archbishop Mpilo Desmond Tutu, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), p. 77. Setiloane is a professor of Religious Studies at the University of Cape Town.

²²The word ancestor refers to what Mbiti calls the "living dead." They were not considered divinities but served as intermediaries. The "intermediaries are link between God the Creator and human beings." See John Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion, pp. 62-64. Manas Buthelezi underscores the bond between the living and the dead thus: "the continuity of fellowship between the living and the dead was analogous to the interplay the natural

fertility and protection of the crops from diseases. It was deemed improper for one to take the seeds to the field without having performed the initial ritual.

Having dedicated the seeds, then people went to the field where they joined hands in the actual task of ploughing. Some people arrived when the work was already in progress. They too joined. The land was treated with care because it was, as it were, a shrine in which the community or tribal gods dwelt. By observing the rituals, people guarded against being alienated from their gods. Alienation and estrangement from the land was equally considered a major violation of the will of the gods.

In fact, the ancestors of the community were considered the legitimate owners of the land. Thus, the land had a sacred meaning for the indigenous people. The event of work was marked by some narration regarding the importance of co-operative power. That, "work was afraid of hands." That, "disunited people are unable to kill a limping deer," meaning that disunity renders the community vulnerable even before its weakest enemy. The resilience, fortitude and heroism of the good leaders, who led the community well was remembered in poetry and celebrated in song.

and supernatural world. Life was such a whole that not even death could not disintegrate it. This means that death was not regarded as a point which marked the termination of fellowship among those who had been in communion on this side of the grave. The solidarity between the living and the dead was possible because of the active presence of the Creator of life, from whose presence both the living and the dead could not escape. See Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation as Wholeness," John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, pp. 95-96.

We have identified thus far, the ritual step as a starting point leading to the "tsimu" event organized around ploughing and sowing. When the task had been achieved or done, then the crowd went to the village or the home of the one who initiated the event. This was the second movement. At the home the people were treated to home-made beer and tea for Christians. All who worked ate and drank together. Schapera noted that "anybody wishing to do so can take part and receive his share in the feast."²³ The celebration was considered the highest form of communion. In the African community, one could not share a meal with an enemy. So, the fact of eating from a common dish and drinking from a common calabash (ukhamba) promoted the spirit of community and solidarity. It was participation in the daily life of the community that one partook in its joys and celebrations. The task accomplished demonstrated the people's co-operative spirit.

Schapera fails to detect the depth of "tsimu" except to say, "...it is a good policy to help others and to ensure their willing co-operation when required for one's own work."²⁴ It was not a simple act of reciprocating kindness. Outsiders are likely to draw such a conclusion. But a careful analysis of the "tsimu" event reveals that "tsimu" implies a certain understanding of what it means to be human. This understanding transcends tribe and material condition. In the

²³I. Schapera, p. 152.

²⁴I. Schapera, p. 152.

"tsimu" event, both the poor and the rich were caught up in the act of "tsimu" and were dependent on each other's humanity. Thus, revealing something of their inseparable or interdependent destiny. In addition, a sense of community as a way of life or bondedness seems apparent in "tsimu." This understanding envisions community in relational, rather than in abstract formal terms.

The symbol of **ubuntu** (personhood) was at the core of "tsimu." Personhood is more than just a biological trait coinciding with the birth process.²⁵ Rather, Personhood implies a state of moral character, which is acquired by learning social rules by which the African community lives. Full personhood is exhibited by excellences such as respect, concern for the well-being of others, honesty, co-operation,

²⁵For Africans personhood is bestowed. For instance, if an African and a White man are approaching and an indigenous African is asked to identify who they are. He or she would say, a person and **umlungu** (**umlungu** means something the personhood of which is unclear) are coming. But when the **umlungu** gets to their home and behaves in a human way, then he graduates from being **umlungu** to being a person (**umuntu** or **motho**). That is to say, in African tradition each human being is given a chance to demonstrate one's personhood.

The naming of a child or even giving names to strangers who have earned the trust of the community affirms their personhood, because "the name is considered in the African societies to be very much part of the personality of the person" Vide John Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion, p. 87. The name that the child receives at birth has meaning, and the parents try to guide the child to live in accordance with the meaning of the name. Therefore, naming ceremonies among the Africans are the beginning of the potential personhood. For Nyamiti, personhood implies that the "individual in question possesses the moral and other human qualities which endow him with dignity, and make him valuable and worthy of respect." Vide Charles Nyamiti, "The incarnation viewed from the African understanding of person," African Christian Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (March 1990), p. 4.

trustworthiness and abdication of individualism and egocentric tendencies in favor of co-operative life in community. Put differently, the **muntu's** (person's) **ubuntu** (personhood) is fully actualized in the community, rather than in an isolated existence. There is a Pedi dictum that says, **Motho ke motho ka ba bangwe batho**,²⁶ meaning "I am human only because you are human." That is to say, one's humanity is defined and enhanced by the humanity of others. This human to human self-definition is like entering one's life, which is tantamount to standing on holy ground of fellowship. Equally striking is the idea that inhumanity to others directly affects one's self-hood or humanity. John Mbiti sums up the notion of personhood in these words: "I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am."²⁷ Here Mbiti focuses on the collective "we," rather than an individualistic "I" as the African view of community. This does not mean that the individual is subsumed under the community. The individual is distinct and unique and his/her duty to the community actualizes and affirms his/her individuality. Menkiti asserts that "ontological dependence to human society " is distinctive to African thought. He

²⁶Mokgethi Motlhabi translates the concept as "a person is a person through other people." He believes that the concept has a universal character in that "...friendliness and neighborliness were not confined to kinsmen or other Africans but also extended to foreigners." He concludes, "the concept **ubuntu** placed emphasis on persons as the highest and intrinsic value." See Mokgethi Motlhabi, "The concept of Morality in African Tradition," Buti Tlhagale & Itumeleng Mosala, eds., **Hammering Swords into Ploughshares**, p. 94.

²⁷John Mbiti, **African Religions and Philosophies**, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 141.

continues, the African view "moves from society to the individual."²⁸ In support of this view, Biko acknowledged that the African village was essential for the community, by that emphasizing a sense of belonging and joint action. Speaking of "tsimu" or "ilima," he said, "farming and agriculture...had many characteristics of joint efforts. Each person could by a simple request and holding ceremony invite neighbors (people) to come and work his plots....In all instances there was help (co-operative ventures) between individuals, tribe and tribe, chief and chief etc."²⁹ The concept of ubuntu serves as galvanizing principle for community political and social action. It provided both content, direction and a way of being in the world. It determined African's behavior in relation to others.

Martin Luther King Jr. expressed a similar onto-genetic idea of the African view of community in which the individual and community share an interdependent or mutual existence, when he said, "...I can never become what I ought to be until you become what you ought to be. And you can never become what you ought to be until I become what I ought to be."³⁰

²⁸Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, "Person and Community in African Traditional Thought," Richard A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, Third Edition, (New York: University Press of America, 1984), p. 180.

²⁹Steve Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 43.

³⁰Martin Luther King, Jr., "Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution," James Melvin Washington, ed., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), p. 269.

Similarly, Setiloane corroborates King's understanding of the individual and community in these words: "in this way all live and let others live." Indubitably, Setiloane's understanding, like King's is based on the belief that "there is a Power of Divinity--at work in community life-all community...."³¹ and this include the whole created order.

The "tsimu" event was predicated upon the belief that the wholeness of life can only be attained where people affirmed each other's humanity. This common affirmation found expression in the co-operative action of the community. The task before the community presented both challenge and victory. The assurance of victory was embodied in the collective power of the people, rather than their division. So, the symbol of personhood and community served as the main pillars of the "tsimu" event. These symbols possess depth and breadth to summon the community to a joint responsibility.

We have examined the "tsimu" event in the rural traditional context. Now, let us attempt to probe how the idea shaped and transformed the character of the urban dwellers. More precisely, how the people in the urban areas understood the concept. Notably, most of the urban dwellers come from the rural areas of South Africa. It is fair to say that some people had no idea of the event because they were not raised in the rural areas. However, "tsimu" is prevalent in the urban context and manifests itself in many forms and practices.

³¹Gabriel Setiloane, "Salvation and the Secular," p. 77.

There exists economic, political and Church³² "tsimu." We will discuss each in turn.

1. Economic "Tsimu".

Faced with new urban circumstances as a result of industrial and technological explosion accompanied by a process of uprooting of the people from their indigenous land, people in this situation endeavored to make ends meet. Economic "tsimu" was practiced to summon the collective energies of the people to give each other financial and material support. This modern version of "tsimu" in the urban setting took the form of **stockfell** parties and **ukuholisana**. The "stockfell" is not an African word but is commonly used by them. It refers to an organized informal economic support system. It is an organization of a group of people, whose income is below subsistence level. The principle of "Stockfell" is to augment the meager wages. The composition of people who formed "stockfell" was cross-sectional and the distinctions of language and tribe was irrelevant. It was not organized around people who lived and worked together as friends. Rather, anybody was free to participate; they rotated from one home to another at least once a month. Each month, financial contributions were made to one person. The recipients were determined before hand but anyone with a

³²This division is for cognitive purposes alone, since the economic, political and religious dimensions of life are all integrally united in the African worldview.

pressing financial needs could request that he or she be considered first.

The object of "stockfell" was twofold: First, to provide the each other's financial well-being based on the interrelated survival needs. Their quest for community and the affirmation and celebration of the other's humanity superseded their tribal and language differences. Second, it promoted a sense of self-reliance, which was a cornerstone of responsible citizenship. The actualization of authentic citizenship was demonstrated by both participation in the life of the community and the ability to provide for one's family. If one is denied the opportunity to exercise these responsibilities, one is relegated to the periphery of existence. In the main, "stockfell" fostered co-operative action aimed at the good of the whole.

Another form of economic "tsimu" is **ukuholisana** While "stockfell" catered for cross-sectional people, one needs not be employed to participate in it. The "ukuholisana" involves individuals who share their wages or part of it on certain determined times, be it fortnightly or monthly, as the case may be. Gatsha Buthelezi expresses similar thought when he says, "ukuholisana" is one of the modern examples of African cultural pattern "...where individuals share salaries by giving their salaries, or part thereof, to others on certain

month-ends."³³ Clearly, most of the people who participated in this informal economic self-support system were working people but unemployed persons were not excluded. The unemployed would at times find it hard, since the money that each person was expected to share was pre-determined. Often, an effort was made to make sure that a broad spectrum of the community participates. This kind of sharing afforded members the opportunity to finance the education of their children or to help educate a neighbor's child. In some cases, people were enabled to purchase properties. At the core of both "stockfell" and "ukuholisana" was an understanding of life together based on the promotion of human dignity.

2. Political "Tsimu"

This leads us to a discussion of the political "tsimu." The idea here is to show that "tsimu" is rooted in the political life of the African community. It does not mean, however, that our preceding discussion had nothing to do with politics. The deliberation simply shows the appropriation of the concept and its application in a modern context. The idea here is to underscore that the tribal reality is not a necessary barrier to co-operation as people have sometimes thought. The leaders of various Church and political organizations bore testimony to this fact. At this point, a

³³Mangosutho G. Buthelezi, "Issues in Kwa-Zulu," Hendrik W. van Merwe et al., eds., African Perspectives on South Africa, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1978), p. 480.

chart of the political leaders and organizations to which they belonged ,and a brief discussion thereof would suffice:

ANC	PAC	BCM	UDF	SACC
Seme X	Sobukwe X	Biko X	Chikane S	Qubule X
Xuma X	Potlako S	Sono T	Sisulu X	Buti S
Moroka S	Pokela S	Cooper I	Boesak C	Buthelezi Z
Luthuli Z	Mothopeng P	Tiro S	Gumede Z	Tutu X
Tambo X				Chikane S
Mandela X				

This chart³⁴ shows that the black leaders were drawn from various South African tribes. This affirms the assertion that a culture of co-operation beyond the bounds of the tribe exists. In a way, the intra-tribal political co-operation validates the impact of *tsimu* as a basis of an authentic community.

The formation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 is

³⁴We use the code letters to identify the tribal affiliation of the leaders. This is not an exhaustive list, since it does not cover the names of all the executive members of the groups represented in this chart. The codes stand for the following: X=Xhosa, Z=Zulu, S=Sotho, P=Pedi, T=Tsonga, I=Indian. and C=Colored. Albertina Sisulu was the only woman to be elected to the office of Co-President in the UDF.

one such examples of political "tsimu." The Front was a coalition of 600 political, grass roots, trade unions and Church related organizations. As an umbrella organization of Africans, Indians, coloreds and some White remnants, the Front brought together strikingly diverse African political perspectives. Since it (the Front) claimed the Congress tradition, those of other political tendencies felt excluded. This was, in part, the limitation of this kind of political "tsimu." The political object, namely to oppose the exclusion of African populace from the decision-making process and the co-optation of the Indians and Coloreds have been catalytic: they precipitated a new phase of co-operative opposition. As we saw that common moral issue is one of the necessary conditions for "tsimu" to happen. For UDF racial and divisive laws of apartheid constituted a defensible moral issue. Hence, the UDF's opposition aimed at the attainment of an alternative vision: non-racial community, in which people are considered on merit, rather than skin-color. Boesak identifies the moral reason for resisting apartheid as its "...fundamental denial of all that is worthwhile and human in our society." He continues, "it is in opposition to the will of God for this country."³⁵

In February 24, 1988 the government banned 17 extra-

³⁵Allan Boesak, Black and Reformed: Apartheid, Liberation and the Calvinist Tradition, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1984), p. 159 These words are contained in the address he gave at the national launching of the United Democratic Front, Cape Town, August 20, 1983.

parliamentary organizations with the exception of the Inkatha and United Christian Conciliation Party both of which related to the government in a special way. The banning immediately prompted the formation of the Mass Democratic Movement with almost all the black religious leaders at the forefront. The Mass Democratic Movement is a second example of the political "tsimu." It was the most representative movement attracting strikingly diverse groups, which subscribed to different political ideologies and religious orientations. The movement was organized around the issue of democratic defense. The banning and denial of free political activity was deemed outrageous and violation of fundamental human rights. This became a moral galvanizing issue. Hence those who formed the Mass Democratic Movement cut across tribal, religious, ideological and political lines. This does not imply that the political coalition based on tsimu renders the differences among groups null and void. What happens is that they (people) appreciate each other's difference and employ it as a unique opportunity for co-operative action. In this case, co-operative behavior is, according to Africans, compatible with **ubuntu**. That is to say, it is considered a virtue to be a cooperative person. The point, however, is that while the pressure of banning and oppression can be attributed, in part, to the Mass Democratic Movement, one cannot ignore that the African sense of justice was mainly challenged to an active response. Against the morally unacceptable system of

apartheid, people were prepared to co-operate for the greater gain of the new community in the future. Desmond Tutu characterized the Mass Democratic Movement as:

"...a movement deeper into God. That is where we touch one another more nearly, as we all grow in our prayerfulness and in our relationship with our God. The closer we are to God, the closer we are to one another. That is the greatest thing than can happen between Churches."³⁶

For Tutu, the struggle has spiritual component, hence he calls it "a movement deeper into God." In addition, the struggle provided the conditions within which relations were fostered and deepened. Manas Buthelezi characterized the people's movements as "...cutting across the boundaries of the church and that of community, both present and in past history."³⁷ This statement validates the assertion that the culture of co-operative action exists in the African life. The reality of collective ventures are pronounced in both urban and rural areas of South Africa.

3. Church "Tsimu"

We saw how the "tsimu" event impacted the political arena and functioned as an urban driving force. The Church was not exempt from the impact of "tsimu," since most of its members came from the black community. Something of the African

³⁶Jim Wallis and Joyce Hollyday, Crucible of Fire, p. 69.

³⁷Church in Action in the South Africa Crisis: The South African Council of Churches National Conference Report, (Johannesburg: South African Council of Churches, 1988), p 15.

heritage found its way into the practical life and ministry of the Church. Two such examples are proper: **mpfuxelelo** or **umvuselelo**³⁸ and funeral Services. The **mpfuxelelo** event demonstrates that the concept of **tsimu** is not foreign to the African religious experience. That, it formed the basis of co-operative action in both church evangelism and fund raising efforts in order to maintain Church programs and to provide material support for the poor. The significance of **tsimu** event is inherent in its power to bond people together across the religious, denominational and doctrinal enclaves. In fact, the concept acquires a more spiritual substance and quality--a quality that enables people to put their common destiny above their differences. In addition, it fosters a spirit of ecumenism and mutual respect of each other's religious tradition.

The recent **Kairos Document** is a practical example of the impact of "tsimu" among diverse theologians most of whom bore the marks of oppression in their lives. The theologians were galvanized by a moral issue: apartheid. This was the a remarkable co-operative activity in response to the kairoitic moment in both church and society. This form of co-operative action gave birth to a prophetic theology grounded in the substance of faith with a concomitant rigorous social

³⁸**Mpfuxelelo** is a Tsonga word meaning revival. Among the Zulus and Xhosas the event is known as **umvuselelo**. On this occasion Churches and Church related groups come together either for spiritual or fund raising revival. The revival event cut across religious lines. It was a form of ecumenism of African Christians.

analysis. The document provided the moral base for participation in the struggle for justice. It stated, in part, that the "moral duty of all who are oppressed is to resist oppression and to struggle for liberation and justice."³⁹ Subsequently, the authors' of the document considered the "unity in faith and action with those who are oppressed"⁴⁰ as a way forward in the struggle for liberation. That is to say, politics and moral integrity find expression in the struggle for liberation. Further, the theologians considered morality and politics inextricably bound together; i.e., the one implying the other.

The pressing apartheid moral issue provided the necessary condition in which the theologians were enabled to mine the resources of their own traditions in the spirit of cooperative action. It is that point of contact and diversity among the "Kairos" theologians, which "tsimu" advocates where sharp differences are celebrated and appreciated. The Kairos theologians exemplify a religious coalition that transcends doctrinal differences. The essence of their coalition, however, emphasizes that "faithfulness to the principle of human equality under God and its implied opposition to racism alone determine the integrity of the churches and their

³⁹The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church, (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1985), p. 29.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 28.

relationship to the black community."⁴¹ The significance of the document can be attributed to its accommodation of diversity grounded in the prophetic principle informed by a common quest for liberation and justice. The concern for justice through co-operative activity also found concrete expression in funeral services. Here, we see how the concept is employed when people face the grim reality of death. As we saw, the *tsimu* event provided the basis for co-operative action in the life of the community. Now, in the "tsimu" event people co-operated in death as they did in life. That is to say, the death of an individual affects both his/her immediate family and the community at large. The communal character of the funeral was demonstrated by the support the family of the deceased person received. The support took the form of work and human solidarity, such as providing wood, water and food. In other words, the family of the deceased person was not expected to work or to incur funeral expenses, since the community provided for them.

Manas Buthelezi characterized the funeral services as "the beginning of the blending [with] the church community spirit."⁴² The liturgy, Buthelezi explains, consisted of:

"singing of simple repetitious choruses, body movements and the clapping of hands. Political slogans are added in the case of the funeral of the

⁴¹Peter J. Paris, The Social Teaching of the Black Churches, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 12.

⁴²The South African Council of Churches National Conference Report, (1988), p. 15.

political activists. Black power salutes also become one of the ingredients of the liturgy."⁴³

More importantly, the contemporary funeral event became a context where the stories of the oppression and torture of the victims were told. The telling of the stories of atrocities and death had a transforming effect on all who heard them. The participants in the funeral who were drawn from every tribe, language, church and political organization, experienced partial liberation as they celebrated victory over death. That is to say, the funerals were not only occasions for mourning the dead but also served as the locus in which people were inspired by the resilience and sacrifice of those who died such heroic deaths. Accordingly, the people rededicated themselves anew to the struggle in order to honor and preserve the memories of the dead and further their high purposes.

Wholeness of Life: A Reflection on Symbols.

The "tsimu" community strives for the wholeness of life. That is to say, this symbol wholeness of life constitutes the form and content of the community. It is worthy to note that in the discussion that follows, the idea of "tsimu" is implicitly implied. In fact, the discussion takes the concept of "tsimu" as both paradigm and overarching framework. That is to say, the association and the coming together of the people transcends ethnic, religious, and ideological frontiers. With

⁴³Ibid.

this in mind, let us reflect on the symbol wholeness of life, particularly how it fosters and enhances co-operative action. Both African and Black theologies put at the center of their discourses the symbol of wholeness of life, person and community. Black theology, however, understands the symbol as liberation par excellence. The idea of wholeness of life is rooted in God, who is the sole source, guarantor and giver of life. That is to say, intrinsic in the concept is the understanding that God wills that each person be a beneficiary of the gift of life. For this reason, Mbiti writes, "religion tells them (Africans) to be humble in the sight of their creator who is God, and to trust him. Their life comes from him and depends on him."⁴⁴ The Africans consider God to be the source of their origin and dignity.

From this understanding two things arise: 1. that, since God is the source of their origin and dignity, therefore, God forms the basis of human equality. Thus, in an apartheid society, the promotion of wholeness of life should be embodied in a political structure that addresses the equality of people under God. 2. That, the religious, moral and political are integrally connected in those who are shaped by the African Christian understanding. This meant that one could not claim to be Christian and at the same time support apartheid, inequality and oppression. So, the symbols of "tsimu"

⁴⁴John S. Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion, (Portsmouth NH: Heinemann Press, 1989), p. 202.

community and the wholeness of life are grounded in the African understanding that "as one participated in life that one apprehended God's presence." For this reason, Buthelezi speaks of "the sacramental character of life."⁴⁵

Clearly, the symbols we are discussing emerge from the social and political biographies of the African people who live under apartheid-dominated political structures. In a sense, the symbols of "tsimu" and the wholeness of life undergird the basic moral values of the African community. They serve as both critic of the present social structures and overarching symbols of the new community that is being anticipated, in the process of being born. But the new community is unlikely to dawn unless the relationships and divergent differences among groups and leaders are restored. This raises the question of how do we achieve the desired political coalition. The basic starting point would be for the leaders to accept a common objective, namely the destruction of apartheid. This acceptance, however, does not imply an adherence to a single strategy. That is to say, multiplicity of strategies must be acknowledged as necessary. But strategies without transformed political agents would not be sufficient to usher in a new community. It is at this point

⁴⁵Manas Buthelezi, "Salvation as Wholeness," John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, (London: SPCK, 1987), p. 96.

that the concepts of liberation, reconciliation and **Pha Badimo**⁴⁶ are useful. In one or another, the structures reflect the character of those who created them. In other words, new democratic structures can be realized through the activities of agents who have been shaped by the democratic principles.

The notion of liberation goes to the heart of the matter, since it involves the liberation and the building of new persons and a new community. In addition to being liberated from oppression, sickness and sin, we should point out the critical need for liberation from the antagonistic violence that Blacks employ against each other. One cannot deny that some of the violence against Blacks has been orchestrated from outside. But that is beside the point, the issue, however, is the acquiescence of some Blacks with apartheid to eliminate other Blacks. That is a matter of grave concern.

We should also begin to reflect on liberation from tribalism. That is, we need to explore ways of appreciating and celebrating tribal differences, instead of employing them as means of division and conflict. The political reality is that the government has exploited these differences in order to drive a wedge among Blacks. In fact, the question of tribal affiliation is a critical social and political issue. The way in which it is addressed will determine the outcome of the new

⁴⁶Gabriel Šetiloane, professor of Religious Studies at the University of Cape Town, uses the concept of **Pha Badimo** meaning communal feast of reconciliation.

political reality. Further, people need liberation from the cult of leadership. The cult of leadership is a form of blind emanation to a leader. That is say, people tend to follow the leader, rather than what is right. In order to achieve true liberation from the cult of leadership people have to be encouraged to make their judgments and arrive at decisions. This means that there is double act of liberation in the South African context: 1. liberation from the oppressive structures and be set free as agents of the new community; 2. that, the context and perspective of the victims themselves must be transformed in order to allow for creative participation.

Indubitably, liberation implies the existence of peace and harmony in the community. In this context, peace and harmony are relational terms. This statement emphasizes collective liberation, rather than individual one. Hence the Scripture says:

"So if you are about to offer your gift to God at the altar and there you remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar, go at once and make peace (reconcile) with your brother, and come back and offer your gift to God" (Matthew 5:23-24).

Similarly, the leaders we have studied have to step back and reflect on how to deal with their differences. Their political and theological differences imply that they need healing in their relationships in order to put their differences as contributing to the struggle for justice. The differences, however, stand in their way to offering to God and to the oppressed the gift of the new social order. How can the new

social order be a product that they can offer together? This brings us to the issue of reconciliation.

Often, the notion of reconciliation is reserved for the domain of the religious and not the political. Given the religious formation of the leaders we have studied, the idea of reconciliation is not a misnomer. The Kairos theologians rejected the use of reconciliation as "an absolute principle that must be applied to in all cases of conflict and dissension." They wrote:

"...But not all cases of conflict are the same. We can imagine a private quarrel between two people or two groups whose differences are based upon misunderstandings. In such cases it would be appropriate to talk and negotiate to sort out misunderstandings and to reconcile the two sides. But there are other conflicts in which one side is right and another wrong. There are conflicts where one side is fully armed and violent oppressor while the other side is defenseless and oppressed. There are conflicts that can only be described as the struggle between justice and injustice, good and evil, God and the devil."⁴⁷

The abuse of the idea of reconciliation should not be allowed to overshadow and to nullify its proper use. The theologians rejected reconciliation between the "armed and violent oppressor" and "the defenseless and oppressed. They supported reconciliation of persons and groups and characterized such conflicts as "private quarrel...." One would assume that the differences among the black leaders falls in this category. It seems to me that reconciliation is primarily a divine act, rather than a human one. That is to say, it is God who

⁴⁷The Kairos Document, p. 17.

consummates and authenticates reconciliation. Put differently, reconciliation refers to what God in Christ has done to reconcile the world to God on the cross. That is, the work of reconciliation has been accomplished for us. Paul testifies to this fact thus: "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (II Corinthians 5: 19 (RSV)). Similarly, in Ephesians 1:10, Paul says, God has sent Christ Jesus "to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth." James Cone contends that "God's reconciliation is a new relationship with **people** created by his involvement in the political affairs of the world, taking sides with the weak and the helpless."⁴⁸ The divine act of reconciliation renders the reconciled agents effectively transformed. Hence Paul says, "When anyone is joined to Christ, he is a new being; the old is gone, the new has come" (II Corinthians 5:17). The transformed agent, liberated from oppression and bondage, must now accept, in Cone's view, "their freedom by joining God in the fight against injustice and oppression." Cone continues, "reconciliation then is not only what God does in order to deliver oppressed people from captivity; it is also what **oppressed do to remain faithful their new gift of freedom.**"⁴⁹ The idea of reconciliation has been understood in terms of unity in Christ. This understanding has contributed, in part,

⁴⁸James Cone, God of the Oppressed, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The Seabury Press, 1975), p. 229.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 233.

to a lack of appreciation for the diversity among Christians. Christians shaped in this way find it difficult to tolerate plurality in social and political life. Reconciliation is understood in terms of restoration of relation between God and humanity, but equally important is reconciliation between the collaborator and the political activist on the basis of justice. Put differently, the struggle would better be served if black leaders were reconciled to one another. This does not imply conformity to a narrow ideological formula, but rather to encourage and to celebrate diversity in the name of plurality and freedom of speech. In my view, such an act of political reconciliation would promote a healthy political relationship among groups. Simultaneously, it would encourage groups to present and to propound their respective political positions without the fear of intimidation of any kind. More importantly, reconciliation forms the basis from which trust can be engendered among black leaders to strive for the realization of the democratic vision.

No doubt, at the heart of reconciliation is the idea of justice. Justice is what makes reconciliation socially credible-meaning: justice is the end or the condition of reconciliation. In other words, justice concretizes reconciliation and makes it both politically and socially plausible and meaningful. In fact, justice is the norm by which one ascertains the nature of true community from a false one. True reconciliation implies a community shaped in the

ethic of love. Similarly, Kline Taylor characterizes authentic reconciliation as emancipatory in praxis. He explains:

"...the reconciliation in question must not simply repress difference but must seek a valuation of it that leads to alliance. The emancipation in question must not just proclaim deliverance but do so through address of specific oppressions in our period, from which deliverance is needed.⁵⁰

Ostensibly, reconciliation forms the basis for co-operative action by acknowledging difference and affirming the need for a restored community of persons.

The leaders in conflict retard the restoration of "a community of human beings, each bearing the image and likeness of God."⁵¹ This means that Blacks, more than before, should reflect on the idea of reconciliation relative to the warring factions and violent conflicts regnant in the community. Given the urgency of the situation, the way forward demands negotiation and reconciliation among Black political organizations. In the past, this was deemed unnecessary because it was assumed that the pending destruction of apartheid would unite Blacks. Recent events have shown that this is not necessarily the case. Rather, blacks also must negotiate their unity, and again; the tradition of "tsimu" can be a helpful resource.

⁵⁰Mark Kline Taylor, Remembering Esperanza: A Cultural-Political Theology for North American Praxis, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990), p. 176. His idea of reconciliatory emancipation is grounded on the "primacy of Justice."

⁵¹Ibid., p. 42.

Feast of Ancestors

Setiloane places the traditional idea of healing within the context of "tsimu" community. Further, he reminds us that the African understanding of healing is not confined to sickness alone but also pertains to the restoration of broken relationships; personal, social and political. The inability of the leaders to co-operate evidences broken political relationships. The session of healing, which Setiloane advocates is based on what he calls:

"a Feast of Ancestors--Pha Badimo at which the victims of sorcery will (this includes collaborators with apartheid), in the company of the total community under the transcendence of Modimo, Qamata, Umveligqangi--God, confess their error and their ways, and then receive absolution, forgiveness and restoration and confirmation of their Botho (human-ness) from the total community including the owners (Ancestors) of the land."⁵²

The Ngaka (traditional priest) presided over the Feast of Ancestors aimed at restoring broken social and political relationships. As Setiloane testifies, "a Feast of Ancestors" serves as an African traditional ritual of reconciliation. He explains that it is ritual where the community come-together "in the presence of the divinity."⁵³ Africans believe that the community as a whole suffers whenever relationships are not healed. The fragmentation prevents communal solidarity, mutual care and empathy. For this reason, the idea of "a Feast

⁵²Gabriel M. Setiloane, "Salvation and the Secular," Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala, eds., Hammering Swords into Ploughshares, p. 82.

⁵³Ibid., p. 83.

of Ancestors" has far reaching socio-political implications. For healing to be accomplished, the offenders would gather in the presence of the community to "confess their errors." The **Ngaka** would communicate their confession to the ancestors, who in turn intercede for them before God. The session of healing would be accompanied by a ritual of purification. After the ritual, the parties whose relationship had been strained would become good neighbors or friends again. The restored relationship would, for the most part, be exhibited in the day to day encounter with each other.

For Setiloane, the **Pha Badimo** feast has a universal character. For this reason, he believes it could serve as a basis for National Convention for all South Africans. He asks a rhetorical question thus:

"Is not this **Pha Badimo** feast and come-together of all elements of the community in the presence of the Divinity (by whatever tradition, white, African, Asian, Colored) which African divination reveals to us, National convention, which has been the cry of the aggrieved of this land for many years?"⁵⁴

At the core of this rhetorical question is Setiloane's vision of racial restoration based on the traditional feast of healing.

The prayer for rain during drought is another example, which underscores the universal outlook of **Pha Badimo**. On this occasion people come together from different backgrounds, tribes, church and political persuasions to pray for rain.

⁵⁴Ibid.

Here, people used their diversity for a common course. They congregated to pray for rain on broad understanding of the ancestral relationship. That is, they believed that the ancestral relationship "can be based on common membership in a clan, tribe, religious or social society."⁵⁵ This broad view of **Pha Badimo** or feast of the ancestors provides the basis for diverse racial participation. Put differently, **Pha Badimo** becomes a fundamental resource for the nature of a reconciled community.

In an instance of strained relations, the community participated in the ritual in order to bear witness to the restoration of broken relations and to receive into the community those who were once alienated and estranged. In some communities, the newly transformed persons would be made to partake of a common meal, which was a symbols of communion and fellowship marking their new status of restoration to the community. Hence, Appiah-Kubi states that "to the African, society, its natural environment and its members, form a single system or morality inter-dependent relationship."⁵⁶ The symbol of **Pha Badimo** "a Feast of Ancestors" seeks to destroy what constitute a wall of division and a source of enmity among people: black leaders. Evidently, if the symbol

⁵⁵Charles Nyamiti, Christ As Our Ancestor, (Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1984), p. 127. Nyamiti identified two kinds of ancestral relationships: (a) **natural relationship** and (b) **sacred status** obtained through death.

⁵⁶Kofi Appiah-Kubi, "Christology," John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, p. 76.

is well appropriated, it could offer some solutions to the protracted differences among the black leaders in two ways: (a). by providing African traditional resources for dealing with a situation where human relationships are strained; (b). by reminding the leaders that continuity of fellowship among them creates harmony between the living and the dead. As Edmund Burke asserted, "people would not look forward to posterity who never look back to their ancestors."⁵⁷ This kind of to-and-from movement serves as a form of reorientation of the person. That is to say, for one to be truly in touch with the present one must reflect on the past, not simply romanticizing it but to allow the past to initiate one into the present.

The symbol of **Pha Badimo** points to the transforming power of the communal feast of healing and reconciliation. More importantly, Africans know that people have a tendency of moving and drifting away from the moral norms and values of society and from each other. They believe that alienation occurs when people are estranged from their past (ancestors), natural environment and God. Thus, restoration and healing of broken relations was at the center of African religious experience in order to release the agent's full potential for creative social and political participation. The process of change had, for the Africans, to begin with the transformed

⁵⁷Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London: 1790), Works (London: World Classic Edition, 1907), Vol. IV, p. 109.

human character--a human being shaped by the understanding that one is fully human in community with others. Ewuku Oguah underscores this kind of communal formation as the basis of social change when he says, "the good of the individual is the function of the good society." He concludes, "a great emphasis is placed on social ethics as opposed to the ethic of the self...."⁵⁸ This statement "strikes a chord of African solidarity and the sacredness of human community."⁵⁹ So, **Pha Badimo** event emphasizes the rootedness of the person in community and that it is the community which defines the person as person. This goes for leaders also. In the African view, a person becomes a leader because of people. That is say, a leader is a servant of the people by the will of the people. This understanding underscores the African democratic principle. Hence, the estranged person is restored to the community through a process of social and ritual transformation. As we have stated elsewhere, that during the process of incorporation, the community plays a vital catalytic role as the giver of norms. We submit that the idea of **Pha Badimo** and its understanding of person in community can offer a fresh **vista** in the search for co-operative action of the leaders in a plural society. The **Pha Badimo** event brought

⁵⁸Benjamin Ewuku Oguah, "African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study," Richard A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction, Third Edition, p. 220.

⁵⁹Kofi Appiah-Kubi, "Christology," John Parratt, ed., A Reader in African Christian Theology, p. 70.

people close to each other by tearing down the walls of ethnicity and hate that had separated them. The healing embodied in the event signified a new way of life; i.e., political praxis.

The Agape Feast

Correspondingly, the Christian feast of communion provides the same transforming possibilities. The communion table constitutes the Christian life--a participation in God's justice and Christ's liberational action in the world. Like the **Pha Badimo** event, the Lord's Supper is a context where "the corporate selfhood of God is shared for human corporateness, the healing of race, sex and class divisions between generations and the healing of the nations."⁶⁰ In other words, communion has ethical consequences. That is to say, the values celebrated should be expressed in the practical behavior of these participants. Gutierrez affirms this view when he says, "the communion with the Lord inescapably means Christian life centred around concrete and creative commitment service to others."⁶¹ The feast of communion has a broad social and political implications. Hence Lane writes:

"...bread broken without social action for justice

⁶⁰Frederick Herzog, God-Walk: Liberation Shaping Dogmatics, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988), p. 140.

⁶¹Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, (New York: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 11.

in the world is not bread broken for a new world. The breaking of the eucharistic bread demands that each participant be **broken and changed in the sacrifice of the Mass** so that they can go forth to build a world more in accordance with the standards of the Kingdom announced by Jesus. If the Christian community is to **change the world**, to be a leaven in society, then it must first of all be **changed itself** from within. That change is effected by the sacrifice of the Mass which gives rise to conversion in the life of the individual and the community, thereby enabling the community and the individual to transform the unjust structures...."⁶²

The Agape meal, properly understood, shapes and transforms the Christian person to live in accordance with the virtues enunciated by Christ. In other words, it helps transform participants to accept the values of sharing according to the norm of justice and love. Sharing in this instance includes both material and leadership. As Paul reminded the Church in Corinth: "that no one should seek his own good but the good of his neighbor" (1 Cor. 10:24). This reminder is a warning against individualistic tendencies, which seek to promote self-interest, rather than the common good.

The ethic of sharing flowing from the understanding of the Agape meal is exemplified in the community of goods in Acts 4:32-35. This communitarian living is constitutive of **koinonia**, meaning "fellowship" or "having in common". Here we have a concrete example of persons liberated to live for Christ and one another. They experience solidarity and mutual care. The spirit at work in the christian community is, in

⁶²Dermot A Lane, Foundations for a Social Theology, (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), p. 157. Emphasis mine.

many respects, similar to that nurtured by the "tsimu" based community. Evidently, both solidarity and co-operative action are integrally bound together. This reality constitutes the basic values of human life.

We have seen that there are resources in African traditional life and Christian religion, which provide sufficient basis for the ethic of community. We have also seen that the ideas of "tsimu," wholeness of life and "Pha Badimo" are central to the African understanding of the importance of community and life together. Similar resources obtain in the Christian religion, such as Agape meal and community of goods, just to cite a few examples. These resources are important since the leaders we have studied are shaped and influenced by both the African tradition and the Christian religion. In fact, these concepts provide a paradigm of the African experience and serve as resources for resolving family, social and vexing political issues.

A healthy community is one in which the spirit of co-operation prevails. As Owuku Oguah attests, "seek the good of the community, you seek your own good. Seek your own good, and you seek your own destruction." He concludes, "mutual aid is a moral obligation."⁶³ The interdependence of human beings, for the Africans, is the basis for social ethics. This understanding find resonance in the Scriptural injunction,

⁶³Benjamin Ewuku Oguah, "African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study," Richard A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy, p. 221.

which exhorts us to be our brother/sister's keepers. In a sense, the success to achieve co-operative action among the leaders would indeed be necessary liberational step in the service of those who have long endured oppression and whose quest for justice and peace can no longer be delayed.

As we have seen, the concept of "tsimu" promotes cross-sectional participation of people and encourages free exchange of ideas and perspectives, and prudent deliberation of strategies for liberation. In other words, "tsimu" is not a closed community. The symbol of "tsimu" recognizes the right of the other to his or her identity, dignity and integrity. Thus, "tsimu" community is a paradigm of the plurality of people, yet striving for creative co-operative action. To pretend that Africans are a homogenous group is politically naive. We must acknowledge our ethnic diversity and use it as enrichment rather than a stumbling-block. This recognition, however, will liberate groups and communities from the cocoons of their ethnic and tribal captivity for participation in the struggle for liberation.

In so far as there is a tendency not to promote the interest of the whole or anything that hinders co-operative action, **tsimu** forces each of them (groups or leaders) to contribute to the good of the whole. In **tsimu** issues of ideological differences do not matter, what matters is the promotion of the well-being of all the people. To be sure, **tsimu** allows the maintenance of diversity. People still

maintain their distinctive roles of culture and language and yet commit themselves to the good of the whole.

The debate raging in many African states about the viability of the multi-party system reveals the depth and urgency of the issue of pluralism in Africa. Some have opposed the introduction of multi-party system, arguing that it would promote tribalism, retard nation-building and weaken the cohesion of the people. Paul Simbwa rejects this argument saying, "single parties have in any case failed to wipe tribalism from the face of Africa."⁶⁴ Surely, it is politically untenable to deny people's democratic rights on the basis of self-defeating objectives. Others support multi-partism stating that it would reinforce the creation of the democratic values, particularly to devolve power from the monopoly of one group and elites to constitutionally controlled multi-parties. Regarding the foreign structures as solutions to the African political problems, Simbwa writes:

"These structures were also imposed on African communities for the benefit of colonizing powers and their successors--African ruling class and other elites. Constitutions inherited at the independence were as such intended to silence and oppress the people, and cannot be democratic."⁶⁵

Having discovered the failure of the externally imposed colonial structures, Simbwa observes "...our pre-colonial structures need more serious examination than hitherto. They

⁶⁴Paul Simbwa, "Political Parties should be Constitutionally regulated," African Christian, (September 30, 1990), p. 5.

⁶⁵Ibid.

may provide a relevant and understood basis for constitutionalism and unity rather than the foreign imposed concoctions whose conditions for success do not exist...."⁶⁶

In our discussion, we have argued that "tsimu" which is a traditional African concept provides, at least, for the Black South Africans the basis for plural co-operative action. The South African traditional societies enjoyed consensus politics in which the people and leaders consulted with one another on matters affecting the well-being of the community. The flaw of the consensus politics is that it excluded women from participation in the decision-making process.

Having reflected on "tsimu" and its contribution for co-operative political action, one needs to examine the form of co-operation between the church and the political. Often, the church (theologians included) tend to acquiesce to the **status quo**. In other words, the voice of the church becomes, in some countries, master's voice for the power's that be. But what form and character should the co-operation take? In any form of co-operation, the church must maintain its prophetic principle. The church must be clear for itself and the world what constitutes the projects of freedom. That is to say, the church should provide theological discernment for authentic co-operative action. The church and the political can co-operate in projects that promote human liberation. Such projects may include the affirmation of "...the values of

⁶⁶Ibid.

democratic participation, the equal value of all persons, and equal access to educational and work opportunities...."⁶⁷ In short, the project of freedom is better defined by the concepts of "integrative society" or "just and livable society."⁶⁸ Clearly, justice is the ground of co-operation. This means that the church is in a position to support those projects, movements and groups that do not contradict the vision of equality of all people before God. In other words, for the church to be relevantly engaged it has to identify God's liberational moments in history and to co-operative with groups that are working to build a more just and sustainable community.

In addition to its prophetic impetus, the Church has to be a "diacritical community." While criticism aims at exposing or identifying the wrong, diacritical goes beyond naming the wrong by providing an alternative identity and vision. This task is more urgent in South Africa today. Unfortunately, Black theology has not succeeded in rising to the social and political occasion. It has been, in many respects, able to name the evil but it has not provided a way forward. Part of Black theology's problem in South Africa is that has remained far too long a theology of the elites and intellectuals in the Universities and Seminaries. For this reason, it has not found

⁶⁷Peter C. Hodgson, God in History: Shapes of Freedom, (Nashville: Abigdon Press, 1989), pp. 232-233.

⁶⁸Ibid.

its place among the grassroots.

Now, let us take our discussion further by addressing the essential theological question of how Christ or the Christian message gets expressed in **tsimu**.

Christ and **Tsimu** as Cultural form

The question of Christ and **tsimu** is a important theological issue, because it pertains to whether or not Christ can be equated with culture.

Most African theologians believe that God reveals God's self in one form or another in all cultures and religions. Idowu sees essential similarities between the understandings of God in traditional African religion and in Christianity. He writes:

"We recognize the radical quality of God's self-revelation in Christ; and yet it is because of this revelation we discern what is truly of God in our pre-Christian heritage: this knowledge of God is not totally discontinuous with our people's previous traditional knowledge of Him."⁶⁹

In the same vein, Mbiti considers African religion and culture as **praeparatio evangelica** (preparation for the Gospel)⁷⁰ in that they expose elements that are in harmony with Christianity, and in need Christ's illumining spirit and

⁶⁹E. Bolaji Idowu, "Introduction," Kwesi Dickson and Paul Ellingworth, eds., Biblical Revelation and African Beliefs, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1969), p. 16.

⁷⁰John Mbiti, "The Future of Christianity in Africa (1970-2000)," Communio Viatorum, Vols. 13-14, (1970-71), p. 21; idem Effiong S. Utuk, "An Analysis of John Mbiti's Missiology," African Theological Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1986), pp. 10-11.

transforming power. For Setiloane, African religious culture expresses some continuity with the Gospel and serves as a starting point for liberational hermeneutics.⁷¹

In wrestling with the issue of Christ and "tsimu," the concept of incarnation may shed some light on the problem. By becoming human ("God's self-involvement in the world"), God in Christ identified with the humanity and encountered and lived in the context human of culture. As John testifies, "the Word became flesh; he came to dwell among us" (John 1:14). God's embodied identification with the humans does not reduce the fact that He is the Creator and source of all things. That is to say, the fact that "God is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and end of all things"⁷² does not undermine his incarnational role. In the same manner, Jacques Maritain emphasizes God's authority over creation when he states, "no earthly power is the image of God and deputy for God." He concludes, only God "is the very source of authority."⁷³ Notably, for Maritain true power is expressed in God; incarnation does not violate this fact. Hodgson says, "...God does not cease to be God in virtue of God's immanence in the world, so also the world does not cease to be the world in

⁷¹Gabriel Setiloane, "Salvation and the Secular," Buti Tlhagale and Itumeleng Mosala, eds., Hammering Swords into Ploughshares, pp. 73-83. This essay focuses on some essential cultural elements that are not at variance with the Gospel.

⁷²Ibid., p. 237.

⁷³Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 50.

virtue of the world's immanence in God."⁷⁴

The issue of incarnation is of theological interest to Allen. He poigantly explains the creator-creature relationship thus: "Because we and God are on different levels, union between us is impossible. The incarnation of God makes it possible. The incarnate God is God, and yet God is on our level because God is human."⁷⁵ Allen employs the analogy of intersecting planes to show how "the divinity and the humanity are combined in a single being who is both fully divine and fully human." The analogy depicts the "Word of God bringing God down to the human level."⁷⁶ Further, he considers the "love of justice itself" as the basis of "assimilation with God." Similarly, Gutierrez points out that "the incarnation, humanity, every human being, history, is the living temple of God. The "pro-fane, " that which is located outside the temple, no longer exists."⁷⁷ The act of incarnation invalidates dual distinction between the sacred and profane, since it aims at raising the humans to a state of righteousness through God's grace and Christ's loving and forgiving power.

⁷⁴Peter C. Hodgson, God in History, p. 250.

⁷⁵Diogenes Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World, (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), p. 198.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988), p. 110.

The incarnational understanding of God, who chose to be involved in human social location, by being in partnership with humankind, takes "tsimu" as a vehicle for the work of the Gospel in the sense that it provides the context for diverse social, religious and political witness of the ongoing projects of freedom in history. The projects of freedom based on justice are not an antithesis to the teachings of the Gosepel. So, in "tsimu" Christ is present in transfroming power. For this reason, H. R. Niebuhr's fifth depiction of Christ as the transformer of culture is appropriate here. Niebuhr explains, that "...the power of the Lord transforms all things by lifting them up to himself." He states in part:

"This is what human culture can be--a transformed human life in and to the glory of God. For man it is impossible, but all things are possible to God, who created man, body and soul, for Himself, and sent his Son into the world that the world through him might be saved."⁷⁸

Christ is both a norm and a prophetic critic of "tsimu" by offering a constant corrective-vision for "tsimu" alternative community. We argue that "tsimu" like any political system must be tested against the Christo-praxis standards inherent in the Gospel. This is necessary because in the event of an interminable cultural conflict Christ provides resourses for adjudicating the conflict. Thus, to equate Christ with any culture is to run the risk of producing a

⁷⁸H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1951), pp. 195-196.

cultural theology⁷⁹ that serves sectional interests rather than all the people of God. To avoid this danger, "tsimu" political coalition seeks to create diversity-in-unity, broad enough to accommodate all the contending political groupings-- a coalition that would be based on Christ-spirited solidarity and mutuality, thereby promoting liberational action.

Christ relates to "tsimu" in the same way he relates to democracy. Western thinkers have closely associated Christianity with democracy. In a speech, Wallace said, "the idea of freedom...is derived from the Bible with its extraordinary emphasis on the dignity of the individual. Democracy is the only true expression of Christianity."⁸⁰ Bergerson expressed the same idea by stating that "democracy is evangelical in essence and its positive motive power is love."⁸¹ For Maritain like Bergerson, "...democracy is linked to Christianity and that the democratic impulse has risen in human history as a temporal manifestation of the inspiration

⁷⁹The Dutch Reformed Church's theological support of apartheid nationalism is one of the examples in our time for cultural theology. Such theology reduces Christ to be a servant of an ethnic culture. We have to be constantly aware of how tradition and culture have been used as instruments of oppression. Our task is not only one of retrieving past culture, but also to develop both critical discernment and suspicious attitude toward the oppressive power of culture. This attitude will enable us to preserve only those cultural elements that promoted wholeness based on justice in accordance with the virtues of the Gospel.

⁸⁰Henry A. Wallace, "The Price of Free World Victory," speech delivered on May 8, 1942, before the Free World Association. Wallace was the Vice-President of the United States.

⁸¹Henri Bergerson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), p. 271.

of the Gospel."⁸² These thinkers believe that Christ is the leaven in a true democracy. Undeniably, the same Christ whom the thinkers link to democracy works effectively in "tsimu" also. Both democracy and "tsimu" stand under the spotlight of the judgment of God.

Niebuhr's statement, "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination for injustice makes democracy necessary"⁸³ also applies to "tsimu." That is to say, like democracy "tsimu" is necessitated by human inclination toward sin and human capacity for justice or good. On the basis of reality "tsimu" seeks to be an alternative political system, in a context of social and political instability, to erect the mechanisms of checks and balances and yet remain honest to its indigenous African traditional reality.

Democracy as understood in the West has not been attractive in Africa because of its failure to appropriate the language and traditional concepts as a political entry-point into the African context. African leaders have simply paid lip service to the idea of democracy because they have not discovered effective ways of making it work as a political system in the African context due, in part, to the primacy of traditional ethic of community over individual personhood.

⁸²Jacques Maritain, Christianity and Democracy, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 28-29.

⁸³Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and of Darkness, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. xiii.

"Tsimu" can be the bridge that unites Christianity and African culture. It may also be the basis for a new political system in South Africa.

The "tsimu" event draws its resource and support from the following: (1) The African religio-traditional practice that emphasizes community, individual obligation, and promotion of human well-being and the importance of the humans; (2) African and Black theologies both of which seek to understand the implications of the Gospel of Jesus Christ embellished in the African idiom and how it gets translated in their everyday lives of cultural uprootedness, alienation, the scourge of political oppression and coups; (3) the continued dialogue between the African and Western theologians and Christians in seeking to bear witness to Christ in a common inhabited world. These resources help "tsimu" to move beyond its limited confines in order to borrow and to appropriate what is redemptive from other contexts, political systems and peoples. The call by African theologians for the Africanization of the Christianity should be accompanied by a corresponding will in the Africanization of democracy or socialism. We contend that both can be grounded in "tsimu." In our judgment, it does not make sense to attempt to indigenize Christianity in Africa while ignoring the politics. Those who feel alienated by a religion that fails to address them in their particular conditions are equally alienated by a heteronomous political system. An authentic Africanization is not simply a

translation of the Bible into an African language; it means "...a sustained articulation of faith which would bear the marks of an original African experience."⁸⁴ Similarly, the Africanization of any political system means more than just uncritical application of it (the system) to the African situation. For this reason, "tsimu" event offers hope for South Africa, since it is built on the foundation of the true African democracy deeply rooted in indigenous political practice.

CONCLUSION

"The idea that I think we need today in order to make decisions in political matters cannot be the idea of totality, or unity, of a body. It can only be the idea of multiplicity or diversity...."⁸⁵

In this project, we inquired into the societal visions and their corresponding theological understandings of four black political and three religious leaders. The inquiry has focused on their respective political and religious understandings and the positions they took in their opposition against apartheid. Since their political and religious understandings are strikingly diverse and their societal visions in conflict, the inquiry seeks to determine whether or not co-operative liberation is necessarily in jeopardy given

⁸⁴Kwesi A. Dickson, Theology in Africa, p. 120.

⁸⁵Quoted in Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 156.

their divergent and often conflictual political and religious positions. More importantly, we seek to discern whether their thought is necessarily irreconcilable? If not, the issue was how might their divergent philosophies be affirmed and enhanced while maintaining and supporting co-operative action.

The analysis of the political and theological thought of the leaders has revealed that the leaders adopted approaches that they deemed appropriate in their opposition against apartheid. These approaches and strategies were not necessarily complimentary, since the government's divide and rule method has effectively destroyed any potential ground for co-operative emancipatory action. In order to maintain the tactic of separation as a guarantee of its survival, the government distributed favors of status, modicum power and material benefits to those who were tolerant of and acquiescent to it. Gatsha and Mokoena exhibit collaborative orientation due to their special relations to the government while others are not. Failure to focus on apartheid context within which the leaders articulated their respective responses heightens the risk of perverting their thought immensely.

Furthermore, this study shows that all the leaders in this study have been influenced and shaped, to some degree, by the Church. This makes the reference to Christ explicitly essential in our examination of these leaders. Thus, the appropriation of the African concept of *tsimu* provides the

basis for speaking about coalitional politics, which is not necessarily an antithesis to **Christo-community** but enhances and makes it relevant to the indigenous African christians. As we have seen, the **tsimu** event affirms diversity while advocating co-operative action. The World Council of Churches is the contemporary example of church coalition in which the convergence of diversity and co-operative action operate. The Republicans and Democrats in the American political context offer an example of the political plurality based on the principle of participatory democratic system. We cite these examples to show that the nature of the restored community does not necessarily imply conformity, that, like these institutions there is a way of forging co-operation without sacrificing diversity. That, is to say, integrative assimilation where difference is rendered irrelevant does not necessarily guarantee political stability. We argue that the vision of the good society is one that affirms tribally and culturally plural networks exemplified in the urban South African life. This understanding is informed by the political reality that the differences among the ANC, PAC and Inkatha will not easily disappear because there are fundamental principles at stake. However, emancipatory coalitional politics in which their respective philosophies are brought together in the service justice is urgently desired.

The "tsimu" event purports to demonstrate that coalitional politics is rooted in the very stuff and substance

of the African community life. Hence, it is a prerequisite for co-operative action aiming at a plural political system in which people, irrespective of ideological affiliations, participates in the interest of the common good.

It is worthy to note that in this chapter we appealed and appropriated both African and Christian symbols in order to find a morally justified ground for authentic co-operative activity. Such an appeal recognizes the transforming power of these symbols. These symbols offer the vision of reconciled community of promise deeply rooted in Christo-praxis. The vision of such a reconciled community implies, as both African and Christian symbols indicate, commitment to full moral and intellectual conversion tempered by freedom, equality and justice. Ostensibly, such moral conversion of the leaders should be demonstrated by the leaders' unflinching support for coalitional solidarity, which would strengthen their mutual relationship and promote healthy dialogue among them to prevent self-defeating and unproductive conflicts.

We conclude that coalition is an essential condition for the elimination of apartheid and may certainly serve as the basis of the long-awaited new South African community.

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